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ABSTRACT
In order for democracy to perform as it should, the press
must provide citizens with a diverse range of information.
The democratic process is enhanced, if the press is
independent of both the state and the market. A study of
the issues in state-press relations and how these relations
may prevent the press from performing its democratic
function, lies at the centre of this work. In an
authoritarian society in transition such as Taiwan, where
the press is subjected to state control, these issues are of
central importance.
This study aims to examine the democratic relationship
between the press and politics in Taiwan and its relevance
to the democratic process. It focuses on three areas: (1)
what is the nature of state control over the press, (2) how
have the boundaries of control shifted as the state is faced
with a more vigorous civil society influenced by the
development of the democratic movement as well as the
growing role of market forces, and (3) to what extent the
press has played a role in the development of Taiwanese
democracy.
A multi-method research design is set out in an attempt
to understand the changing political and economic role of
the press. Intensive library research and a detailed
content analysis of administrative records were conducted in
order to examine the mechanisms of press control exercised
by the party-state over both the mainstream and alternative
media. Moreover, an ethnographic approach is used to enable
a study of state-press relations which focuses on the
reporting of politics.
We conclude that the confrontation between the party-
state and civil society has altered the close links between
the Nationalist Party, the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) and the press.
The transformation of state-press relations marks a change
from direct control by the party-state to a form of market
censorship, with the party-state manipulation of the press
shifting from regulation and censorship to news management.
In the years before the rule of martial law, the party-state
exercised power over the press by means of its licensing of
newspapers, giving financial support to the press industry,
and seducing proprietors through the provision of political
and economic favours. By the late 1980s, the strategies of
public relations had become important for a party-state
which was undermined by an increasingly aware populace and
was faced with a less manageable press. Finally, we suggest
that unless newspaper barons are willing to distance
themselves from the party-state and divert power to
journalists; and the journalists are willing to rely on
professional judgement and to energetically pursue facts,
the press will exercise little impact on making the party-
state more accountable to the public during Taiwan's
transition to a democratic society.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
RESEARCH PURPOSE
Media democracy is an integral part of a democratic society.
The essence of democracy lies in citizens' right to gain
access to information upon which they make rational
political decisions. Underpinning this assumption, is the
idea that the media enhance the democratic process by
providing citizens with a space in which they can contribute
to the shaping of public culture and render governments
accountable.
This ideal vision of the marketplace of ideas is
undermined, however, because the media are subject to state
and market censorship (Garnham, 1990; Habermas, 1989; Keane,
1991). In democratic societies, the problem begins as news
organizations compete for audiences and advertising revenue.
By maximizing profits, newspapers tend to provide the
familiar and simple news their audiences and advertisers
want. Consequently, market competition prevents reporters
from supplying the kind of news that would allow citizens to
practice sophisticated citizenship. Apart from economic
competition, state intervention in journalism through legal
censorship and news management also affects the press's
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autonomy in political reporting. Consequently, the media
are not always able to provide the range of views needed to
meet the conditions of an informed democracy.
In fact, the defence of media independence from
political-economic pressures continuously needs to be worked
towards, especially in Taiwan, an authoritarian society in
which the state has traditionally controlled the media.
Between 1949 and 1987, Taiwan was under the rule of
martial law and civil society was absorbed into the party-
state, controlled by the Kuo Min Tang (KMT). During this
time, Taiwan was a society which lacked the necessary
institutional infrastructure, such as the free press,
independent judiciary and autonomous civil associations
required by a modern democracy. By the mid-1980s, a variety
of authoritarian legal constraints-- notably the thirty-
eight-year-old martial law was abolished, and rules for
democratic politics were gradually established. After
nearly four decades of authoritarian rule, a civil society
created by the opposition movement in which citizens might
advance their social interests and scrutinize the KMT's
conduct has emerged.
Taiwan is in democratic transition. Taiwan's
experience with democratization makes possible a
comprehensive understanding of issues relating to media and
democracy. The theoretical interest here is how and to what
extent the process of democratization in Taiwan has gained
from the rise of media power, or the democratic process has
been an impetus behind the development of an independent
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press.
This study aims to examine the political role of the
press in Taiwan's move toward democratization. In other
words, it is interested in understanding the relationship
between the press and politics in Taiwan and its relevance
to an informed citizenship. Three areas are focused on: (1)
what is the nature of state control over the press, (2) how
have the boundaries of control shifted as the state is faced
with a more vigorous civil society as well as the growing
role of market forces, and (3) to what extent the press has
played a role in the development of Taiwanese democracy.
The theoretical assumption underlying this study is
that the press is a contested terrain in which social
groups, especially those rich in political, economic and
cultural capital participate for political ends.
Furthermore, the linkage between the press and politics is
not simply evident at a structural level, but also is
affected by dynamic social situations. The long-term
relationship of the press to politics can be enriched by
adopting a system outlook (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1977).
However, an examination of the political institutions'
interaction with the press which takes place in the routine
practice of journalism can better capture the essence of the
changing nature of political influence (Schlesinger, 1990;
Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Therefore, this study
proposes that a theoretical perspective which combines
structural constraints and the dynamics of daily control is
appropriate in a study of the changing political and
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economic role of the press in Taiwan.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
This study is divided into seven substantive chapters which
engage with the three research questions set out above. In
Chapter Two, an overview of current western writing on state
interaction with the press is presented, raising issues
about the equality of access among citizens to information.
Beyond this, the state is viewed as a potential threat to
the press, because of its increased involvement in the
practice of journalism through news management and
censorship. In general, the debates on the political impact
on the media have centred around official-press relations.
Specifically, this chapter includes an important but largely
neglected area focusing on dissenting groups and their
interaction with the media.
Social and political contexts make possible a fuller
appreciation of issues regarding media, politics and the
problem of democracy. Therefore, Chapter Three provides a
sketch review of confrontations between civil society and
the state in Taiwan. The Nationalist Party, Kuo Min Tang
(KMT) has colonized civil society through its mobilization
of the political, economic and cultural state apparatuses
since 1949 when it retreated from mainland China. Through
sustained political opposition, civil society emerged in the
late 1970s, and began to undermine the one-party system by
the mid-1980s.	 Chapter Three demonstrates that only a
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democratic civil society can expand the freedom of the
press, and first and foremost sustain the democratic state.
By relating the history of politics and the press in
Taiwan, the fourth chapter focuses on the press system in
Taiwan examining the mainstream and alternative press. It
gives a historical account focusing on the changes to the
press system as it responded to the changing political,
economic and social circumstances between 1949 and 1992.
Control of the press under the KMT's authoritarian rule was
facilitated by a number of emergency decrees. Furthermore,
the party-state has intervened in the economics of the press
through the licensing and patronage systems, and regulated
journalistic performance through directly running the papers
or through a system of interlocking directorships by means
of instructions and warnings delivered at the negotiating
table or by telephone. Nevertheless, the KMT control over
the press began to decline by the early 1980s. This chapter
shows how market forces played a dual role in liberalization
of the press. On the one hand, economic interests
encouraged the papers to override political directives. On
the other hand, market forces also limited the range of the
press, driving the small radical press out of the market.
In a discussion of media and democracy, Chapter Four
also probes the contribution of the alternative media in
Taiwan towards the process of democratization.
Specifically, this chapter is concerned with the evolution
of the alternative media and their relationship with the
process of censorship.
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In the next three chapters, the daily interaction
between the press and politicians are scrutinized. An
ethnographic approach is adopted to look at the ways in
which the competing politicians make use of the press.
Chapter Five gives an account of the use of ethnography in
studying the reporting at politics. Chapter Six examines
the party-state's interaction with the press. The party-
state known as the Executive Yuan, the Presidency and the
ruling party headquarters are considered most difficult to
report due to the control of information. On these news
beats, journalists are denied access to top administrators,
instead, the information is released by the party-state
public relations machine.
In Chapter Seven consideration is given to the
Legislative Yuan which functions like the parliament in a
representative democracy. Here the battle between competing
groups, such as the political parties or lobbyists to win
media attention is examined.
Chapter Eight evaluates how and to what extent the
press in Taiwan has contributed towards the process of
political democratization. This begins with conclusions
which are drawn from an empirical investigation into the
party-state intervention in the press through legal control
or financial assistance or by routine news management.
Also, the last chapter attempts to provide some suggestions
for further research and speculates about how alternative
media are likely to accelerate current trends toward media
decentralization and democratization.
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METHODOLOGY
According to the theoretical approach mentioned previously,
a multi-method research design is required to gather
evidence. Apart from library research, the major empirical
research used in this study is based on three projects. The
first project deals with the evolution of the opposition
movement in Taiwan. This project was conducted in 1990 in
which the Taiwan Provincial Assembly Record and the
Legislative Yuan Record from 1957 to 1988 were subject to a
content analysis in order to gather evidence on the
political message articulated by the opposition legislators.
This evidence is cited in Chapter Three.
The second project, conducted between 1989 to 1990
aimed to examine how the Taiwanese newspapers portrayed the
opposition groups. This project consisted of an analysis of
the content of three newspapers from 1960 to 1988. Some of
the evidence gathered in this project is cited in Chapter
Four.
In the third project, an ethnographic approach was
adopted to study the reporting of politics. Direct
observation, interviews and a study of the content of seven
newspapers was conducted between September and December
1992. The field work is reported in Chapter Five, and the
findings are described in chapters Six and Seven.
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A NOTE ON PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In Taiwan, under martial law media democracy was seen as a
research area which was politically sensitive.
Consequently, there has been little intellectual effort
devoted to the study of media, politics and democracy.
This study differs from previous studies on Taiwanese
media and politics. The position adopted here is that the
context of social and political change has to be taken into
account to understand the political role of the press. Chen
Sheue-yun (1991b), Cheng Jei-cheng (1988), Jacobs (1976) and
Tien Hung-mao (1989) have attempted to map out the
institutional configurations in which the press operates in
terms of ownership and control; however, they fail to
identify that the party-state has controlled the press at
its foundation through the patronage system.
The contribution of alternative media in Taiwan's
political development is under-researched. Berman (1992)
and Lee Chin-chuan (1991) are two studies concerning the
evolution of Taiwan's alternative media. It seems that the
infrastructure of the alternative media is under-developed
in their studies. More importantly, they only concentrate
on the relationship between opposition magazines and state
control. The newly developed electronic media which are
used by the opposition to disseminate its political message
are largely neglected.
Taking a view of the dialectical control of news
production, this study considers not only how the ruling
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party makes use of the press, but also how the opposition
attempts to win media coverage. Surprisingly, there is
almost no academic work in either Chinese or English
devoted to examining the interaction between both the
ruling party and the opposition with the press on a daily
basis in Taiwan. As already mentioned, the lack of academic
attention to the relations between media and politics at the
system level is largely due to the legacy of censorship. By
contrast, part of the reason that researchers neglect the
importance of news management employed by either the party-
state or the opposition to exert influence over the press
lies in their research interest. Taiwan's academic
community seems to focus on studying the content of
political news, on the basis of which press-official
relations are generalized. Almost none of these studies
would involve an examination of press-official relations in
the real world.
The press in Taiwan changed much between 1949 and 1992.
There can be little doubt that the press in Taiwan has
become a vital part of the political system. Therefore, the
press can not be divorced from its links with political
institutions. Any attempt to loosen the political control
over the press still remains problematic. This study
attempts to add to our knowledge about the state of
citizenship, and the limits that exist on journalism and the
implications for both in the changing society of Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
STATE AND PRESS RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a theoretical perspective, drawing
upon current western writing in an attempt to apply it to
the changing political economy of the press in Taiwan. It
explores issues of media control and accessibility by
reviewing the literature on the connections between the
media, and the political and economic establishment in
general, and interaction of the media and source
organizations in particular. It also evaluates the
consequences of the media-source entanglement on the
possibilities for democratic communication.
The democratic role of the media is to serve society by
cultivating people for participatory democracy. The media
are central to the public sphere which has the function of
supervision of the conduct of the state and civil society.
The boundaries of public sphere are determined by the
interaction between the state and civil society. The
dynamics of the state and civil society are elucidated in
the first section of this chapter in order to offer a full
picture of how the democratic project which includes
political liberalization and freedom of communication is
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realized.
The emancipatory function of the media is bound up with
how the media system is organized in a specific social and
political context. The second part of this chapter looks at
how the broad economic and political structures interact
with the news media, and assesses their consequences for the
freedom of media operation. At the system level, because
the state and economy structure the news media through legal
regulation of media and market censorship, to what extent do
the media serve people with a special interest in the
politics and economy, rather than all citizens in a
democracy?
By challenging the viewpoint of structural restraints
on the media, discussion of the possibility for the media to
offer dissenting views shifts to the routine practice of
news gathering and processing. At the situational level,
media control and accessibility are informed by the daily
interaction between the news workers and the various sources
of information including the powerful and less powerful
groups involved in the negotiation of news.
THE STATE, THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC SPHERE
The conventional dichotomy of 'state' and 'civil society' is
used as an analytical tool by political sociologists and
political scientists to investigate the changing structures
and dynamics of social and political systems.
The concepts of the state and civil society are
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difficult to define precisely, since they are open to
differing interpretations. In the liberal tradition, the
state is associated with public affairs, and the civil
society is linked to the private domain (Bobbio, 1989:22-23;
Hall, 1984:20). Here, 'public' means everything which is
directly administered by the state, while 'private' is
defined as everything which is outside the control of the
state and is left to the voluntary arrangements made by
individuals. As a retreat from the public world, civil
society consists of two private spheres: the family and free
market economic transactions and social labour (Habermas,
1989:30). Under the principle of separation between public
and private, the state should not interfere in the family
where the personal, familial, emotional and sexual relations
are domestically cultivated; and the market where economic
transactions are self-regulated and self-articulated.
However, the boundaries between the state and civil
society are constantly changing. Therefore, the public and
private realms are not natural divisions, but socially and
historically constructed. Within any specific social and
historical conditions, civil society and the state are two
moments which interact in a complex way. In other words,
these two moments act separately but contiguously,
distinctly but interdependently to combine the social system
into a whole (Bobbio, 1989:43; Hall, 1984:23; Touraine,
1981:104). By taking this view, as the state colonizes
civil society, there is also a reverse process by means of
which civil society colonizes the state. 	 Although an
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asymmetry of power distribution between the state and the
civil society is to be expected, it will never be an
absolute domination of one over the other.
The notion of a state having permeated society has been
widely discussed, although the manner and scale of the role
which the state performs is historically specific. The
state is undeniably a messy concept. The state is defined
in terms either of its function, or what form it may take.
The way in which the state interacts with civil society is
depicted in terms of the state's functions. For instance,
the capitalist is conceived as the organizer who occupies a
crucial position between contradictory demands to safeguard
capitalist accumulation and to• secure political
legitimation. The major task of the capitalist state is to
create the conditions inwhich a certain way of life is
possible. For instance, economically, the state must secure
the conditions for reproduction of capital and maintain
capitalist accumulation. Politically and judicially, the
state must manage the crises created by specific forms of
class struggle and to serve the general interest of all
classes. Ideologically, the state must cultivate some sort
of social, moral and cultural basics in order to maintain
the unity and cohesion of social formation. Also, the state
has to carry out the task of maintaining its own legitimacy
(Frankel, 1982:257-258; Hall, 1978:205). Here, the state is
treated as a materialized concentration of the class
relations of a given society. In capitalist society, the
state acts more or less in favour of the basic interests of
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dominant classes, because state forms and activities
function for modes of production (Poulantzas, 1974:27), and
state elites are ideologically aligned with dominant classes
(Miliband, 1989:20).
As mentioned above, the state inevitably interferes in
the social, political and cultural relations of society.
The power with which the state actually influences civil
society is acquired legally. In other words, the state's
rule must be responsible to and framed by law.
From an institutional point of view, the state is a set
of administrative, policing and military organizations
coordinated by an executive authority through which
legitimate power is exercised within and over a given
territory (Held, 1989:41; Skocpol, 1993:310). Legally, the
state is considered as the sole monopolistic source of
coercive power. Firstly, the state is endowed with
sovereign power and entitled to rule within its own
boundaries. Sovereign power is a type of absolute and
enduring power, other centres of power must obtain a licence
or permit from it in order to function and exist. Secondly,
the state is endowed with the public power to defend itself
from external attack or to prevent its own internal
disintegration (Bobbio, 1989:61-75). Due to the fact that
the state is founded predominantly on 'legal authority' and
succeeds in consistently getting its orders obeyed, state
actions, whether carried out by the judiciary or
administrative apparatuses, can stretch across both public
and private domains.
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In addition to the legitimate monopoly of force, the
presence of an administrative apparatus which has the
function of taking care of the provision of public services
is another necessary constitutive element of the modern
state (Bobbio, 1989:61). The state enforces its authority
and power through the administrative apparatus which
embraces a wide range of functions. Politically, the state
is armed with a repressive apparatus which includes the
police, prisons, judiciary and civil service in order to
settle conflicts of interest and repress offences against
established law embodied in civil society.
Ideologically, the state may intervene in the
ideological apparatus for providing the common interest and
the supervision of morality. The State Ideological
Apparatus includes the educationalapparatus, the religious
apparatus (the churches), the information apparatus (radio,
TV, press), the cultural apparatus (cinema, theatre,
publishing), the trade-union apparatus, the family and so on
(Poulantzas, 1974:25). However, the manner and scope of
state intervention in civil society are very much dependent
on the historical conditions in which the state exists.
Economically, any state has to extract resources from
society in order to support its coercive and administrative
organizations. Therefore, the state has itself to link to
the economic apparatus in order to sustain the process of
accumulation and private appropriation of resources (Offe
and Volker, 1982:253-254).
In capitalist democracies, the state strongly links to
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individual members in civil society through its
infrastructure. Although state officials are functionally
and socially related to the dominant economic groups, the
power of state officers is largely controlled by the
electorate and by law. By contrast, in an authoritarian
society, the state elites are unaccountable and empowered to
undertake a wide range of actions without routine
institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.
Furthermore, the machinery of the state is endowed with
enormous capacity to coordinate and influence all areas of
social life (Mann, 1993:316-317).
Apart from the interference of the state, civil society
itself also has permeated the state. Theoretically, civil
society is seen as the private realm and the domain of the
life world, relatively separateand distinct from the state.
Also, civil society comprises both the domain of economic
relations and the intimate sphere of personal relation
anchored in the institution of the conjugal family
(Habermas, 1989:30). Civil society is a place where
economic, social, ideological and religious actions are
generated for maintaining a broad base of the state. But,
equally important is the fact that civil society is also a
place where new sources of legitimation and new sources of
consensus can be generated in order to make the state more
accountable (Bobbio, 1989:25). That is to say, it is within
the private realm that individuals and various
collectivities are able to participate in the articulation
of their needs and to pressure the state into meeting their
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needs and interests. If the state lacks the capacity for
solving the conflict which occurs in the civil society or
simply ignores the demands of that civil society, the state
experiences a crisis of legitimacy.
By reviving the concept of civil society, this is seen
in action terms as the domain of struggles, public spaces
and political process. Much attention focuses upon
emancipatory potential in the civil society. By taking this
view, the public sphere which mediates the state and civil
society is introduced. The public sphere is a space within
which public opinion is crystallized, thereby putting the
state in touch with the needs of society.
The public sphere sustained by a network of
institutions including libraries, press, parties and
parliament, is thus the arena in which individuals publicize
their needs and debate over issues affecting themselves.
The public sphere is distinct both from the public authority
of the state and the private realm of civil society, because
its concern is not with private interests but the public
good. Theoretically, the public sphere embodies the idea of
rational and universalistic politics (Habermas, 1989:73-74).
Only when a community of citizens can equally and freely
have access to and control over the public sphere can its
political function be achieved. By participating in
rational-critical discussion, the personal opinion of
private individuals may evolve into public opinion. Through
the vehicle of public opinion, the regulation of civil
society and the conduct of the state are effectively
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scrutinized.
The formation of collective actions or social movements
allows publics to engage in deliberation and decision making
in order to bring pressure to bear upon the state. A
movement is a collective enterprise launched by individuals
having a sense of their belonging to a wider collective and
building their future by challenging the appropriation of
production, of social resources, the logic of governance,
and the interpretation, control and implementation of social
knowledge exercised by the state (Giddens 1984:204;
Touraine, 1981:81). The individuals who participate in a
movement are no longer attributed to social classes, they
are defined by a specific social condition and culture. In
practice, the major task of movements in mobilization is to
recruit enough people - sharing a conflictual culture and a
collective identity. Resource mobilization is a process of
careful calculation and rational decision-making on the
control and use of money, personnel and information (Turner,
1981:8-18).
A movement is developed within the society, its members
are situated in the same social-historical contexts as their
adversaries (Touraine, 1981:77; 1985:785). The development
of movements is inevitably restrained by the social,
economic and political structures under which the movements
emerge. However, some form of political representation is
necessary for the survival of any movement. For instance,
the social and political environment is open enough to allow
the existence of individual and collective identities.
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Also, the movements must be able to maintain their autonomy,
rather than become institutionalized themselves. Moreover,
an open information system is necessary to circulate the
messages carried by movements. The movement itself is the
incarnation of public opinion, which in turn creates a
public space between the state and the civil society. This
space symbolizes the survival of societies and of cultural
differences.
Apart from social movements, the news media are
considered as another significant element of the public
sphere. Ideally, the media play a potentially emancipatory
role in society, because they have a potential influence
over the political establishment by the formation of a
discursive public sphere. According to the political
function of the public sphere, the media must be open to
all members of society and provide the rational discourse
through which citizens are cultivated to concern and
understand public affairs and to collectively pursue the
public good (Habermas, 1989:29-31; Park, 1940:684). Since
all private people are guaranteed to take part in rational-
critical debate by the free and equal use of the news media,
a critical consensus and a coherent opinion are effectively
crystallized.
In sum, the function of public opinion can be grasped
only in relation to the development of civil society and the
state in any specific historical situation. The dynamics of
public opinion channelled through social movements, mass
media, unions, or political parties are the means by which
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civil society calls the state to account. Without public
opinion, civil society loses its typical function; at the
extreme civil society is absorbed into the state and
saturated with official opinion. Therefore, the boundaries
of public opinion which are generated by social movements
and the mass media in the pursuit of public interest
influence the expansion and democratization of civil
society.
MEDIA CONTROL AND ACCESSIBILITY
In contemporary societies the media have become a major
institution of power. In serving democracy, the media are
expected to have substantial independent resources which
allow them to become an important institution of power. The
fact •that the media have been tightly interwoven with the
major institutions of power,--government and economy,
suggests that this media function in democracy has become
questionable.
As elaborated above, the news media serve democracy by
creating an undistorted communicative situation within which
citizens are cultivated to be concerned about and understand
public affairs in order to collectively pursue the public
good (Park, 1940:684). Put differently, a critical
consensus is achieved, the news media follow the rule of
rational discourse through which divergent and sufficient
political views are subject to open discussion, and all
individual citizens are guaranteed to gain access to the
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media freely and equally (Habermas, 1989:73-74).
Ideally, the media are regarded as a necessary
safeguard in a democratic society. The media offer a space
for the formation and articulation of public rational-
critical opinion which makes established power accountable
to the individual. To fulfil this function, the media must
to be open to all and free from domination.
However, this ideal situation of communication has been
undermined by an increase of state intervention and market
control over the media. From the political point of view,
the capitalist state becomes an active and major participant
in the development of an advanced capitalist society,
including those aspects of society structured and shaped by
political institutions (Hall, 1978:212-215; Offe and Volker,
1982:253-254). In the meantime, the state also becomes
increasingly assertive in the field of political
communication. For instance, apart from the old techniques
such as the system of licensing and state censorship, the
new strategies of public relations and opinion management
are widely adopted by the state to influence the market on
which the media rely on for news production (Habermas,
1989:196-197; Keane, 1992:19-21). Under such circumstances,
the media have been criticized for failing to provide sites
for public participation, because they generate a kind of
quasi public opinion, rather than a critical consensus.
From the economic point of view, market competition
produces market censorship that has undermined the practice
of the news media in public life. 	 Unrestrained market
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competition facilitates the exchange of opinion among those
who are financially powerful. Through the practice of
public relations and advertising, powerful interest groups
employ the media effectively and regularly and thus distract
the media from their pursuit of the general critical public
good. Furthermore, the integration of mass entertainment
with advertising has damaged the existence of the critical
consensus that the media once provided. To some extent, the
commercial media have devoted themselves to cultivating a
passive spectatorship which distracts the private
individuals from political action (Habermas, 1989:193-195).
In summary, control and accessibility of the news media
are determined by the political and economic contexts within
which the media operate. The relations between the media
and the state and economic structure have consequences for
the range of ideas available in the public arena. First,
state intervention in the media is seen as threatening to
narrow the field of public discourse; however, state
intervention is also a necessary evil to liberate the media
from market censorship. Secondly, the economic structure of
the media restricts the field of public discourse by
promoting certain commercially driven ideas over others.
1. A Structural View of State, Economic and Media
Relations
Political-economy approaches to media studies which involve
an examination of the complex connections between political
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and economic power and the media may offer an explanation of
how the public sphere is limited or liberated within these
boundaries of control.
(1) Control through Political Power
The political economy perspective primarily concentrates on
the impact of the economy on the media, with a consequent
neglect of political and legal determinants on news
production. In general, the impact of the political
establishment (designated as the state, the government,
political parties) upon journalism is both through legal
regulation of the media and informal control over news
production. The state, the government and the political
parties may exercise -their power over the news media by
direct control over ownership. Moreover, the political
establishment may control the media either through
management by representation on the media's policy-making
bodies or by imposing informal strategies on the media
(Gurevitch and Blumler, 1977:175-176). It is true that the
press-party parallelism exists in both the authoritarian
countries and democratic countries. Press partisanship is
evident in the authoritarian countries, because the ruling
party is involved in media ownership. By contrast, in
democratic countries, the fact is that press partisanship
does exist, although the media are not directly controlled
by political parties or the government. The evidence that
the press is biased in favour of certain political parties
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is based on a correspondence between the editorial policies
of newspaper and party lines, and given the party
affiliations of readers.
First and foremost, formal legal restraints on the
media are the most important factor in shaping the structure
and the content of the media. The notion of freedom of
communication is determined by the constitution and
legislation of every country. Legal constraints derive from
rules and regulations which define the rights and
obligations of the news media.
Regulation has become a new institution of social
control mediated through the state. In theory, regulation
is conceived of as a form of control which legally provides
the executive and judicial arms of the state with powers to
intervene in the private realm (Horwitz, 1989:42). To some
extent, apart from the laws, regulation also consists of the
rules which are implemented and made by some government
bodies (Michael, 1990:43). The scope and manner of
regulation needs to address the following questions: (1) the
range' of operation and content which are subject to
regulation; (2) the degree of specificity in regulation; (3)
who carries out the regulation and to what extent this
control system is used (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975:174-
175).
In general, according to most systems of regulation,
the government is empowered to intervene in the ownership
and content of the media (Michael, 1990:43). At first, the
state is authorized to decide on who is allowed, forbidden
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or required to communicate information. In terms of
ownership, licenced monopolies are seen as a traditional
method of government regulation. According to this system
of licensing, the government is authorized to create a body
of subsidiary legislation to define the scope of licences.
Moreover, the government is able to decide between rival
claimants for licenses, to approve and renew permits.
Secondly, the state is armed with laws which decide on
what kinds of information are allowed to be transmitted.
Broadly speaking, content censorship normally conducted by
the state is by means of prior restraint and post-
publication censorship (Keane, 1991:96). Strategies taken
by the state against the media prior to publication include
the friendly chat, gentleman's agreement, requests or
warnings and the issuing of mandatory guidelines. Post-
publication censorship operates from the time of the initial
publication of material to its dissemination. The
confiscation of publications and the printing machine are
normal practices. It may also lead to the closing down of
the media organizations and legal action being taken against
the communicators.
Legal constraints imposed by the government on the
media are wedded to the historical and political
circumstances surrounding them. The law relating to the
media varies greatly from one nation to another and from
time to time within the same country. For instance, in the
Eastern European countries, the national media were largely
interwoven with the Marxist-Leninist party and functioned as
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a conduit for party definitions of reality (Downing,
1984:11-15; Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1963:121-130).
Control of the press under these regimes was regulated by
specific laws. In the case of China and the Eastern Bloc,
formal legal restraints on the media have been explicit.
Freedom of the press in these countries was established in
constitutions and special press laws (Jakubowicz, 1990:50).
In the United States with its First Amendment tradition, the
media, especially the press, enjoy rights against
interference from the state. Nevertheless, the press must
respect values protected by the legal system. Furthermore,
press laws are usually formulated and are limited to an
ordering framework that legitimates state intervention in
the media in an attempt to sustain a variety of press
markets and eventually - to ensure freedom of the press.
In the authoritarian or communist states, the media
serve more or less directly as agents of state social
control. Therefore, state assistance is a necessary support
for the media to carry out this task (Jakubowicz, 1990:49-
50). In the capitalist and democratic societies, the state
will only interfere where there is a problem of monopolistic
power.
As already mentioned, the state has the function of
absorbing the costs of capital and ameliorating the harmful
effects of capitalism in a capitalist and democratic society
(Horwitz, 1989:41-42; Offe and Volker, 1982:253-254). Along
the same lines, state intervention in the economics of the
press is justified. Since the press market which once was
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conceived as a free marketplace of ideas has been hampered
by economic power, the state is allowed to intervene in the
press to ensure it is able to provide all citizens with the
same quality of information (Picard, 1985a; Sparks, 1992:47-
50).
For example, in Western Europe, especially in the
Nordic region, the state has played an active role in the
protection of a financially and culturally weak press from
competition in order to sustain the health of the newspaper
industry. In these countries, the manner of state
intervention in the economics of the press include some of
the following: (1) funds to help train journalists, (2) the
provision of aid and information to newspapers by government
public information personnel, (3) postal rate reductions,
telecommunications advantages and exemptions from sales
taxes and profits are introduced to help the press reduce
operation costs, and (4) the provision of funds including
subsides, loans and grants to help cover newspapers'
operating expenses (Picard, 1985a:101-108; 1985b).
In practice, an increase of state involvement in the
media*, especially the press where once there had been little
governmental interference, is still regarded as a
potentially dangerous aspect of political influence on the
media. With a growing awareness that potential abuses of
state power over private media markets exist, state media
intervention must be both open and accountable (Keane,
1992:241).
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(2) Control through Economic Power
Traditionally, the media operating in the free market are
seen as a safeguard against state interference. In a
pluralistic society, commercial media serve as primary means
of communication for citizens. However, in the face of the
accumulation of economic power in the media market, such as
the growth of monopoly control, the concentration of
ownership and the need to pursue and secure a share of the
audience market, a media system dominated by private
ownership is no guarantee of providing the diversity of
information that is essential for effective citizenship.
2.1 The Structure of Ownership
Over the last two decades, newspaper proprietorship has
become both more concentrated and more closely integrated
with core segments of economic and financial capital
(Bagdikian, 1985:100; Curran, 1978:73; Murdock, 1982:140).
Three main types of interlocking relationships between the
media and economic sectors are found, and each of these
three types fulfil a particular function (Murdock, 1980:51;
1990:4-5). For example, the media which connect to
financial services, such as banks and insurance companies
offer sources of advice and provide channels for the
negotiation of insurance, loans etc. on favourable terms.
Also, the media which link to suppliers, competitors and
others in the immediate business environment exert influence
28
on the formation of corporate financial policy. Moreover,
since the media are integrated into the wider network of
monopoly capital, they are unlikely to avoid playing a role
in generating both solidarity and a common consciousness
among the various segments.
Apart from a narrow and uniform ownership of the media,
it seems that the prevailing market dynamics operate in
favour of the existing media and against newcomers gaining
entry into the market (Murdock, 1980:59). Generally, the
established media have large financial resources and
accumulated expertise that enable them to effectively cope
with the changes in the market. More importantly, the
established media have already an established position in
the market, and financial consolidation may enable them to
buy out rivals at above the market rate. 	 As for the
disadvantaged groups, the chances of survival in the
marketplace can be limited. Firstly, the level of
investment required to enter the market can be too high and
too risky for many groups (Curran, 1978:104). Secondly, the
advertisers tend to place advertising with established
newspapers rather than with newcomers, therefore, economic
survival of newcomers is fragile (Sparks, 1992a:45). Since
the dynamic inequalities inherent in competition between
weak and strong media is unlikely to be neutralized, the
media environment necessarily diminishes the availability of
new ideas in the marketplace.
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2.2 Advertising Control
Another important structural constraint which limits the
operation of the media derives from the dynamics of supply
and demand in the commercial market (Murdock, 1982:124).
Like all enterprises in a capitalist economy, the media are
profit-making enterprises that have significantly changed
the form and content of the media (Bagdikian, 1985:104).
The commercial media not only need to produce
information, but also have to ensure this information is
marketable and sellable. As a consequence, profit and
advertising are the fundamental and intractable forces which
shape the nature of media product either in its form and
content.
Competition for advertising patronage has significantly
narrowed down the range of ideas in the media (Bagdikian,
1985:104). Since the media sell their audiences to
advertisers, the media have to narrow the desired audience
for the advertisers by controlling the nature of their
content. In this way, the media product is determined by
the advertisers who represent the capitalist groups, rather
than the consumers those who express their demands in a free
marketplace.
In the United Kingdom, the development of the
commercial press has resulted in two separate markets: the
quality press and the tabloid press. The quality papers
which depend on part on advertising revenues to finance
their publications tend to attract affluent minorities by
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providing cultural and political information while paying
little attention to the poor. By contrast, the tabloid
papers which rely on the cover price for their main revenues
tend to focus on non-informational content in order to
maximize the size of audience. Consequently, those readers
who numerically are not large enough for the mass
advertisers and yet are not wealthy enough to interest the
luxury advertisers are denied access to the papers (Sparks,
1992a:40-42).
One common strategy which has been adopted by the new
media competing for a steadily shrinking market against a
background of rapidly increasing costs, is to broaden their
circulation by appealing to the widest possible cross-
section of readership. By so doing, more space is given
over to content with a common denominator to increase the
circulation. For instance, under this market pressure, the
left media have altered their content to be depoliticalized
and deradicalized in an attempt to serve large audiences for
advertisers (Curran, 1980:102-104). More importantly, the
proportion of space devoted to human interest material has
increased at the expense of public affairs coverage (Curran,
1991a:116). Much media attention has been concentrated on
some areas of political life and consumption, such as
health, fashion, leisure, personal relations, holidays and
so on (Murdock, 1980:59). Furthermore, in news reporting
current events are portrayed as a matter of recency and
speed. Therefore, the news is an account seemingly without
a process and history which are crucial elements in the
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development of a critical consensus for citizenship (Curran,
1978:74). In addition, intense market competition has
changed the character of television news substantially. For
instance, in America, television evening news has a greater
attention on ordinary people's health and family life,
rather than focusing on people in politics. Stories on
crime, heroism or tragedy still are highlighted in news
bulletins. The dramatic change in journalistic practice is
that the journalist no longer presents himself or herself as
a neutral person but increasingly shares the emotions of the
audience (Hallin, 1992:22).
2.3 Control through Interlocking Directorships
Media control and accessibility is not merely a structural
phenomenon related to economic and political structures. It
is also that power elites, particularly those in the realms
of government and the economy are allowed to gain access to
the daily operation of news media in a way that ordinary
citizens do not. The people who are leading members of
political or economic power blocs also exert influence on
the media on a daily basis by means of interlocking
directorships: people who are owners of media corporations,
journalistic executives and creative communicators.
The key individuals and groups of news media
proprietors share the same interests and general outlook as
the dominant blocs within the capitalist class. Therefore,
the capitalist class may interfere with media practice by
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having interlocking directorates with the people who own the
media or hold high ranking positions in the media. For
instance, media proprietors are in constant contact with the
business community through sharing a similar social
background, education, circle of friends, and way of life.
The elites in the realms of media and economics share a
cluster of common values and perspectives (Dreier, 1983:443-
448; Murdock, 1980:45; 1982:124).
Furthermore, the owners of the media have property
rights to control their own media and output, either by
intervening in day to day operations, or by establishing
general goals and appointing staff to implement them
(Murdock, 1980:43-45). In reality, press owners may
intervene in the operation of their own papers for promoting
their private intere-st (Golding and Murdock, 1992:23).
Apart from exercising power over their own media, owners are
able to control competitors. In general, the major moguls
have • advantages in establishing the rules for the
competitive game. Meanwhile, they have the economic power
to drive out the small and weak competitors in the
marketplace by launching expensive campaigns, offering
discounts to advertisers or buying up key personnel (Golding
and Murdock, 1992:24).
It is equally true that advertisers can exert power to
censor the news media in their favour. For instance,
American media were silent about the medical evidence on
tobacco use in order to protect a major advertiser
(Bagdikian, 1985:107). 	 In the United Kingdom, examples
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demonstrated that advertisers intervene in television
production in order to get their message into the programmes
themselves. Common tactics adopted by advertisers include
some of the following: sponsoring a sporting or cultural
event for television in return for screen credits, financing
original programme production, paying to have products
displayed or used naturally in a feature film or television
drama. and so on (Murdock, 1992a:36-37; 1992b: 205-207).
Generally, the assumption of a relationship between
patterns of control and patterns of content is confirmed by
the data which derives from the analysis of media content,
rather than examining the concrete activities which are
performed to exert influence on the media practice (Garnham,
1990:6-9; Murdock, 1980:42; 1982:144-148). News media
proprietors are integrated into social or political elites
and usually adopt a similar ideological position. The
opportunities of gaining access to the media are largely
given to dominant groups through which they have a strong
influence on the shaping of political, economic and social
reality.
	
For example, news is predominantly about the
actions and opinions of political elites, rather than
financial and industrial elites 	 (Murdock,	 1980:61).
Furthermore, news media endorse the ideology that
legitimates the dominance of certain groups as well as
ignoring, discrediting, marginalizing or problematizing the
opinions or actions of non-dominant groups. Therefore, the
media attempt to reinforce political and social norms by
mobilizing public to marginalize radical groups.
	 For
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instance, in coverage of industrial news, the structural
position between capital and labour is regularly transformed
into a simple political confrontation between 'them' and
'us', citizens versus bureaucracy, the moderate majority
versus the militant minority, the law-abiding versus the
deviant (Murdock, 1982:147). Also, taking a particular view
of social structure and process, the media tend to transform
structural inequalities into individual difference (Curran,
1978:74). As a consequence, the media fail to reflect the
diversity of ideas in the society.
It is true that the media are strongly interwoven with
different key social institutions. It is equally true that
the consequences of these relationships with both the state
and the economic have significantly eroded the media's
commitment to provide all citizens with high quality of
impartial information. However, neither the market nor the
state are uniform or omnipotent structures. Moreover, an
examination of news content is not sufficient to explain the
logic of determination or mediation between market and state
censorship and diversity of ideas. Therefore, in
understanding the fact that the media serve established
power, not just in its structural features, a greater
attention to the interaction of sources and media in the
social organization of news work and actual practices of
creating the news product is necessary.
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2. The Dialectic of Control of Source-Media Relations
A theory of news production cannot be properly developed
unless the notion of the dialectic of control is taken into
account. The news making processes either within or between
organizations are connected with the organization of power.
By taking this view, it is in the relationships between the
powerful and less powerful members of society designated as
the state and the civil society, the state and the media,
news organizations and news sources, even journalists and
editors and newsworkers and publishers etc., that negotiated
control over the definition of social reality takes place.
The argument that the news media are the extended
social relations of the ruling apparatus is based on the
analysis of strategies and perspectives used by the news
media for the gathering of news, or the ability of power
elites in the realms of government and the economy to exert
influence on journalistic performance.
(1) Media Dependence on Authoritative Sources
A stream of studies in source-media relations tends to
concentrate on the viewpoint of news organizations. Due to
the fact that the news media are spatio-temporally linked to
the bureaucratic routines of legitimate authorities, news is
a potentially important instrument for government agencies
in the shaping of public opinion.
Drawing on phenomenological, ethnomethodological and
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symbolic interactionalist perspectives, Fishman (1980, 1981,
1982), Lester (1980), Molotch and Lester (1974a, 1974b), and
Tuchman (1972, 1973, 1978, 1982) propose that news is
constructed reality, and it is pre-constituted by the
powerful institutions.
At first, news is regarded neither as a reflection nor
as a distortion of reality. Within this paradigm, reality
does not exist by itself, but it is constituted through the
process of news gathering or news production. Therefore,
the news making process is perceived as a series of
activities by which the newsworkers define social events,
rather than merely record them. For instance, when
newsworkers are faced with events, they immediately invoke
routines in order to handle these happenings. That is,
newsworkers transform happenings into a meaningful structure
that has potential as a news event. Also, such raw material
should be capable of being subjected to routine processing
and dissemination. The source organizations which routinely
provide events for newsworkers to report on also operate in
the same way.
Within this research paradigm, empirical studies
involving an examination of the routine activities of news
gathering demonstrate that the news organizations are
spatio-temporally constrained by their relations to
legitimate bureaucracies. Since the media are reliant on
the powerful and legitimate institutions for raw materials
to produce the news, the bureaucratically created and
ideologically embedded versions of news are easier to get
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across to the public. Therefore, they conclude that the
news media reinforce official versions.
1.1 The Organizational Level
As mentioned previously, news organizations are embedded in
an environment within which they interact with other
institutions. The concepts of 'the news net' and 'the news
beat' are used to explain how the rhythm of newsmaking is
embedded at the intersection of news organizations and
legitimate institutions.
Theoretically, a news net is a special kind of spatio-
temporal arrangement adopted by the news organization to
plan the use of both human and physical resources and so
control the flow of work (Tuchman, 1978:25; 1982:6). In the
business of newsmaking, the news organization schedules its
work in time and space by administering a news net to
identify social phenomena and to organize elements of
everyday occurrences as news. The news net imposed by the
news organization to recognize news events inevitably
constrains news production, despite the private intention of
the individual newsworkers.
By studying the anchoring of the news net in time, the
news organizations are found to have a close relationship
with political and economic institutions. For instance, the
time-rhythms between news organizations and legitimate
institutions are so compatible that the framing of news is
subservient to the industrialization of time (Tuchman,
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1982:7; 1983:334). Furthermore, news organizations have a
large amount of personnel and physical resources available
to cover the stories which happen during business hours.
Therefore, the occurrences which take place during normal
business hours, 9 AM to 6 PM during weekdays possess a
greater potentiality to become news.
But, Tuchman (1983:335) admits that the media may
possess some degree of autonomy, especially when they have
to work out a frame for an unexpected occurrence. Under
such circumstances, news organizations have to suspend
previous frames, because they no longer are adequate to
order new experiences. Moreover, in real situations more
than one definition of time is always available. Therefore,
many organizations make attempts to justify and to claim
that their definitions of time are applicable.
For the purpose of economic investment, news
organizations recognize news events through the anchoring of
the news net in space. Generally, the news organizations
wed themselves to specifically territorial and institutional
beats including civic, state, national or international
sites, through which a huge amount of information conceived
of having a significant consequence for the public use is
efficiently gathered.
By examining the scheduling structures of news
organizations, the evidence shows that this is closely
connected to the institutional structures of the powerful,
such as government agencies and other legitimate social and
political institutions (Tuchman, 1982:6).
	 For instance,
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news organizations allocate a vast majority of resources to
cover the news which occurs at those institutional locations
indicated above, but not at other sites. In general,
government agencies are targeted, because government
business is assumed to be significantly influential on
ordinary people's daily lives. Moreover, newsworkers have
a tendency to work with legitimate institutions, because
their information is stored in a form that is readily
accessible in the light of their scarce resources
(Tuchman,1978). The high degree of predictability of
prescheduled activities are very often grounded in
bureaucratic settings. Since the legitimated social and
political institutions are identified as a reliable and
steady source of news, the news organizations are assumed to
provide an image of reality which favours the status quo.
Taking a similar view, Fishman (1980,1981,1982) and
Roshco (1975:67) suggest that the official point of view is
reinforced by news beat reporting. The source organizations
such as government agencies organize a social world in which
reporters work. This bureaucratically structured
arrangement inevitably restricts journalistic conduct. A
news beat is defined either by geography or by the subject
matter which a reporter is assigned to cover and to work
with their sources. They argue that when newsworkers face
situations which have no clear beginning or end, they
usually adopt an idealized 'phase structure', that is break
down the situations into discrete steps.	 The phase
structure is created by the source organizations to
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transform complex occurrences into procedurally defined
events. However, such bureaucratic phase structures are
significantly taken by newsworkers as a criterion of
newsworthiness. For instance, by covering crime news,
journalists usually obtain crime incidents from law
enforcement agencies, such as the police (Fishman, 1981:107-
108). Furthermore, on the police and court beats, crime
news is organized through bureaucratic procedures, each
beginning with an arrest and ending with sentencing
(Fishman, 1980:54-63). Moreover, in City Hall and County
government, methods used by newsworkers to view the
newsworthiness of occurrences are based on schemes of
interpretation which originate from and are used by those
institutions.
	 Consequently, non-events which take place
outside the formal procedures are treated as illegitimate
occurrences (Fishman, 1982:231-235). Therefore, routine
news legitimates the existing political order by
disseminating bureaucratic definitions of the world and
filtering out troublesome perceptions of events. Because
newsworkers are seduced by the social arrangements of source
organizations, they are deprived of seeing a different or
contradictory reality.
In sum, the framing of news is subservient to the
rhythms of source organizations, especially those of the
legitimate agencies. Therefore, news can be viewed as a
practical and political accomplishment. If news reflects
anything, it mainly reflects the practice of the reporters
on the beat, because the news media spatio-temporally rely
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on the government agencies and legitimate authorities for
information, power elites in the realm of government can
more easily gain access to the media than other less
powerful groups in society.
1.2 The Individual Level
The power of the authorities is inherent in the gathering of
news. The content of much news is generated as a by-product
of the exercise of authority.
In the process of fact-finding, newsworkers engage with
the practical rather than theoretical activities that make
sense of the world. In science, the problem of facticity is
embedded in the process of verification and replication. In
news, verification of facts is both a political and a
professional accomplishment (Park, 1940:699; Roshco, 1975;
Tuchman, 1978). Unlike in science where knowledge is the
result of systematic investigation, news is a form of
knowledge that the newsworkers depend upon news sources for
transposing into content.
In practice, two strategies are adopted by newsworkers
to build up facticity (Tuchman, 1978:88-89). In the first
place, newsworkers use more facts to validate an alleged
source fact. That is, newsworkers accumulate facts, then
constitute a web of facticity by establishing cross-
references. In the second place, newsworkers attempt to
intermesh fact and source, especially regarding any facts
that are unable to be verified in a short period of time.
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Basically, the identification of the source is a matter
of convention. During the process of the gathering of news,
newsworkers consistently choose authoritative sources over
other potential sources, such as quasi-legitimate sources or
average citizens. Newsworkers believe that some people
especially in positions of authority, offer information that
is more accurate, because they have more facts at their
disposal (Tuchman, 1978:93), or they control a flow of
information from one part of a social network to another
(Gans, 1979:130-131; Roshco, 1975:62; Sigal, 1986:20).
Furthermore, newsworkers assume that in legitimate
organizations information is more accurate, because they are
socially and politically significant constituents (Tuchman,
1978:93), or information there is more accessible, because
it has been in a form ready for transcription (Murphy,
1978:178; Sigal, 1986:178).
However, if the individual becomes a news source, he or
she has to make contact with newsworkers and prove his or
her reliability as a news source (Murphy, 1978:117; Tuchman,
1978:93). Most routine events are deliberately promoted by
political or bureaucratic sources. To accomplish routine
events, the event needs news promoters (political or
bureaucratic sources) and news assemblers (newsworkers) both
being complementary with each other (Molotch and Lester,
1974a,1974b). Therefore, the news media routinely carry
stories that are defined by the institutionalized power as
public events.
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(2) The Dynamics of Media and News Sources
In contrast to the previous perspectives paying much
attention to the newsworkers gaining access to the
authorities sources, some more recently developed approaches
focus on how the authorities deliberately exploit the news
media for making publicity. By taking this view, the power
relations between the news media and the powerful or less
powerful source organizations are conceived of as a kind of
dialectic of control, rather than just focusing upon the
actions of the media or of the source per se. Put
differently, news production is a contestable field within
which sources, including the powerful and less powerful
organizations, are able to have access to the media to
construct their preferred meaning and to promote news events
for public use (Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1989;
Schlesinger,	 1990;	 Schlesinger	 and	 Tumber,	 1994;
Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock, 1991).
Much attention has highlighted the access government
enjoys to the news media, at the expense of perspectives and
media strategies adopted by the less powerful groups
(Schlesinger, 1990:76). For example, this is shown in
studies of reporter-source relations in news reporting
surrounding election campaigns (Gurevitch and Blumler,
1982), the criminal justice field (Ericson, Baranek and
Chan, 1989; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994; Schlesinger,
Tumber and Murdock, 1991), legislature (Cook, 1989; Ericson,
Baranek and Chan, 1989), local government (Murphy, 1978) and
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the state (Bruce, 1992; Hess, 1984; Keane, 1992; Mancini,
1991; Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott, 1983; Sigal, 1973;
Tiffen, 1989).
1.1 Official Sources
Recently, the fact that modern state intervention in the
media by means of information management and public
relations practice have received a much greater emphasis.
The state is not only a regulator of the media, it is
itself a communicator. Therefore, in addition to old
tactics, such as secrecy or censorship imposed by state
authorities or government agencies on the media, new
techniques of information management including public
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relations practice and image making have been regularly
exercised by the state or government agencies to promote
their own views of the development of policy and ensure the
policy is properly understood and supported (Bruce, 1992;
Hess, 1984; Keane, 1992; Schlesinger, 1991; Schlesinger,
Murdock and Elliott, 1983). To some extent, state
intervention in defining and regulating political
information is seen as a new source of power which is
neither accountable to the legislature, nor subject to the
rule of law (Keane, 1991:95). Therefore, state mechanisms
for powerfully regulating the information that the media
rely on for their news production are considered harmful to
the media's position in a democratic society.
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1.1.1 Publicity Activities
The exercise of public relations is a pervasive practice of
all modern organizations to exploit their use of the media.
Strategies and perspectives of public relations adopted by
the government toward reporters have become more
sophisticated and regular. As a matter of fact, government
agencies have actively devoted an enormous amount of effort
and resources, in an effort to manage information in order
to promote public policy, to maintain a public image and to
keep hidden private conduct. With an intention to shape
public opinion, government agencies attempt to control the
news in an organized and self-conscious way.
The exercise of public relations is a highly controlled
and calculated endeavour. Every organization inevitably
transforms occurrences into verbal or written forms
according to its own political or organizational purposes in
order to communicate with the outside world (Smith,
1984:59). For instance, a state press office is a system
which is a spatio-temporal arrangement set up by a
government agency to make public its activities. Instead of
permitting reporters to make contact with public officials
directly inside the agency, the press office actively
provides the media with suitable information to construct a
news story.
Bruce (1992), Gandy (1982), Hess (1984) and Keane
(1992) indicate that this device of information subsidy and
management launched by the press offices of government
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results in carefully planned and highly controlled accounts.
Generally, under the orchestration of the press office,
media rooms are organized within organizations, interviews
are consolidated into news conferences or briefings, more
routine material is distributed, even transportation and
accommodation for news gathering are arranged. For example,
the White House has routinely used a variety of information
channels including press releases and pseudo-events, the
presidential press conference or the daily briefings to
stage news events (Gandy, 1982:74; Hess, 1984:50-51).
Ultimately, the White House serves up what the reporters
want, and also deprives the reporters of having the
opportunities to work on the material for themselves.
The press conference is a typically formal information
channel used by government agencies to deliver their message
to the public. The press conference is a carefully planned
account within which statements are tightly structured;
questions are pre-planned; specific topics may not be given
priority; certain reporters may be accredited and follow-up-
questions may not be allowed (Bruce, 1992:169-171; Keane,
1992:19-21). Furthermore, the supplementary documents and
press kits offered by government agencies are designed as a
package of knowledge in which certain primary facts,
suitable values, summaries of speeches with quotable quotes
from the spokespersons are included in order to limit the
work for a reporter (Hess, 1984:49; Murphy, 1978:178-179).
More frequently, information subsidies from news
sources are delivered in the form of briefings and leaks.
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The form of briefings is a special design which allows
participants, including the sources and the journalist, more
freedom in the exchange of information. However the sources
have the authority to decide the rules of games for the
journalists. The rules played in the briefing including:
(1) quotes being off-the-record (unable to identify the
source); (2) on-the-record (the speaker is identified); (3)
background (the position and status of source is described,
but no specific source can be identified; and (4) deep
background (no attribution is allowed) (Hess, 1984:119;
Keane, 1992:20). A leak is the unauthorized release of
confidential information initiated by the source to
manipulate public opinion. The anonymity of the source of
information and obscuring the fact are two tactics that make
a leak possible (Sigal, 1973:144; Tiffen, 1989:96-97).
Therefore, media reporting based on leaks or informal
briefings is unattributable. Since the sources of both a
leak and off-the-record briefings are disguised, they are
not only free from public demands of individuals taking
responsibility for the information they claim, but also have
a greater opportunity of pursuing these individuals' private
goals. Meanwhile, to some extent, the reporters enter into
some kind of exchange, trading part of their own
professional autonomy for access to information that will
help them carry out their news-gathering tasks. However,
following the rules laid down by the authorities, this
process casts doubt on the media's credibility as an
impartial and objective institution.
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The creation of a pseudo-event is another kind of
method used by public relations experts in government
agencies to promote publicity. Theoretically, pseudo-events
refer to happenings which are carefully designed and created
for the immediate purpose of being reported (Bruce,
1992:152; Schudson, 1978:170). Therefore, the contents and
the timetables of these events are consciously planned to
meet the needs of news media.
The authorities' influence over the media goes far
beyond their ability to stage events and plant favourable
stories, the state authorities have ways of retaliating
against unfavourable coverage. For instance, in the case of
a White House press release, tactics used against awkward
reporters include some of the following: denying interviews,
•••
withholding access to information, giving exclusive
information to favoured reporters and misleading information
to disfavoured ones, and awarding prestigious government
positions to especially cooperative newsworkers. On some
occasions, informal procedures are taken by top government
officials, including the President himself, to express their
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of news coverage. For
instance, they telephone news executives to convey strongly
worded 'suggestions' and to complain about particular
reporters and stories (Parenti, 1993:64-65).
1.1.2 Censoring Activities
In addition to making publicity, the state may also impose
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censorship on the media to limit political debate on an
issue which poses an obvious threat to national security.
The evoking of national security by the state exerts
powerful control over media reporting. The media's right to
challenge official definitions of national security and
national interest are undermined, and the media's
independence from government agencies and their ability to
provide relevant information for citizenship are questioned.
When the authorities are faced with a state of crisis,
a form of regulation which is secretive and deceptive is
used to control the media. In the name of national
security, well organized political censorship in accordance
with specific political ends, is conducted as a legitimate
measure to regulate the information pertaining to the crisis
(Keane, 1991:95-100).
Examples of political censorship imposed by government
agencies in wartime and peace time are well documented,
although in peace time, the modes of control are weaker and
yet more subtle. For instance, during the Falklands War and
the Gulf War, information was subject to direct censorship.
In the Falklands crisis, the movement and communication of
journalists covering the war was completely controlled by
the armed forces (Harris,1983). As for the Gulf War, the
reporters were reliant on the information released by the
Pentagon, the White House and other allied powers. As a
consequence, the news especially on television, simply
promoted the policies of the United States government and
military, while strengthening the power of the National
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Security State (Kellner, 1992:52-55).
In normal periods, the practice of information
management enacted by the authorities results in more
complex news management, rather than overt censorship. In
the cases of specific British crises, such as a siege, or
the kidnapping and hostage taking which occurred during the
1970s, the modes of control and pressure imposed by the
political establishment on the media are much more
complicated. Some common practices were adopted by the
authorities in the name of effective security to control the
news. First, a gentleman's agreement was established
between the media and government officials to control and
manage the information with the purpose of securing the
lives of victims. Moreover, when publicity might endanger
hostages' lives, a news blackout was implemented. Under
such circumstances, usually a regular daily briefing meeting
was offered to secure the media's compliance. Finally,
faced with the issues concerning national security matters,
voluntary self-censorship and self-restraint of the media
was requested in order to assist the state to preserve order
(Schlesinger, 1990:37-39; Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott,
1983:113-119).
The Northern Ireland case is another example of the
British way of censorship. In this case, direct bans have
been imposed by British government on the message delivered
by the terrorists. For instance, television interviews with
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Irish National Liberation
Front (INLA) are banned in accordance with the Prevention of
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Terrorism Act which has been in effect since 1974 (Murdock,
1991:108). The Northern Ireland case also shows that the
British army and the police use many techniques to restrict
the activities of newsworkers within given boundaries
(Curtis, 1984:248-254). For instance, well organized
facilities trips were offered to reporters and supplementary
information packages were attached.
Furthermore, apart from routinely making contact with
the media and suggesting suitable stories for newsworkers,
legal action was occasionally taken against reporters, and
any kind of contact with terrorists could put newsworkers in
danger of prosecution.
1.2 Non-official Sources
According to the notion of a dialectic of control, the
powerful or less powerful sources are able to mobilize media
resources to advance their specific political interests.
Although both powerful and less powerful sources try to
extend their influence with the media, the less powerful
sources usually do not have established legitimacy in
gaining access to mainstream media in order to satisfy their
political agenda. For instance, all kinds of social
movements carry their own message through unique channels to
make their society hear their voices. Despite having access
to the mainstream media, the movements are more likely to
gain greater visibility by marching on the street, by
lobbying and negotiating with the political and economic
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establishment and by delivering messages through campaigns,
educational programmes and more importantly through
alternative media (Offe, 1985:829).
It is not surprising that the media have been viewed as
a powerful institution through which their intended meaning
can be widely disseminated to the public. Various groups
always compete for media access in order to gain greater
visibility, win more adherents, and create a groundswell of
public opinion change. Therefore, news production must
always be conceived as a contestable field in which groups
with unequal symbolic and material positions are in
competition for the mobilization of intended meanings.
As has been mentioned, for a comprehensive
understanding of news production, the nature and extent of
strategic actions conducted by both the powerful and less
powerful source organizations should be equally taken into
consideration. However, the research areas associated with
the less powerful groups who devote resources to promoting
an oppositional and alternative view through the media has
been under-developed. There has been little systematic
study of their production processes or an examination of how
and why the perspectives of less powerful sources can appear
in the news media. In general, most of the studies
concerning the relations between the less powerful groups
and the media often involve an analysis of news content,
rather than an examination of concrete media strategies
which the less powerful groups carry in their approach to
the media. Evidence derived from studies of news coverage
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indicates that youth (Fowler and Kress, 1979), immigrants
(van Dijk, 1988), unions (Morley, 1981), terrorists
(Elliott, Murdock and Schlesinger, 1986) and political
dissidents (Chen Sheue-yun, 1991b; Cheng Jei-cheng and Chen
Sheue-yun, 1991) are portrayed unrealistically, and
concludes that these groups have lacked advantages in
competition for the space in the media.
A few studies such as Gitlin (1980) and Jones (1986)
place great emphasis on social interaction from the point of
view of the source as well as the media. It has been shown
that disadvantaged groups are able to make efforts to allow
their visions to be negotiated through the news media,
although the media are not always on their side (Gitlin,
1980).
_
The study of British industrial disputes in the late
1970s and the early 1980s provides a good example for the
illustration of the negotiation over control between groups
whose material and symbolic advantages are unequally
distributed. Jones (1986) shows that throughout the
industrial disputes, unions, employers and the government
all tried to exploit the news media in order to seek
publicity and to manage information about the dispute.
However, as may be expected, the government and employers
held the advantage in this battle for publicity.
Generally speaking, the nature and extent of publicity
are very much dependent on certain characteristics of the
less powerful group, such as its size, cohesiveness,
economic importance, national role, or even the personality
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of leaders (Seaton, 1991:265). For instance, during
disputes, unions, especially the National Union of
Mineworkers, were primarily dependent on their leaders for
seeking regular publicity. Moreover, they lacked a reliable
system for providing a constant flow of information about
the impact of their action and the likely consequences for
the public (Jones, 1986:92). Nevertheless, throughout the
disputes, some strategies had been taken on board by unions
to exploit the use of the news media. For instance, someone
was appointed to monitor media coverage and watch for bias
on a daily basis in order to request a right of reply.
Furthermore, the policy of accusing the news media of bias
was implemented to increase the newsworthiness of the union
and to create an air of self-doubt among the reporters
themselves, thereby hopefully reducing biased reporting.
Moreover, some interview accounts and supplementary
materials were carefully designed to present the union in a
favourable light and management as being unreasonable
(Jones, 1986:90-94).
CONCLUSION
In the present study, the media are regarded as a site of
social and cultural struggle. Ideally, all citizens have a
right to participate in shaping media cultures. In reality,
under most circumstances, the people in positions of power
certainly have a greater chance to use the media.
Studies on the complex connections between the media
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and political and economic institutions provide a knowledge
base of how and in what ways the media function to favour
the political and economic establishment. Also, an
explanation of the complex relations between the media and
social institutions is necessary to understand the broad
features of news production (Davis, 1993:42; Schudson,
1991:145). However it seems that a structural approach does
not articulate well with a social and political situation
that is changing rapidly. For instance, a perspective
concerned with the social structure of the media tends to
focus on long-term and friendly relations between the media
and political and economic institutions. Consequently, the
media's confrontations with the political establishment,
whether to pursue their own political interest (such as by
the underground press) or to secure business profits (such
as is the case with papers in authoritarian societies which
deviate from official lines) are excluded from the research
agenda. As will be shown, in a situation of change, a more
flexible theoretical approach is needed.
A citizen's access to the media is central to the
function of a democracy. The fact that economic and
political constraints on the media result in the
disappearance of diversity and quality information indicates
that ordinary citizens are denied access to the media. The
exercise of public relations by news sources, whether the
powerful or less powerful groups aiming to win media
attention, suggests that ordinary citizens are at times able
to gain access to the media, although this may be slight in
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contrast
sources.
by these
approach
necessary
with the access privileges enjoyed by powerful
In exploring the issues of news management engaged
competing groups on a daily basis, a theoretical
falling beyond the structuralist argument is
.	 To sum up, a theoretical perspective which
combines structural constraints and the dynamics of daily
control is taken by the present study to explain the
transformation of state-press relations in the process of
democratization in Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ITHE STATE AND
THE CPVII., SOCIETY IN TAIWAN
INTRODUCTION
The essence of democracy lies in the absence of inequality
of opportunity, whether political, economic or social.
However, democracy in terms of freedom of political
participation and freedom of the press is always a state to
be achieved.
Democratization- in society emerges from the
confrontations between civil society and the state.
Theoretically, the state and civil society interact in a
complex way within specific historical conditions (Bobbio,
1989:43; Hall, 1984:23; Keane, 1988:62; Touraine, 1981:104).
State power exercised through its military, policing, legal,
administrative and cultural apparatuses inevitably
determines the scope and manner of actions taken by groups
within civil society; reciprocally, these actions can
challenge state rule and make it accountable to civil
society. Therefore, the boundaries between the state and
civil society are constantly changing through time.
Taking a view that the ultimate foundation of democracy
is the institutionalized communication between the state and
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civil society, the purpose of this chapter is to depict the
democratization in Taiwan based on the dialectical process
between state intervention and civil liberalization.
TAIWANESE REALITY
In 1945, the Nationalist Party also known as Kuo Min Tang
(KMT) took control of Taiwan from Japan. Four years later,
the KMT was defeated in China's civil war and retreated to
Taiwan. The KMT has ruled the island for more than four
decades. Over the years debates about ethnicity have been
an important factor which have had a great impact on
Taiwan's political, economic and social life.
1. Ethnic Conflict
The conflict between two ethnic groups the Taiwanese and
Mainlanders is the core issue for democracy in Taiwan.
Ethnic conflict has been a medium for the extension of
citizen rights. To some extent, it reflects the crisis of
national identity among ordinary citizens on the island.
Ethnically, the twenty million population of Taiwan can be
divided into four groups. The Taiwanese are the largest
ethnic group and constitute almost three-quarters of
population. Taiwanese speak the Fukien dialect of Chinese
and their ancestors migrated from Fukien Province either
before 1885 or during the period of Japanese occupation.
There are also 3.2 million Hakkas who migrated from Guangdon
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province in the nineteenth century, while 2.9 million are
mainlanders who came to Taiwan during the KMT regime after
the Chinese civil war in 1949. There are about 325,000
aborigines who are the offspring of the earliest inhabitants
of the island and racially designated non-Chinese; most of
these people live in mountain areas (Harrison, 1991:22).
The first confrontation between mainlanders and
Taiwanese is known as the 228 Incident which occurred on 28
February 1947. The 228 Incident remains a bitter memory
centred on the political legacy of KMT rule on Taiwan. This
incident concerned a Taiwanese woman who was physically
beaten by mainland soldiers, which triggered an island-wide
rebellion against Chen Yi's administration. In this
instance, between several thousand and twenty thousand
Taiwanese, mostly local students and elites were killed by
Chen Yi's forces (Tien Hung-mao, 1989:36). Moreover,
thousands more living on the island were harassed and
labelled as criminals during what was known as the KMT's
'white terror' of the 1950s and 1960s. The 228 Incident has
haunted relations between Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders
ever since.
After the arrival of the KMT regime in 1949, the task
of nation building was carried on. The nationalist heritage
which the KMT advocated was rooted in the territory of
mainland China where its sovereign power was no longer
exercised. By claiming to be the legitimate government of
all China, the KMT operates a state machinery to create a
spirit of solidarity and collective commitment to the
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Chinese 'nation'. For instance, the structure of government
that existed on the mainland is preserved. More
importantly, the culture which derived from China was
diffused through Taiwan. 	 Also, Mandarin used on the
mainland as an official language was implanted into Taiwan.
The opposition nationalism started by Taiwanese
intellectuals in the late 1970s, rejected the mainland-
rooted KMT government and argued for acceptance of the de
facto separation of Taiwan from the mainland. For them the
KMT represents a 'Chinese political entity' as opposed to a
native 'Taiwanese identity'.
The cleavages between mainlanders and Taiwanese do
exist, because there is a substantial difference in attitude
towards KMT rule between these two groups. For instance,
-
mainlanders perceive themselves as being much more
'Chinese' as opposed to 'Taiwanese' (Chang Mao-kuei and
Hsiao Hsin-hung, 1987:36-39). For most Taiwanese, China is
another country. They regard themselves as Chinese by
culture; they would like trade with China, visit it as
tourists, but at least for the moment, they have no
intention of becoming integrated into the mainland (Feldman,
1991:9). By contrast, Taiwanese more or less politically
detach themselves from the mainland, instead they identify
with Taiwan and its local culture (Chang Mao-kuei and Hsiao
Hsin-hung, 1987:36-39). Such differences in perception have
profound political ramifications for the government's goal
of political unification with mainland China.
Furthermore, compared with the Taiwanese, mainlanders
61
tend to support the KMT and the existing government
institutions. According to a . survey carried out in Taipei,
mainlanders are more satisfied with the government, they
appreciate a stable political system and wish to pursue a
harmonious social and political order. Moreover, the
mainlanders are willing to restrict individual freedom (Hu
Fo and Yu Ying-long, 1983:38). By contrast, Taiwanese ask
for the protection of civil liberties, freedom of speech and
a wider participation in the political process.
Furthermore, they want to share political power with
mainlanders, and upgrade their status to exercise a greater
influence on politics. Ethnic difference is also reflected
in voting behaviour. In general, KMT candidates draw about
an equal number of votes from both groups. However,
opposition candidates (most of them are Taiwanese) draw
about 87.6% of their votes from Taiwanese voters, and only
12.4 % from mainlanders (Hu Fo and Yu Ying-lung, 1983: 37-
38).
The task of nation building is a site in which the
ethnic groups compete against each other for cultural
sovereignty. During this process, major ethnic groups will
attempt to incorporate sovereignty and administrative power
and to diffuse their own language and culture within the
nation-state (Giddens, 1985:219; Smith, 1991:68). In
Taiwan's case, by exerting control over the state, including
the military, administrative, judicial and ideological
apparatuses, the KMT has a great advantages in the
mobilization of its nationalist heritage on the one hand,
62
and suppressing Taiwanese resistance to this on the other.
Nevertheless, with the economy booming, an increasing per
capita income and literacy rate, increased use of mass
communication, and a differentiated urban sector, the
opposition nationalists who wish to establish a democratic
structure with a Taiwanese identity came into existence in
the mid-1970s.
2. The KMT Controls the State Apparatuses
(1) The Party-State
From 1949 to the mid-1980s the KMT regime was characterized
as a one-party authoritarian regime. In a one-party state,
the ruling party is the key source of power in the regime to
-promote national unity and encourage economic development.
By contrast, opposition parties are effectively prohibited
or excluded from any significant political role (Huntington,
1991:12-13). In terms of its party structure and party-
state relationship, the KMT regime is a Leninist party-state
(Cheng Tun-jen, 1989:477; Chou Yang-sun and Nathan,
1987:277-278; Chu Yun-han, 1992:17-18; Myers, 1987:1003;
Tien Hung-mao, 1989:9-11).
A Leninist-type party has a single powerful leader, at
the zenith of the KMT rule, the party leader held four posts
simultaneously that included the head of the state, leader
of the party, executive head of government and the active
commander-in-chief of the military-security apparatus (Chu
Yun-han, 1992:25). In such a party, the authority of the
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party is placed above all government agencies and
representative bodies. For instance, under KMT rule all
major government appointments and policies and legislative
proposals have to be endorsed by the party headquarters.
All middle to high ranking government officials and military
officers are recruited and selected by the KMT (Chu Yun-han,
1992:20).
In practice, the structure of a Leninist party is to
establish a close interlinked relationship with the state
apparatus. The party functions as a government within
government, and the distinctions between the party and the
government are blurred. For instance, personnel
appointments among the party, the government and legislative
institutions often develop and follow a path of inter-
institutional circulation (Winckler, 1984:488-489).
Not surprisingly, there is an organizational parallel
between the KMT and the state apparatus. In order to effect
a complete monopoly over the state apparatus, a
sophisticated system is implemented to channel directions
from the party to the state apparatus. The normal practice
is that an array of party branches are structured within the
government bodies and the legislature. The mechanism
between the party and the government can be depicted at two
levels (Tien Hung-mao, 1989:89-90).
At central government level, the Policy Coordination
Committee is charged with resolving conflicts among and
within the three representative bodies in the Legislative
Yuan, the Control Yuan and the National Assembly. It links
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the Central Standing Committee (the highest decision-making
body of the KMT) to three representative bodies which allow
them to carry out directions from the party centre. Party
branches also exert an influence within the Executive, the
Judicial and the Examination Yuan. In each of these central
government institutions, there is a political cell
consisting of party members who hold key positions.
At the provincial and local levels, an organizational
device is developed to make sure that the public policies
are in line with the party directives. At the provincial
level, a political cell is formed which consists of the
governor and heads of departments and bureaux. This pattern
is replicated in county and city governments.
Furthermore, at each level of the legislature there is
..
a party caucus which is organized by all KMT members. Each
party caucus is directed by a party secretary who
coordinates overall legislative action in conjuncture with
the committee chairmen on the floor. The party secretary in
the legislature, the speaker, the deputy speaker and the
legislative committee chairmen are organized into the
executive committee of the party caucus. The main duty of
the executive committee is to persuade party members to
support government policy.
Finally, at each level of territorial administration,
a political coordination group is set up to link party
headquarters, government offices and the legislature
together. This inter-institutional group includes: (I) the
party committee chairman and two members of the party
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committee designated by the chairman, (2) the governor (or
mayor or county magistrate) plus two members of the
administrative body appointed by him; and (3) the speaker of
the provincial assembly (or local legislative council) plus
two assemblymen who are party members.
(2) Sovereign Power
The legal system administers a range of rights attributed to
those who govern and those who are governed. As a political
institution of social control, the legal system
legitimatizes state intervention in the citizen's private
life (Horwitz, 1989:42).	 In Taiwan, the legal control
operated by the executive and judicial arms of the party-
state have significantly undermined the development of
citizenship.
From 1949 to 1991, in the face of military
confrontation with communist China, Taiwan was in a
permanent state of emergency. Therefore, government
institutions and civil rights in Taiwan were under
constraint by at least sixteen emergency laws, decrees and
judicial interpretations (Hu Fo, 1990:34-35). Generally
speaking, the Provisional Amendment for the Period of
Mobilization of the Suppression of Communist Rebellion,
known as the temporary provisions and martial law, has the
most profound effects on the scope of government power and
the citizen's political life on the island.
The temporary provisions introduced on 10 May 1948 as
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a result of the threat from communist China were lifted in
May 1991.
	 According to the temporary provisions, the
President was endowed with an unlimited authority. For
example, Article 1 of the temporary provisions gave the
President the power to take emergency measures to avert an
imminent danger to the security of the state or to the
people-- without being subject to the procedural
restrictions prescribed in Article 39 or Article 43 of the
constitution. Furthermore, the President is accountable
neither to the populace nor to any legislative bodies. The
President and Vice-President's tenure in office is no longer
limited to two six-year terms prescribed in the
constitution.	 Moreover, the President was empowered to
change the structure and personnel of Central government.
_
In addition, the President could authorize additional
members to be elected or appointed to the three national
representative bodies-- the National Assembly (one of whose
functions is to elect the President), the Legislative Yuan
and the Control Yuan.
More importantly, the temporary provisions froze the
membership of the three national representative bodies-- the
National Assembly (Presidential Electoral College), the
Legislative Yuan (the parliament) and the Control Yuan
(control over the efficacy and discipline of government
officials) in place until 1991, in keeping with the KMT's
claim to be the only legal government of all China.
Although elections for supplementary seats had been held
every three years between 1969 and 1989, only approximately
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one third of the parliamentary seats were open to
competition.
Martial law was declared on the Mainland in 1934, and
remained in effect until July 1987. As a matter of fact,
martial law was implemented on the basis of an
administrative order issued by the Executive Yuan since
Taiwan was designated a combat area in China's civil war in
December 1949.
Under martial law, civil rights guaranteed by the
constitution, such as the right of assembly, the right of
association including formation of new political parties and
freedom of publication were suspended. Therefore, the
development of citizenship within civil society was severely
inhibited.	 For instance, Article 11 of the martial law
_
stipulates that in areas falling under martial law, the
senior commander could prohibit popular assemblies,
organized associations, mass rallies and petitions and could
impose sanctions against speeches, lectures, newspapers,
magazines, photographs, postcards and other printed
materials deemed harmful to the military.
According to martial law, the Taiwan Garrison Command
(TGC) was the most powerful agency between 1950 and 1987,
because it took charge of all matters (either the local
administrative or judicial) in the implementation of martial
law. Under martial law, the TGC was heavily involved in
every aspect of political life. For example, the TGC was in
charge of authorizing citizens to travel abroad, monitoring
all entries into Taiwan, approving meetings and rallies,
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receiving and sanctioning books and periodicals and
maintaining social order (Hu Fo, 1985:17).
Article 4 of the martial law empowered the TGC to
conduct precirculation censorship. Also, Article 3 defined
speech and writing sedition if they were deemed to be
propaganda supporting the Chinese communists, if they
slandered the head of state, stirred up animosity between
the government and the people, or violated the national
policy of anti-communism.
In addition to the temporary provisions and martial
law, the National Mobilization Law was another emergency
decree which was implemented to regulate the actions of
civil society. Two articles in the National Mobilization
Law are often applied to actions which are seen as a
_
political or military threat to government. For example,
Article 23 allows the government to restrict freedom of
speech, publication, correspondence, public assembly and
association if circumstances should require such actions.
Also, Article 22 stipulates that the government may restrict
or prohibit newspapers, wire services and printing (such as
pamphlets or books) whenever it deems necessary.
(3) Administrative Power
The structure of the KMT government has departed from the
constitution, because the operations of government are based
on the series of emergency laws mentioned above. With the
KMT claiming to be the only legitimate government of all
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China, the structure of central government brought over from
the mainland was maintained. Therefore, there is a
duplication in administrative structure between the central
government and the provincial government, particularly in
education, transportation, police, finance and economic
policy (Tien Hung-mao, 1989:105). As two governments are
ruling within approximately the same territory, the degree
of autonomy of the provincial government is quite limited.
For almost four decades the KMT regime did not much
rely on democratic legitimacy for its rule. In other words,
political participation of ordinary citizens was very
limited. Starting in 1950, gradual steps were taken to
implement local self-rule at provincial and local level,
while the national representative bodies remained tightly
controlled until 1992.
By 1969, elections opened to the public were confined
to the township, county and city levels. 	 In practice,
ordinary citizens have been allowed to elect their
representatives up to provincial level and government
executives up to the county and city levels since 1946.
As already mentioned, in keeping with the legacy of the
KMT government the only government of all China, the members
of three representative bodies-- the National Assembly, the
Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan elected in 1947 on the
mainland were allowed to hold their posts until the recovery
of the mainland permits new elections. Therefore, elections
for supplementary seats were held every three years from
1969 to 1992.
	 After the 1970s the number of national
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representatives for the supplementary elections was
increased year by year.	 For example, in 1972, 53 new
members were added to the National Assembly, 51 to the
Legislative Yuan. In the 1983 election, a number of 73
legislators were elected, however, only a third of members
of the legislature were elected by the people of Taiwan.
In Taiwan's case, the right to vote has never been in
question, but the extent to which government officials have
been subject to electoral scrutiny has been a matter of
public debate. For instance, key government officials
including the provincial governor, the mayors of Taipei and
Kaohsiung municipalities are still not accountable to the
electorate. The President and Vice-President are indirectly
elected by members of the National Assembly. According to
_
the constitution, the Premier is nominated by the President,
and approved by the Legislative Yuan.
In the 1970s, the KMT faced two challenges. One came
from the international community, another came from the
domestic political situation including the growing middle
class and the political opposition. In the 1970s, the KMT
was besieged by a series of diplomatic setbacks including
the loss of membership in the United Nations and the ending
of formal diplomatic relations with Japan and the United
States. As a consequence, its claim to be the
representative of all China had been seriously undermined.
In response to these legitimacy crises caused by drastic
changes in the external environment and the native Taiwanese
demanded a right to share political power, the KMT made some
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concessions in its authoritarian rule. For instance, the
KMT began to incorporate Taiwanese into the party's high
decision making bodies and initiated supplementary elections
to replenish the ageing national representatives. However,
these initial political reforms were seen as political
measures designed more to co-opt the opposition than to
expand participation (Cheng Tun-jen, 1989:485; Wang Cheng-
huan, 1989:94). The most significant political reforms
conducted by the KMT to accommodate public pressure for a
representative democracy took place between 1986 and 1987.
These reforms included lifting martial law and press bans,
allowing the establishment of new political parties, a
search for a new formula for electing representatives to
parliament and Taiwanese citizens being allowed to visit the
Chinese mainland.
Although the KMT tried to step up recruitment of the
Taiwanese into the party, army and government, most of the
high ranking positions in the party-state were still
controlled by the mainlanders until the 1980s. For
instance, at the height of KMT rule, the asymmetry of
political power between Taiwanese and the mainlanders was
significant. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s, the important
positions of the KMT and the government were occupied by
mainlanders, especially those evacuated from China in 1949.
Although 80% of its members were Taiwanese, the KMT's
leadership remained firmly in the hands of the mainlanders.
In the early 1970s, when Chiang Ching-kuo was serving
as Premier, more Taiwanese were recruited into the party and
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the government. In May 1972, the number of Taiwanese in the
Central Standing Committee was increased from two to three
out of 21 (Tien Hung-mao, 1975:616). In December 1979, the
number of Taiwanese in the Central Standing Committee
remained the same. In February 1984, the number of
Taiwanese in the Central Standing Committee was increased to
12 out of 31 (Winckler, 1984:489). In 1988, mainlanders
still controlled 17 seats (55%) of the total 31 in the
Central Standing Committee (Tien Hung-mao, 1989:38).
Furthermore, ethnic difference was also salient in the
disproportion of representatives among top administrators in
the government. In the early 1970s, six positions at
cabinet level in the Executive Yuan were held by Taiwanese
including that of Deputy Premier which had previously been
-
occupied by Chiang Ching-kuo himself. As for the other four
Yuan of the Central government, namely the Judicial,
Legislative, Examination and Control, three out of four
Vice-Presidents were Taiwanese. Also, for the first time a
Taiwanese, Hsieh Tung-min was appointed as the governor of
Taiwan Province.
In 1984, in the cabinet of the Legislative Yuan, three-
quarters of the key posts were held by mainlanders (Tien
Hung-mao, 1989:37-38). For instance, within the cabinet,
the Deputy Premier, ministers of the Interior, Communication
and Justice and two ministers without portfolios were
Taiwanese. But ministerial posts which were in charge of
policies related to defence, foreign affairs, finance,
economic affairs and education remained in the hands of
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mainlanders. Furthermore, mainlanders still held all top
positions in the military and security apparatus except two:
garrison commander and Vice Minister of Defence.
(4) The Economic Apparatus
A form of state capitalism has been adopted in Taiwan.
Under KMT rule, the government has played a pivotal role in
anchoring economic development. First, from 1949 to the
present many policies have been carried out which had a
great impact on economic development. For instance, in the
early 1950s three major economic policies were implemented:
land reform, price stabilization and import substitution
behind a protectionist tariff policy (Tien Hung-mao,
1989:19). From 1962 to 1971, some export promotion policies
were created to stimulate an economic boom. Furthermore, in
1972, the government decided to invest public capital in ten
major construction projects to sustain economic growth
against a worldwide economic recession, and provide
additional employment and improve the industrial
infrastructure of the country (Tai Hung-chao, 1989:1).
These ten projects developed a north-south freeway,
instigated railway electrification, built a railway in
northeastern Taiwan, a new international airport in Taoyuan,
a nuclear power plant, an integrated steel mill, a giant
shipyard in Kaohsiung, petro-chemical complexes, Taichung
harbour, and Suao port.
After 1978, the government continued to channel public
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investment into twelve new major construction projects.
Also, policies devoted to develop high-tech and capital-
oriented industries were conducted. During 1986-1988 the
economic policies were focused on the promotion of
international commercial trade, therefore, some measures
were adopted to liberalize trade by relaxing import and
foreign exchange restrictions (Tai, Hung-chao, 1989:8).
Second, in order to exert an influence over the
economy, the government not only regulates economic matters
(licenses firms, manages foreign exchange and controls a
cumbersome tariff structure), but also owns, operates and
invests in many enterprises. Furthermore, most public
enterprises are in the sectors of basic industry and banking
(Lin Chung-cheng, 1989:166, Liu Chin-ching, 1988:68).
_
For example, the total number of national corporations
is 27, and the largest 12 operate under the supervision of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Some of them, such as
China Steel, China Shipbuilding, China Petroleum and Tai-
Power, are ranked as the largest enterprises in the country.
In 1985, these public enterprises employed more than a
hundred thousand people. A majority of chairmen and general
managers were former officials of the government, retired
senior military officers, or former KMT county and city
executives.
The provincial government also supervises 33
enterprises which include the Taiwan Wine and Tobacco
Monopoly Bureau, and 11 major commercial banks, insurance
companies and trust banks.
	 In addition, the vocational
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Assistance Commission for Retired Soldiers which is heavily
subsidized by government, runs some forty firms including
many of the largest so-called private enterprises.
The KMT itself also has accumulated a huge amount of
financial resources. From 1949 through to 1987, little
distinction was made between party and state in business
affairs. The KMT itself controls a number of enterprises.
In 1994, the KMT has NT$ 38.5 billion (US$ 1.5 billion) in
real properties (The Journalist, 6-12 March 1994:12). Party
property is controlled through holding companies that in
turn embrace around 100 firms in which the KMT holds shares.
The KMT holds investments in commercial banks, insurance and
investment companies, and the petroleum and construction
industries. More specifically, the KMT has holdings in the
ownership of the media. Three television networks and the
China Broadcasting Corporation, Central News Agency, China
Daily News, Central Daily News and Cheng Chung Publishing
Corporation are all run by the KMT (Wealth, Dec. 1991:114).
In general, the power distribution along ethnic lines
is much more symmetrical than in the political sectors.
Although more Taiwanese than mainlanders engage in medium
and small size business, the basic industries and public
corporations are controlled by mainlanders-- these include
the steel industry, shipbuilding industry, petroleum
industry and banking etc. (Lin Chung-cheng, 1989:178; Liu
Chin-ching, 1988:68; Tien Hung-mao, 1989:38).
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(5) Social Associations
Apart from exploiting the use of the judicial apparatus, the
military, police and security forces to monitor the civil
society, the KMT also mobilizes support from citizens for
its nationalist tasks through the regulation and controlled
ownership of the ideological apparatus.
In general, social control was derived from martial law
and emergency regulations. Also, the KMT implemented a
series of administrative orders to regulate the practices of
the publishing industry in the 1960s. For example, the New
Literature and Art Movement was launched by the Ministry of
Defence to strengthen the ideology of anti-communism in
1965.	 Furthermore, in 1967, the Committee of Cultural
_
Recovery directed by the Executive Yuan, and the Cultural
Bureau by the Ministry of Education were established to
manage cultural affairs (Kuo Foong, 1990:17).
In fact, the KMT itself is closely connected with all
the existing social organizations. The KMT has broadly
penetrated all voluntary associations since the party was
reorganized in the early 1950s. The groups with a political
orientation, such as trade unions, the farmers' associations
and the irrigation associations are significantly controlled
by the KMT (Chu Yun-han, 1992:27). Therefore, opposition
forces, if they exist, do not coalesce around these groups.
According to the organizational structure of the KMT,
party units within each association are brought under the
direct control of the provincial party committee, the Taipei
77
Municipal Party Committee, or the Kaoshsiung Party
Committee, except those involved with the armed forces, the
security apparatus, overseas Chinese communities,
manufacturing industries, transportation and communication
sectors and college campuses. The party headquarters of
manufacturing industries is in charge of public and private
industries, and the party headquarters of employees
supervises the sectors of shipping, railroads, highways, the
postal service and communications (The Journalist, 31 June-
6 July 1989:41-43). 	 Both headquarters are directly
supervised by the Department of Social Work of the KMT.
In order to infiltrate deeply into everyday life, party
cells and local party branches permeate Taiwan Society. In
addition to mobilizing support for KMT candidates, the local
party branches provide many kinds of social services or
social support to citizens (Lin Cha-long, 1989:14; Tien
Hung-mao, 1989:72). Such services include arranging easy
access to major hospitals, the establishment of a local
library, free sewing and cooking classes, free legal aid,
and other consultations, and material assistance to poor
families etc.
During the election, local factions are used to
mobilize voters. Generally speaking, each faction consists
of a leader, his key lieutenants, grass-roots supporters and
reliable voters in a given geographical areas or local
association. After the election, the cadres of the local
faction are offered benefits, favouritism or channels of
upward social mobility in return for their support (Lin Cha-
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long, 1989:135; Tien Hung-mao; 1989:164-165). Thus even
though factions may not have a formal structure, their
informal networks of affiliation can be widely extended.
In sum, under KMT rule, the party-state permeated
deeply into civil society from 1949 to the mid-1980s. The
KMT was empowered to colonize civil society by the
introduction of martial law and at least sixteen emergency
laws, decrees and judicial interpretations. Under the rule
of martial law, the right of assembly, the right of
association, including the formation of new political
parties, and freedom of publication were denied. Therefore,
it is reasonable to say that Taiwan was a society which
lacked the necessary institutional infrastructure, such as
a free press, independent judiciary and autonomous civil
associations for a modern democracy.
3. The Actions of Civil Society
The state and civil society are two areas which articulate
in a complex way. The development of civil society is
intimately bound up with the scope of the actions of the
state. As the state colonizes civil society, there is also
a reverse process by which civil society colonizes the state
(Bobbio, 1989:43; Hal1,1984:23; Touraine, 1981:104).
In Taiwan's case, because of heavy party-state
involvement in civil society, the public sphere, where the
conduct of party-state was open to public scrutiny, was
relatively restricted.
	 However, by scrutinizing the
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historical and social development of Taiwan from 1949 to the
present, or at least until 1986, it can be seen that actions
derived from civil society did attempt to make the KMT
accountable. The political opposition is seen as the most
significant and consistent anti-KMT collective action in
Taiwan in terms of its qualitative mobilization success and
manifest political impact.
In Taiwan, the central thrust of the political
opposition is the pursuit of citizenship rights in general
and Taiwanese national identity in particular. The spread
of citizen rights has by no means blunted ethnic divisions,
however; conflict between the mainlanders and Taiwanese
symbolizes the extension of civil and political rights. The
political opposition mobilized by the Taiwanese started as
a political reform movement in an attempt to press the KMT
to loosen its authoritarian rule in the mid-1970s. At the
initial stage, most criticism voiced by the opposition was
centred on certain issues, such as the abolition of martial
law, freedom in the formation of new political parties,
fresh elections for the three national representative
bodies, the disclosure of government corruption, the
abolition of unfair practices in election campaigns, and the
lifting of government control of the media. Such criticism
essentially attacked the foundations of the political
system. However, in the early 1980s, the opposition went
beyond these political demands, and began to question
Taiwan's sovereignty and destiny.
The opposition movements can be examined by focusing on
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three areas: the actors, modes of action and issues. In
general, the development of political opposition can be
divided into three periods: 1957-1960, 1975-1979, and 1984
to the present.
(1) The Free China Group
The activities of Free China Group began in 1959 and ended
a year later. They advocated political reform and
constitutional democracy. In the second half of 1960, after
making a formal announcement of the establishment of a new
party, the leader Lei Chen was arrested and charged with
being a communist agent. The KMT thereby blocked the first
effort to create an opposition party on Taiwan.
1.1 Actors
In the initial stages, the actors of the opposition movement
were confined to the intellectual and political elites.
They consisted of two groups: the mainlanders and the
Taiwanese (Lee Shao-foong, 1989:222). The mainlanders
concentrated their activities around the Free China Journal.
The Free China Group included liberal intellectuals,
dissenting members of the KMT, and leaders of the political
parties which were in alliance with the KMT. Most actors in
the Free China Group were not involved directly in electoral
politics.
By contrast, Taiwanese groups were organized by native
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politicians who tried to win electoral contests against KMT
candidates. They included Wu San-lien, Kao Yu-Shih, Li Wan-
Chu, Kuo Yu-hsin and so on, and they ran in individual
elections at the local level.
1.2 The Modes of Action
Generally speaking, publication of newspapers and political
journals and the electoral campaigns were two methods used
by the Free China Group to communicate with the external
world and challenge the political situation. Free China
Journal, Democratic Currency Journal and Public Forum Daily
were the mouthpieces of the opposition movement. But they
had problems in gaining gross-roots support, because the
_
circulation of these two journals rarely reached the public.
Moreover, during this time, all electoral practices were
confined to the local level and held every four years.
Although Public Forum Daily owned by local politician
Li Wan-Chu was recognized as a most eloquent newspaper in
the 1950s, it was embroiled in serious financial trouble by
the 1960s and was sold to the United Daily News (Chen Kuo-
hsiang and Chu Ping, 1987:80-81).
In 1958, local politicians organized the Association
for the Study of China's Local Self-Government to reform
what they thought of as the corrupt electoral politics in
Taiwan (Lee Shao-foong, 1989:227). Under martial law,
freedom of association was banned; therefore, the
association was never accepted as a civil organization by
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the KMT authorities.
In 1960, the Free China Group and local politicians
joined together and tried to organize a party to challenge
the KMT. A series of meetings dealing with the formation of
a new political party were held from June to August (Public
Forum Daily, 15 and 26 June, 23 and 31 July, 1960:3).
Finally, on 23 August, they publicized a draft of a party
constitution. As the formal announcement of a new party
approached, political tension increased. This attempt
failed on 4 September 1960, when Lei Chen was arrested and
charged with having contact with a communist agent. After
this instance, the Free China Journal was shut down and Li
Wan-Chu lost the ownership of Public Forum Daily.
1.3 Issues
The issues promoted by opposition movements at this stage
were confined to two categories: constitutional structure
and government policies. The Free China Group emphasized
the need to reform the constitutional structure; they called
for a replacement of the one-party dictatorship with a
constitutional democracy and the restoration of civil
liberties.
For example, 70 of 84 articles in the collections of
essays of the Free China Journal entitled Lei Chen and
Democracy are discussions of the constitutional structure of
the ROC. Within this category, 45 articles discuss the
government structure and push for greater autonomy for the
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provincial government, 25 articles press for raising the
standard of civil liberties and personal rights. Within the
category of government policies, they request the KMT to
amend unfair electoral practices and end its involvement in
the armed forces, judiciary and administration (Chen Sheue-
yun, 1991a:178).
As for local politicians, they more or less
concentrated on demanding effective public policies. For
example, questions regarding government policies were
frequently raised by the non-party assemblymen who were
known as liberal local politicians in the Taiwan Provincial
Assembly. In 1957, 67 out of 91 questions posed by the non-
party assemblymen were concerned with the government's
unlawful electoral practices and called for the
Taiwanization of public offices. In 1960, 114 questions
were asked, 68 on the reform of public policy, and 46 on the
amendment of the constitutional structure (Chen Sheue-yun,
1991a:180).
In sum, dissenting activities at this stage were
limited to elites including KMT's intellectuals and local
politicians. Except during elections, their message rarely
got across to ordinary citizens. Since no effective
channels could link the intellectuals to the public, the
political opposition was unable to pose a serious challenge
to the KMT.
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(2) 1975 - 1979
After 1960, the political opposition stopped trying to
organize or lead a political movement. Following the rapid
economic growth and the development of the middle class, the
opposition movements began to revive in 1975, and reached
a peak in 1979.
In contrast to the previous stage, the Taiwanese played
a dominant role within this movement. They were not only
the primary source of political activities, but they also
actively engaged in literary activities, electoral campaigns
and street actions. More importantly, apart from demands
for political reform, they began to raise the issue of
national identity. For instance, in 1979, the political
-
opposition announced a common political platform in which
they called for self-determination for Taiwan.
2.1 Actors
In comparison to the preceding stage, the opposition leaders
were distinct from the previous group which had been mainly
organized by the mainland intelligentsia. Leading members
of opposition movements (except Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang
Hsin-chieh) were young (mostly in their thirties) people
like, Yao Chia-Wen, Chang Chu-Hung, Hsu Hsin-liang, Lin Yi-
hsiung, and Shih Ming-te were the generation of Taiwanese
brought up and educated under KMT rule.
Also the demographic backgrounds of the new opposition
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group were much more diverse than previous ones. They were
drawn from diverse career backgrounds such as: politics,
journalism, the law, education and even business (Lee Shao-
foong, 1989:272). Their most crucial characteristic was
that they possessed a strong sense of Taiwanese heritage.
They feared that in the long run a Chinese Taiwan meant a
Chinese Communist Taiwan, therefore, they were reluctant to
identify with the Chinese mainland and a government aiming
to rule the mainland.
2.2 The Modes of Action
The methods used by the opposition movements to campaign for
their political reality were diversified at this stage.
Although the publication of political journals and books and
an engagement in electoral practices were still important,
in addition, the street protests and mass assemblies began
to play an increasingly important role in their course of
political action.
The Taiwan Political Review published in August 1975
was the first political journal offering a forum for
oppositional Taiwanese politicians. Huang Hsin-chieh was
the publisher and Kang Ning-hsiang was the editor. In
December 1975, the magazine was suspended for one year,
because the content of the fifth issue went beyond what the
KMT would accept (Armbruster, 1976:19; Jacobs, 1976:787).
The circulation of the Taiwan Political Review was 25,000
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 Jan. 1976:19).	 After
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Taiwan Political Review was closed down, another journal The
Eighties was subsequently published by Kang Ning-hsiang.
In 1979, Formosa was the flagship of the opposition
movement and was published by Huang Hsin-chieh in the August
and closed down four months later, because the publisher and
editors were arrested for provoking a riot known as the
Kaohsiung (or Formosa) Incident. The circulation of Formosa
was between 62,000 to 94,000 (Lin Cheng-yi, 1989:106).
As for electoral practices, the 1977 election was the
turning point for opposition movements, because they scored
impressive victories. They won 21 out of the 77 seats in
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and 4 of the 20 magistrate
and mayoral seats. Encouraged by these results, the non-
party leaders looked forward to broadening their mass
support through electoral practices. In the 1978 election
for the national parliament, they organized themselves as a
quasi-party, and publicized a 'common political demand' (Lee
Shao-foong, 1987:127; Shih Ming-te, 1988:52; Tsaw Chun-han,
1979:34). But the election was cancelled, after the U.S.
made a decision to give official recognition to the People's
Republic of China.
By 1979, the opposition movement had adopted a new mode
of action to promote their political views. This was the
public rally. In January 1979, the first public gathering
was held in Kaohsiung to protest against one of the
opposition leaders having been arrested by the KMT. After
that, the non-party forces held a series of mass assemblies
to challenge the KMT authorities during 1979, such as 'Hsu
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Hsin-liang's Birthday Party' (Cheng Mu-sing, 1987:233),
'Taichung Park Concert' and 'Farewell to Jail Party for Wu
Che-lang' etc. (Chiang Chuan-nan, 1989:17).
Formosa magazine launched in August 1979 was the
flagship of the opposition. Formosa was intended to expand
the opposition forces and to recruit new supporters. For
instance, Formosa maintained 11 'service offices' throughout
the island and organized 13 mass meetings and demonstrations
island-wide (Shih Ming-te, 1988:50). As the pace of
political mass action quickened, the KMT authorities grew
increasingly alarmed. Eventually, on 10 December, the
Kaohsiung Incident occurred, and as a result the development
of the opposition movements came to an end. On 10 December,
the Formosa office held a rally to promote human rights.
After a serious clash between the demonstrators and the
police a riot developed. More than one hundred policemen
and civilians were injured. Within two days, leaders of the
Formosa group Huang Hsin-chieh, Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-
hung, Lin Yi-hsiung, Shih Ming-te and dozens of followers
were arrested. In the Martial Law court the leaders were
charged with an attempt to overthrow the government and
given prison sentences ranging from twelve years to life.
Thirty-three followers were tried in the civil courts and
received lighter sentences.
2.3 Issues
Generally speaking, the opposition movement still paid much
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attention to pursuing constitutional reform. For instance,
they urged the KMT to lift martial law, reform the national
representative system, increase civil liberties, legalize
opposition parties, allow the free establishment of the
press and to open up the election process for the provincial
government. In addition, the opposition group demanded the
Taiwanization of public offices and the removal of the KMT
from its involvement in the armed forces, schools, media and
judiciary. In addition, the opposition movement promoted a
new slogan related to issues of national identity which was
'self-determination by Taiwan residents of Taiwan's
political future'. Politically, this principle of self-
determination symbolized the opposition's rejection of the
KMT's mainland-rooted government structure. Ideologically,
they began to realize that the KMT was a 'Chinese political
entity' which was opposed to a native Taiwanese identity.
For instance, in the 1978 election campaign, the non-
party publicized its candidates' common programme which
contained twelve issues which included: self-determination,
a reform of the national representative system, an end to
martial law and increased civil liberties including
political, economic and social human rights, the
legalization of opposition parties, freedom of the press and
the release of political prisons and so on (Ming Pao, Feb.
1979:28).
When the subjects raised by the non-party members in
the interpellation sessions of the Taiwan Provincial
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were analyzed, evidence
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suggests that the direct election for numerous government
posts were filled by appointments and the KMT's monopoly
over political power was frequently questioned.
For example, in 1979, 74 out of 171 questions asked by
the non-party assemblymen in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly
were related to the reform of the constitutional structure
(35 to the reform of governmental structure, 29 to
increasing civil liberties), the other 97 questions were
associated with political policies (25 with the corruption
of government, 21 with illegal electoral practices and 18
with the removal of KMT involvement in the armed forces,
schools, media and judiciary). As for the Legislative Yuan,
24 questions were raised. Ten questioned constitutional
structure (2 the reform of governmental structure, 8
increasing civil liberties), 10 questioned political
policies (5 the KMT monopoly over political power, 4 related
to an independent foreign policy) 	 (Chen Sheue-yun,
1991a:181).
(3) 1984 to the Present
At the beginning of 1985, civil society in Taiwan was in
ferment. The opposition movement and new social movements
were growing rapidly, therefore, the space where
oppositional political discourses existed was wide open.
From 1984 to 1987, especially during 1985, many kinds of new
social movements emerged which demanded that the KMT
authorities meet their needs. The consumer movement was the
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first new social movement which was formed in 1980. Before
1986, the women's movement (1982), anti-pollution movement
(1984), labour movement (1984) and ethnic minorities'
movement (1984) were to emerge on the scene. The Farmers'
movement (1988), student movement (1987) and teachers'
movement (1987) subsequently developed after 1986 (Chang
Mao-kuei, 1989:92-93).
These new social movements were rather uniform, but
their political bases lay mostly outside the KMT party, and
they usually aligned themselves with the opposition
movement. Basically, the issues pursued by the new social
movements were within the areas of politics. For example,
the anti-pollution movement requested compensation from
chemical and petrochemical complexes owned by the
government. The women's movement usually criticized the
shortcomings of educational policies. They proposed that
teaching practice should be free from political
intervention, and also that Taiwanese cultural values should
be included in the curriculum. The student movement very
often endeavoured to take up human rights issues documented
in the constitution and called for the reform of the
representative system and the ending of the party and
military domination of educational institutions.
From 1984 to 1986, the opposition movements became
institutionalized and as a result in 1986 a new Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) was finally born. However, because
the ROC'S President, Vice-President and Premier and Taiwan's
Provincial Governor were not subject to popular elections,
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the DPP could not control these powerful executive posts.
Moreover, the legislators who were elected on the mainland
still held these posts, and the DPP were unable to act as an
effective opposition. Furthermore, just like the other
institutionalized movements, the DPP began to face the
formidable challenge of attempting to hold together its own
diverse factions.
3.1 Actors
At this stage, the leading members of the opposition
movement included the relatives and dependents of the
Kaohsiung Incident and even the defence lawyers of the
Kaohsiung Incident.
	
Moreover, some young political
•M,
campaigners for non-party forces in the 1980s began to play
an important role within the oppositional group (Lee Shao-
foong, 1989:278).
3.2 The Modes of Action
The formalization and legalization of an opposition party
became the primary objective pursued by the oppositional
group at this stage. This process can be explicated through
modes of action adopted by the opposition movement to
transform itself into a social force. Generally speaking,
electoral practices, street demonstrations, the publication
of political journals, and actions (verbal or physical) in
parliament were adopted by the opposition to express their
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political or cultural identity.
During the 1980s, the opposition movement designated
itself as /Tangwai l
 (a party outside the KMT) in public and
also organized and functioned much like a political party.
In February 1984, about twenty Tangwai legislators,
provincial assemblymen and Taipei city councillors
established the Association of Tangwai Elected Officials for
the Study of Public Policy. In March, despite the threats
from the KMT authorities, the Association began to build up
local branches. By the end of June 1986, the opposition
movement was developing into a party rather than a loose
coalition of groups, because the Tangwai had instituted
thirteen local branches throughout the island as an
infrastructure for a coherent political party of opposition
in the future. Finally, on September 28 a new party called
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established, even
though such a party was denounced by the government as
illegal.
After 1984 public rallies were widely used by the
opposition movement to push for political liberalization and
democratization. A content analysis of the Independence
Evening Post which is known as a liberal newspaper indicates
that the opposition movement launched 15 street actions in
1986, and 99 street actions between June 1987 and May 1988
(Chen Sheue-yun, 1991b:225). Other evidence shows that
there were 1285 mass protests between January and September
1987 (China Times, 4 Jan. 1988:3). Police sources estimated
that there were 729 demonstrations during the first four
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months of 1988, 70% of which were anti-government in nature
(Seymour, 1988:59).
As for publications, the number of magazines published
by oppositional groups was approximately 40 in 1990 (Li
Ming-shui, 1986:106). These magazines were often suppressed
by the KMT authorities, therefore they had a short lifespan
and very often went underground. However, many suspended
publications were quickly brought back by the publishers
under different titles. Because key actors often shifted
from one journal to another, it is difficult to calculate
the total number of oppositional journals (New Line, Nov.
1986:22-31).
Generally speaking, the oppositional magazines can be
divided into the moderate and the militant magazines that
reflect two factions in the opposition party. In general,
the moderate magazines advocate power through parliamentary
politics and reform within the system. By contrast, the
militant magazines strive for political change through mass
protest. The vast majority of oppositional publications are
more militant than moderate. Asian and Warm Current are two
important moderate journals which were published by Kang
Ning-hsiang. Deep Plough, Great Sympathy, Striking Roots,
New Trends, New Line, New Perspective, Age of Democracy are
known as militant journals (Lu Ya-li, 1985:159).
3.3 Issues
At this stage, the issue of national identity was high on
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the opposition's agenda, although the opposition still
called for the reform of constitutional structure and
government policies. By the early 1980s, the principles of
self-determination for Taiwan and an independent Taiwan
began to enjoy increased prominence within the opposition.
For instance, they announced in 1983, that self-
determination for Taiwan was part of their political
programme (Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 Nov. 1983:27).
However, slogans regarding national identity, such as
'Taiwan is an independent unit', 'The people of Taiwan have
the right to advocate Taiwan's independence' and 'The
establishment of the Republic of Taiwan' were more likely to
be made in the chamber where opposition legislators could
have immunity from prosecution rather than as public
statements. Before 1992, according to the Sedition Law and
the Criminal Code, advocacy of Taiwanese independence was a
crime that could bring the death penalty.
During this period of time, the magazines also served
as an important channel for the opposition movements to
disseminate political messages. Generally speaking,
moderate magazines called for political democratization,
respect for human rights, the reform of government
institutions, a free press and the legalization of the
opposition party. By contrast, the militant journals took
a more radical stand. The militant journals not only
endeavoured to promote native Taiwanese consciousness, but
also called for 'an Independent Taiwan' or 'Republic Of
Taiwan'.
	 Furthermore, during 1984-1985 some opposition
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magazines launched personal criticisms of major KMT leaders
who were alleged to be involved in corruption (Lu Ya-li,
1985:159-161).
When the questions raised by the non-party legislators
in the Legislative Yuan are examined, the results show that
issues related to questions of national identity were
frequently raised after 1985. For example, in 1981, the
questions raised by the non-party legislators were
associated with two categories: constitutional structure and
government policies. 37 of 55 questions called for the
reform of government structure and respect for human rights.
Also, 18 questions addressed the reform of electoral
practices and the removal of the KMT's involvement in
political, economic and ideological institutions (Chen
IN.
Sheue-yun, 1991a:201).
In 1986, 2 of 154 questions were in connection with the
issue of national identity, 82 questions requested
constitutional reform, such as respect for human rights (52)
and the lifting of martial law and emergency decrees (9).
Furthermore, 29 out of 70 questions demanded the KMT stay
outside of political, economic and ideological institutions
(Chen Sheue-yun, 1991a:203).
Between June 1987 and May 1988, 21 out of 427 questions
raised in the parliament requested self-determination for
Taiwan. 196 questions pressed for constitutional reform,
such as the reform of government institutions(69), the
abolition of emergency decrees (28) and respect for human
rights (99). There were 427 questions related to government
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policies, of which 116 attacked the monopoly of the power
structure (political, economic and ideological) by the KMT,
29 pressed for the legalization of contacts between Taiwan
and the Mainland and 27 pushed for changes in the quorum
rules (Chen Sheue-yun, 1991a:205).
The opposition movement in Taiwan mobilized by the
middle-class intellectuals in the pursuit of a liberal
democracy and a distinctive Taiwanese identity began in the
mid-1970s. After one decade, the opposition movement had
become a significant political force, bringing a far
livelier level of public debate in society. By 28 September
1986 it had built a legitimate opposition party. After
nearly three decades of mobilization by the political
opposition, the public space for articulating a diversity of
_
political interests had gradually opened up in Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
Democratization in Taiwan consists in the struggle led by
Taiwanese who are attempting to establish a civil society
alongside an authoritarian state. The KMT has played a key
role in Taiwan's politics since 1949. Through the monopoly
of the state apparatus, the KMT orchestrated political and
economic development and mobilized its nationalist heritage
on the island. Under such an officially dominated public
sphere, civil society was effectively absorbed into the
party-state until the mid-1980s.
From 1977 to 1979, a weak oppositional sphere mobilized
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by Taiwanese intellectuals to achieve civil rights and to
pursue a Taiwanese identity came into existence. Faced with
harsh actions taken by the military apparatus, police and
security forces, the opportunities by which the Taiwanese
might take to the street or issue publications advocating
political change was heavily restricted.
From 1986 to the present, the oppositional sphere has
widened through the mediation of an institutionalized
opposition party and new social movements. The
confrontation between civil society and the party-state had
shaken the one-party state to its very foundation in the
mid-1980s, for instance, the KMT's response to the challenge
from civil society was to democratize the legislature,
replace martial law with an independent legal system, end
party domination of the media and educational institutions
and allow people to visit mainland China. As a result, the
KMT regime which was once referred to as a 'hard
authoritarian' state has moved to being a 'soft' one. The
mainlander-dominated rule under a one-party dictatorship has
been replaced by joint mainlander-Taiwanese rule.
In sum, the mainlanders' ideological commitment to
constitutional democracy, and persisting political struggle
of the Taiwanese opposition, and, first and foremost, the
economic and political maturity of ordinary citizens are
part of the long-term impetus towards Taiwan's
liberalization and democratization. It has not been without
bitterness that the authoritarian KMT regime based on a
Leninist party structure has moved forward democratic rule.
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However, political and social transformation in Taiwan has
been profoundly significant for the people of Taiwan.
Perhaps, Taiwan's democratic reform and political
liberalization can serve as an example for communist China
which often declares its intention to pursue political
unification with Taiwan either through negotiating table or
by force.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE AND
THE MAINSTREAM AND ALTERNATIVE PRESS
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of the press lies at the heart of the democratic
process. Ideally, media democracy means that the people
have equal access to the media. In the real world, this
vision is undermined, because the media are often subject to
state control and market censorship (Garnham, 1990;
Habermas, 1989; Keane, 1991). Arguably, media democracy
only exists on the condition that the press is relatively
independent from political and economic pressures.
Therefore, the defence of the freedom of the press is always
a state for which to be strived, especially in an
authoritarian society like Taiwan, where the press has been
subjected to state control.
This chapter sets out a framework for the discussion of
how the party-state has interfered with both the mainstream
and alternative press to pursue its own communicative
interests, and in what ways its intervention has been
significantly diluted by the economic and democratic
political forces generated by civil society. Underlining
this discussion is the concept of dialectical control
between the state and civil society. The liberalization of
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civil society introduces the new dimension of power arising
from the advance of social interest and scrutiny of state
conduct. Thus, despite the authoritarian regime offering
less media democracy, the possibility of autonomous
communication by ordinary citizens still exists. Therefore,
a search for models of democratic communication in Taiwan
would involve an examination of not only the exploitative
use of the mainstream media by the party-state, but also the
development of underground media speaking on behalf of
various dissenting groups that the party-state struggles to
suppress.
TAIWANESE REALITY
According to the liberal press model, one political role of
news media is to publicize and scrutinize the actions of
government on behalf of the citizens. Generally speaking,
in a highly ideological and authoritarian system, the news
media are often used as socializing agents for the ruling
party or the government. Taiwan is a case in point.
The party-state has intervened in the media through
involvement in the economics of the media, by controlling
ownership and regulating journalistic performance for four
decades. Although Taiwan has a highly commercial radio and
television broadcast system as well as newspapers and
periodicals, these media are also subject to substantial
official control. Recently, apart from the electronic media
which are still controlled by the party-state, the
101
development of democratisation and free market forces in
Taiwanese society has significantly altered the nature of
state censorship over the press.
1. The Party-state and the Press
The Nationalist party, also known as the Kuo Min Tang (KMT)
in Taiwan was characterized as a one-party authoritarian
regime from 1949 to the mid-1980s: In such a one-party
state, the party is the key source of power, because all
government agencies, representative bodies and civil
organizations are tightly controlled by the KMT (Cheng Tun-
jen, 1989:477; Chu Yun-han, 1992:17-18; Chou Yang-sun and
Nathan,	 1987:277-278;	 Huntington,	 1991:12-13;	 Myers,
1987:1003; Tien Hung-mao, 1989:9-11). In Taiwan's case, the
KMT enjoyed privileged access to the state, including its
administrative, economic, judicial and ideological
apparatuses, through which its nationalist heritage was
disseminated into society.
Under KMT rule, the media were used to cultivate the
KMT's nationalist programme and to motivate the people to
actively support government policies. The media were also
used to condemn those who opposed its governing system and
national identity. For instance, according to the Radio and
Television Law, the functions of radio and television
enterprises are making known national policies and
government orders, reporting news, making commentaries,
promoting social education, developing Chinese culture,
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providing decent recreation and enhancing public welfare.
According to the liberal press model, the media are
independent of state authorities; thereby they perform as a
watchdog making state authorities accountable to ordinary
citizens. By contrast, in a highly ideological and
authoritarian society, the media are integrated with state
agencies and seen as socializing agents for the purpose of
ideological purity.
According to the constitution, freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are conceived as rights of all citizens
in the Republic of China (ROC), fully guaranteed by the
party-state. However, the KMT was in confrontation with
communist China between 1949 to 1987, freedom of speech and
freedom of press was suspended in accordance with martial
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law in order to maintain the security of the country. Since
the KMT established its rule in 1949, an anti-communist
policy has been adopted to justify its restriction of
political and civil rights. The media are viewed as an
ideological arm of the state, therefore, they have to
function as an educator to promote the solidarity of the
people and to strengthen the rule of law in accordance with
the ideology of anti-communism. Furthermore, the media must
challenge those who attempt to undermine this basic policy.
For example, in 1958, in a speech to publishers, the late
President Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the government
welcomed newspapers criticizing its policies. Furthermore,
there would be no great objections, even if newspapers
should exercise greater freedom in commenting on public
103
affairs. But the President stressed that all criticisms
should be made in a manner not contravening the fundamental
interest of the nation (Hansen and Bishop, 1981:40).
In 1974, in a message for the Fourth Journalists'
Conference, the late President Chiang Kai-shek urged that
every journalist should accept responsibility for
publicizing the greatness of the Three Principles of the
People, attacking heresy and cultivating the people's
conscience and desire to aspire for the better. In so
doing, the journalists could help the government complete
the sole task of the National Revolution (The KMT's Fourth
Journalists' Conference, Sept. 1974).
In 1978, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo addressed
the Fifth Journalists' Conference, he also urged local
journalists to enhance the morale of the people and
encourage the government's anti-communist policy.
'First, ... We must swear to be dedicated and courageous. We
must be faithful and loyal to our country. We should support
the government's anti-Communist policy all the way and
fortify the nation's position and power....
Second, ... I am convinced that in these times no one should
undermine our constitutional foundations by spurning public
opinion and giving false accounts of the facts....
Third, ... I am convinced that no one should continue to
seek private gain at the expense of the people, undermine
stability, attempt to fish in troubled waters or put
obstacles in the way of national progress....
Fourth, ... I am convinced that there should be no one who
continue to undermine social stability and peace with the
intention of plunging the world into disorder by doing evil
things and confusing the people with rumours....' (China
Yearbook, 1978:31-34)
In sum, it is evident that the news media have been
seen as socializing agents for the KMT government. By
taking their social responsibilities, the news media should
serve as a channel for enunciating state policy or
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exercising ideological control, never act as the fourth
estate which is independent of the government.
(1) The Party-state and the Press Control Machines
The state is the sole monopolistic source of judicial and
coercive power (Held, 1989:41; Skocpol, 1993:310). A great
volume of power that the KMT exercises over the media is
mediated through the state apparatus.
The regulation of the news media in Taiwan was
extensive from 1949 to 1988. Before 1988 deregulation, most
of the laws and regulations implemented by the KMT to
interfere in the media industry or journalistic performance
were administrative ones. The KMT government tightly
controlled the media in accordance with the following
regulations: (1) the Publication Law (promulgated in 1952,
revised in 1958 and 1973); (2) martial law (revised in 1948,
again in 1949 and lifted in 1987); (3) the National General
Mobilization Act (promulgated in 1942 and revised in 1949,
abolished in 1991); (4) Sedition Law (promulgated in 1949);
and (5) press bans (issued in 1950 and abolished in 1988).
In Taiwan, legal control of the news media has been
directly operated by political authorities rather than
judicial agencies. In general, three government or semi-
government agencies are in charge of managing and regulating
the news media: these are the Government Information Office
(GIO) of the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Garrison Command
(TGC) under the Ministry of Defence and the Department of
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Cultural Affairs (DCA) of the KMT.
According to the Publication Law, the GIO is in charge
of the registration of newspapers, magazines and other
publications. It empowers the GIO and the TGC to enact
publishing bans and deny newspaper licenses, including
disregarding court decisions. Under the rule of martial
law, the TGC primarily suppressed the opposition periodical
press from 1949 to 1987. The task of managing the political
outlook of the press is left primarily to the DCA. The DCA
coordinates contacts between the KMT's press branch and the
network of party branches in individual news organizations.
(2) The Party-state Involvement in the Economics of the
Press
Legally, the press industry in Taiwan had been heavily
regulated by press bans known as the three restrictions
implemented by the Executive Yuan between 1951 and 1988.
The first restriction concerned the legal requirement for
the registration of new newspapers. From the early 1960s to
1988 no licenses for new newspapers were issued.
Accordingly, the KMT government foreclosed registration of
new press licenses citing the need to conserve scarce
foreign exchange for buying imported newsprint. Therefore,
until 1988 the total number of newspapers in Taiwan was
frozen at 31.
The second restriction concerned the regulation of the
page limit. The government ordained a 6-page limit on all
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newspapers before 1967, although it was revised several
times. From 1967 to 1976 the number of pages was confined
to 10, and between 1977 and 1987 12 pages were imposed on
all newspapers (Wang Hung-chun, 1986:67). The maximum in
1988 rose from 12 to 20 pages (Wang Hung-chun, 1988:20).
However, this provision allowed newspapers to include an
extra 4 pages on special occasions, such as the Founding of
the ROC (1 January), Youth Day (29 March), Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial Day (5 April), Birthday of Confucius (28
September), National Day (10 October), Taiwan Restoration
Day (25 October), Chiang Kai-shek's Birthday (31 October)
and Constitution Day (25 December) (The Manual of News Work,
1956:44).
The third restriction was that the location of a
_
newspaper's printing facility should be near to its intended
area of distribution. Moreover, the price of all newspapers
was set by the government and the Press Council, with no
freedom for adjustment by the publisher or the market.
In addition to the regulation of the press industry
previously mentioned, much of party-state intervention has
involved fiscal advantages and subsidies being offered to
promote better economic conditions for newspapers. The KMT
government has heavily intervened in the economic
infrastructure of the press since the mid-1950s. According
to the Manual of News Work issued by the Taiwan Provincial
Government, advantages, including tax rate, transportation
rate and telecommunication rate concessions, have been
provided by administrative agencies to the news media since
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1956 (Wen Shih-kung, 1984:eight).
Moreover, the government has reduced taxation on
advertising revenues and exemptions from sales taxes and
duties on imported news print and ink to help the operating
costs of the press. The newspapers in Taiwan are exempted
from taxes on their profit. Unlike other businesses, the
shares of newspapers are not sold on the open market.
According to the regulation of the Department of Economics,
any company with NT$ 200 million (US$ 8 million) in capital
is required to make the transaction of shares public.
However, two media conglomerates, the China Times and the
United Daily News, each had an annual revenue of more than
NT$ 5 billion (US$ 1.4 million) in 1985, and none of them
were listed in the stock market (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 26 March 1987:40). The government only taxes 5% of
the newspapers' advertising avenues. Also, tax privileges
are granted in importing modern printing facilities. For
instance, the newspaper industry has to pay duties on
imported newsprint (10%) and on printing facilities (14%)
(Lee Chin-chuan, 1987:65). This is far less than the duties
which are paid by other publishing industries, such as the
book and magazine sectors.
Furthermore, subsidies and loans are given to help
cover the newspapers' operating expenses. Generally
speaking, before the mid-1970s, almost all the newspapers in
Taiwan were funded by the KMT government. The Manual of
News Work published by the Taiwan Provincial Government in
1956, indicated that journalists had been subsidized as well
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as civil servants since 1953. Furthermore, an official who
was responsible for news work in the Taiwan Provincial
Government pointed out that the privately owned papers
including the two big paper groups were regularly asking the
government for financial assistance to cover the costs of
staff until the late 1960s (Chen Sheue-yun, 1991b:135).
Also, they were dependent on government loans to upgrade
print facilities and to build office blocks.
It is worth discussing how the DCA played an important
role in providing financial assistance to help ensure the
continued existence of some privately owned newspapers.
Generally, these papers were not able to survive in an
economically competitive marketplace. The main reason for
the KMT's assistance for preserving politically docile, but
economically weak papers was a wish not to increase the
availability of newspapers which might introduce diverse
views or opinions into the marketplace. In addition, by
protecting existing small papers through the provision of
funds, this helped most papers avoid being taken over by
opposition groups and made them less willing to challenge
the KMT regime. For instance, the DCA provided NT$ 80
million (US$ 2.2 million) to help the Min Tsu Evening News
survive in 1982, and insisted that the paper should continue
to be controlled by the founding family (The Journalist, 3-9
Aug. 1987:41). In 1986, with the DCA's endorsement, the
People's Daily was given a loan of NT$ 140 million (US$ 4
million) by some banks in order to establish modern printing
facilities (Wealth, April 1987:216).
	
In 1987, Hwa Xia
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Investment Holding Co. which is controlled by the KMT
Central Finance Committee provided NT$ 70 million (US$ 1.7
million) to the Great China Evening News to help the paper
compete more economically (Wealth, Nov. 1987:191).
Finally, the government provides financial assistance
through public advertising and subscription to newspapers.
For instance, the government provided 70% of advertising
revenues for the newspapers in the 1950s (Lee Chin-chuan,
1991:13). The most prominent example of the government's
indirect intervention in aiding the press is that 134,748
heads of neighbourhood and community associations have been
subsidized to subscribe to the newspapers since 1970.
Before the mid-1988, they had to subscribe to the party-
state owned newspapers (Brain, May 1989:17). Also, the
Ministry of Education has subsidized the Central Daily News
to publish the Foreign Edition for students (including
Chinese) studying abroad. Accordingly, the provision of
funds was NT$ 120 million (US$ 4.8 million) in fiscal year
1988 which began 1 July and NT$ 79 million (US$ 3.2 million)
in fiscal year 1989 (Wealth, May 1988:147). Another example
is that the Central News Agency annually received more than
NT$ 250 million (US$ 10 million) from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. This provision of funds was used to help
cover 80% of its operating expenses in 1991 (Wealth, March
1992:99).
Generally, before 1980 the newspapers published by the
government and KMT authorities had a circulation advantage.
For instance, public institutions, agencies and offices
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ranging from national government bodies to local community
centres, and even secondary and primary schools had to
subscribe to these newspapers. Furthermore government
enterprises, such as railways and bus stations, and even
some tourist hostels often offered only these so-called
public dailies for sale (Tien Hung-mao, 1989:200). By
contrast, public institutions, agencies and offices were
rarely permitted to subscribe to either the Independence
Evening Post or the People's Daily News which are best known
for a relatively critical stance and balanced coverage on
politically sensitive issues (Berman, 1992:143).
(3) The Party-state Intervention in Control over
Ownership
Media control is exercised through the complex interplay
between legal structural constraints and control of
ownership (Murdock, 1982:123-125). Before 1988, apart from
state intervention in the economics of the press, the KMT
also involved itself directly in the ownership of some of
the media and in preventing political opponents from taking
over the privately owned media.
3.1 The Party-state Ran a Third of Newspapers
As mentioned previously, from 1960 to 1988, the number of
newspapers was 31, because the government foreclosed
registration of new press licenses.
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By 1988 Taiwan had 31 newspapers, 19 of these were
privately owned, while 4 were run by the KMT and the
government, and 6 by the military. Taiwan's press structure
can be explained by two variables: newspaper ownership and
geographical scope of circulation.
According to Table 4-1 (p.159), geographically,
Taiwan's newspapers can be classified into three categories:
island wide, regional and local before 1988. The 8
newspapers in the island-wide category published local
editions readily available only in the relevant portion of
the island. The same first four pages and the supplement of
each issue were distributed throughout Taiwan, but local
editions of the island-wide newspapers typically covered
such areas as the Great Pingtung Plain and Eastern Taiwan.
_
The local edition of an island-side paper gave extensive
coverage about areas of the island.
The regional newspapers were circulated over about half
of the island, but distribution patterns naturally depended
on the paper's place of publication. Papers in the regional
category published one edition to appeal to the entire
market. This was accomplished by printing local pages such
as a Central Taiwan page, a Cha-nan Plain page and so on.
Generally, local newspapers located in a county seat,
tended to restrict local coverage to their home town and its
neighbouring counties. These newspapers usually depended on
news agencies for non-local coverage.
Table 4-1 (p.159) also shows that 7 newspapers were
affiliated with the KMT and the government. Three of them--
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the Central Daily News and the Chinese Daily News (northern
and southern editions) were directly owned by the KMT. The
Central Daily News was the official publication of the KMT
Central Standing Committee. Its editorial line and
treatment of controversial issues exposed the current views
of the party's policy makers and set the direction of the
others. The Chinese Daily News was a primarily KMT
controlled paper including southern and northern editions.
Unlike the Central Daily News, the Chinese Daily News
emphasized local news and also 'soft' news.
Various government agencies controlled 8 newspapers.
The Shin-sheng Pao Company, an affiliate of the Taiwan
Provincial Government issued two dailies: the Hsin Sheng Pao
in Taipei, and the Taiwan News Journal in Kaohsiung. The
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circulation of the latter was limited to southern Taiwan.
The other 4 newspapers were associated with the General
Political Department in the Ministry of Defence: the Youth
Daily News (previously known as the Youth Soldier News),
Matsu Daily News, Kinmen Daily News, Chung Chen News, China
Daily News and Taiwan Daily News. Except for Taiwan Daily
News and China Daily News, their circulation was mainly
confined to active military personnel and students and their
editorial policies maintained a strongly conservative tone.
When privately owned newspapers are examined, the China
Times and the United Daily News are in the island-wide
category. The United Daily News was the flagship of a
newspaper conglomerate which owned two other newspapers: the
Economic Daily News and the Min Sheng Pao. The China Times
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was the centrepiece of another conglomerate which also
included one daily, the Industrial and Commercial Times.
The three Taipei evening newspapers (the Independence
Evening Post, the Min Tsu Evening News, the Great China
Evening News) formed a specific category of the regional
press. Circulation generally remained restricted to the
northern part of the island. The China Post and the China
News were two English papers that form another category
within the regional press.
Another privately owned paper, the Mandarin Daily News
was unique for its use of 40 phonetic symbols next to the
Chinese characters and was intended for primary students and
aimed to help adult readers to learn Mandarin.
3.2 Interlocking Relations Between Publishers and the
KMT
Generally speaking, the KMT intervenes in the press,
especially the privately-run papers, through interlocking
relationships. Before 1988's deregulation, most publishers
of privately owned papers were more or less associated with
the KMT-- for instance, the owners of two media
conglomerates, the China Times and the United Daily News,
monopolised approximately 80% of newspaper circulation.
There were Yu Chi-chung and Wang Tih-wu, whose political
power was symbolized by their position on the KMT's highest
decision organ--the Central Standing Committee.
By examining the social backgrounds of the newspaper
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publishers, it becomes clear that there is a high degree of
media-political elite integration. Firstly, the publishers
of government and party owned newspapers are linked by their
common pattern of education. Most have either gone to
Central Chengchi School or National Chengchi University,
with the former being established to train information
officers for the KMT. As for the publishers of military
newspapers, they have all graduated from the Political
Warfare College of the Ministry of National Defence which
was built up to educate information officers for the armed
forces.1
Secondly, personal appointments, among publishers of
party and government owned papers and political elites in
the party and the government often follow a path of inter-
institutional circulation. In general, they may start at
government (party) agencies, then transfer to the newspaper
publishers, and back to the higher ranking posts in the
government or the party.2
When the social backgrounds of the publishers of
privately owned newspapers are analyzed, three patterns are
found. Firstly, the vast majority of publishers, especially
the mainlanders are closely associated with the KMT. Table
4-2 (p.160) shows that 13 out of 15 newspapers' publishers
are KMT party members. For example, the owners of two
newspaper conglomerates, Wang Tih-wu and Yu Chi-chung were
'Data compiled by the researcher based on Who's Who published by
China Book Corporation in 1978 and China Yearbook (1949-1988) published
by the Government Information Office of the Executive Yuan.
'Ibid.
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members of Central Standing Committee which is the highest
organ of the KMT. Wei Chun-mung served as Director-General
of Government Information Office, while Yu-Huang Nancy was
with the KMT Central Advisory Council. Keng Hsiu-yeh and
Wan Jung-taw worked for the Central Daily News as editors-
in-chief before they established their own newspapers.
Secondly, four privately owned newspapers were
published by the Taiwanese. Two of them are considered
relatively independent on many politically sensitive issues.
Wu San-lien, publisher of the Independence Evening Post, was
a well-regarded non-KMT political figure and served as
Taipei's mayor in the opposition party. The People's Daily
News publisher Li Jei-piao, was a businessman with four
owners more or less related to private business enterprises.
A third pattern is that the privately owned newspapers
display a highly-concentrated pattern of ownership which may
be characterized as being family ownership centred. Table
4-2 (p.160) points out that the privately owned newspapers
whether controlled by the mainlanders or Taiwanese were
largely dominated by their original founding families and
their associates.
3.3 The Party-state Involvement in the Takeover of the
Newspapers
Before 1988, in addition to owning a significant number of
newspapers, the KMT government tactically controlled the
privately owned newspapers by ensuring these remained in the
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hands of loyal KMT backers. Generally speaking, the
existing licenses for newspapers were allowed to be traded,
but only the people who were politically affiliated with the
KMT could participate in any ownership transaction. Apart
from that, the high price of these licenses effectively
prevented groups who challenged the KMT from acquiring the
press.
The KMT government had heavily intervened in the
transfer of newspaper ownership during the period of 1970-
1985. For instance, under the mediation of the KMT, the
United Daily News acquired the Hwa Pao for NT$ 40 million
(US$ 1 million) in 1977, and the China Times took over the
ownership of the Mass Daily for NT$ 21 million (US$ 520,000)
in 1978 (Wealth, April 1986:174-175).	 As has been noted
previously, the owners of these two paper groups, Wang Tih-
wu and Yu Chi-chung are closely associated with the KMT.
A notable case in the transfer of newspaper ownership
is the Taiwan Daily News. The Taiwan Daily News known as an
outspoken newspaper which did not black out news on
opposition activities was sold to the KMT for US$ 2.2
million in 1978 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 Sept.
1978:22). Moreover, the KMT purchased the Commercial and
Industrial Daily News with a price of NT$ 60 million (US$
1.5 million) in 1982 in order to prevent it from being taken
over by opposition groups (Wealth, April 1987:230). Shortly
after, the DCA also invested NT$ 90 million (US$ 2.5
million) in modernizing its equipment and facilities. In
1985, the Department of Defence took control of the People
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Voice with a price of NT$ 100 million (US$ 2.5 million)
(Wealth, April 1987:179).
(4) The Party-state Involvement in the Regulation of
Journalistic Practice
4.1 Content Regulations
Under sets of laws and regulations, the KMT government is
empowered to censor the contents of news media, in order to
protect national defence secrets, maintain social order, and
first and foremost to curtail the voice of its political
opponents. Generally speaking, Taiwan's publications were
banned through violating some vague restrictions. According
to martial law which was in force from 1949 to 1988, the TGC
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could prohibit newspapers, magazines photographs, postcards
and other printed materials deemed harmful to the military.
After an examination of the regulations related to
publications, it becomes clear that most of the regulations
are designed to suppress political dissent and punish
individuals involved in the production and distribution of
politically undesirable print matter. Except for the
Publication Law, religious and moral issues are not of
direct concern. Article 33 of the Publication Law
stipulates, 'no publication shall make comments on a lawsuit
currently under investigation or pending judgement, or on
the judicial personnel handling the case, or on the parties
concerned; nor shall it publish details of debates about a
lawsuit closed to the public'.
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Martial law empowered the TGC to conduct pre-
circulation censorship of printed materials which was deemed
supportive of the Chinese communists, slandered the head of
state, stirred up animosity between government and the
people, or violated the national policy of anticommunism.
Furthermore, the Regulation for the Censorship of
Wartime Publications declared that publication was
forbidden, if it made any attempt to: (1) reveal any secret
documents of a military, diplomatic or any other official
organ without authorization; (2) support the Chinese
communists; (3) slander the head of state; (4) violate the
national policy of anti-communism; (5) stir up animosity
between the government and the people; (6) impair public
morals and (7) endanger the public peace. Furthermore,
Article 6 of the Sedition Law prescribed a prison sentence
of seven years to life for those convicted on the charge of
'disseminating false news with the intent of confusing
public opinion'. Article 7 prescribed a minimum prison term
of seven years to anyone 'providing propaganda benefit to
the bandit rebels (Chinese communists) through writing,
illustration or speech'.
In sum, the essence of these laws and regulations was
to ensure that the publications conform to the KMT's basic
policy. This means that under regulations such issues as
the relaxation of martial law and other emergency decrees,
the continued unchallenged rule of the KMT, news of the
political opposition, the KMT's refusal of contacts with
Beijing, the KMT's rejection of independence for Taiwan, the
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military's role in Taiwan's politics and personal matters of
chiang's family were not open for discussion.
4.2 Informal Control
The KMT party apparatus has played an important role in
monitoring media activities, especially before the mid-
1980s. Generally, the DCA which coordinates contacts
between the KMT's press branch and the network of party
branches in individual news organizations is responsible for
managing the political rectitude of the press.
One task of managing the press is to convey KMT
policies about press work and to transmit party directives
on the format and content of the media. In order to fulfil
this aim, the DCA held five work conferences for the news
media between 1963 and 1978 (China Yearbook, 1963, 1964,
1969, 1974 and 1978).
For example, more than 200 newsworkers participated in
the Fourth Press Work Conference held in April 1974. The
participants included (1) 131 KMT publishers, board chairmen
or general managers of newspapers and electronic media, plus
editors and department heads from all major media; (2) 100
KMT party functionaries in charge of propaganda activities
in the party or government administrations; and (3) 13 KMT
scholars and experts specializing in communications (The
KMT's Fourth Press Work Conference, 1974:83-88).
At the conference four themes were widely discussed.
These were (1) how to bring press policy in line with the
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Three Principles of the People, (2) how to mobilize the
media to support the nation's development programmes, (3)
how to coordinate the media's anti-People's Republic of
China coverage through joint efforts with party and
government offices, and (4) how to improve the content and
management of the mass media to serve the interests of the
nation.
As elaborated previously, publishers and top editors of
major newspapers are party loyalists. They usually act as
gatekeepers to prevent certain kinds of information from
reaching their audience. Broadly speaking, the journalists
who failed to follow the party line, were punished through
reprimands by party officials, or by being transferred to
less desirable posts, or even by dismissal. Sometimes, KMT
officials would approach reporters about how the party hoped
to see certain issues covered. Very often the pressure
imposed on reporters did not involve direct contact by
officials, but through a superior who gave warnings about
their possible loss of employment (Jacobs, 1976:786). For
example, when the Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong's
future was signed in 1984, the DCA instructed the press not
to print the text of the agreement. After the full text was
discovered in the United Daily News, the chief editor Chao
Yu-ming was removed from his position (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 26 Dec. 1985:26).
More importantly, some tactics have been used by DCA
officials to ensure that news coverage is within politically
acceptable boundaries.
	 Before the mid-1980s, the DCA
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frequently made phone calls to editors with instructions or
suggestions on how a story should be treated (Hansen and
Bishop, 1981:42).
Generally, events concerning electoral campaigns or
other major political events, whether domestic or foreign,
that may have affected the political stability needed
special handling. Therefore, the DCA usually met the
publishers and top editors of major newspapers in advance to
discuss the proper orientation of press coverage to the
event concerned. For example, on 19 November 1977, a mass
protest against alleged irregularities in counting votes
took place in the Central Taiwan town of Chungli. In this
instance, a serious clash between angry voters and the
police occurred. Consequently, a district police station
was burned and a number of casualties were reported. On
that day, the GIO met the newspaper's publishers and editors
and laid down three guidelines for the press to deal with
the first major outbreak of popular anti-government violence
in 30 years. At the GIO's requests, the news stories
pertaining to the incident were not allowed to appear on the
front page or make the main headlines. Also, no photographs
in connection with the riots were allowed to get into print
(The Journalist, 23-39 Nov. 1987:37). As a result of this
pressure, all newspapers complied with the GIO's
restrictions.
In 1983 the U.S. edition of the China Times violated
unwritten taboos by running a front page story about the
achievements of athletes from China at the Los Angeles
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Summer Olympics. Its owner Yu Chi-chung was condemned by
the KMT's conservatives (Far Eastern Economic Review, 26
Dec. 1985:26). After two years of operation, the paper was
forced to close down in November 1984 (Track of the Times,
1991:78). Another notable case is when the People's Daily
News was charged with violating the Publication Law in 1985.
On 10 June 1985, the People's Daily News published six out
of eight news items regarding Communist China on its front
page. In this instance, the GIO took an unprecedented
administrative measure against the People's Daily News by
suspending its publication for seven days (Chen Kuo-hsiang
and Chu Ping, 1987:210-211).
Since the mid-1980s, press comment has been far more
open than the previous 10 years yet the party cultural
department remains active in advising editors on how to
handle certain sensitive topics. On 28 September 1986, the
DCA met with the editors of the major newspapers with
suggestions that they should drop news stories regarding the
formation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP). In this instance, the major newspapers, such as the
China Times and the United Daily News were reluctant to
completely toe the party line, in part due to market
competition. They still printed stories about this event,
although it was treated lightly (Wealth, Feb. 1990:170).
2. Liberalization of Civil Society and the Press
In Taiwan, commercial journalism emerged between 1970 and
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1980. During this period, the growth of the economy led to
social pluralism, urbanization, and increased mass exposure
to the media. More importantly, popular demands for more
civil and political rights led to a challenge of the KMT's
authoritarian rule and a demand among readers for a range of
opinion.
Between 1960 and 1980, Taiwan's gross national product
increased at an annual rate of 9%; its exports expanded by
around 20% a year; the average annual individual growth rate
increased from 25 to 45% (GNP Per Capita In Taiwan, 1988).
High growth in the industrial sectors not only changed
patterns of employment, but also brought about the growth in
advertising investment. Moreover, high growth rates for
income had meant widespread improvements in the living
standards for residents. As a consequence, they were able
to spend more money on purchasing consumer goods and
cultural items, resulting in record rates of ownership for
televisions, radios, magazines and daily newspapers. For
example, the ownership of newspapers increased significantly
from 9.7% to 14.1% between 1976 and 1979 (Taiwan Social
Index: 1989).
Newspaper sales rose from 1.8 million to 3.5 million
between 1976 and 1979 (China Publication Yearbook, 1981:16).
During the period of 1976-9, advertising investment in
newspapers increased from an estimated NT$ 1.94 billion to
NT$ 4.42 billion (Yen Po-chin, 1987:67).
In the early 1970s, in order to cope with the change in
the audience market the major newspapers deliberately
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invested in new printing plant and new printing technology.
For example, the United Daily News (1971), the China Times
(1971), the Taiwan News Journal (1976), the Central Daily
News (1963), the Chinese Daily News (southern edition)
(1971), the Min Tsu Evening News (1971), and the
Independence Evening Post (1971) built new offices and
printing plant and all adopted new technologies, such as
high speed printing machines (Lee Jang, 1975:96-98).
In western countries, the growth of the concentration
of ownership and competition for advertising patronage has
significantly narrowed the range of ideas in the print media
(Bagdikian, 1985:104; Sparks, 1992a:40-42). In Taiwan's
case, the audience market and advertising played a crucial
role in emancipating newspapers from state economic control.
Commercial interests and consumer pressure sometimes force
the papers to run counter to the political establishment.
As a result, Taiwan's papers maintain a degree of
independence that is not found in many other authoritarian
regimes (Berman, 1992:156).
Because of economic growth in the early 1970s, most
privately owned newspapers, especially the China Times and
the United Daily News, are no longer reliant on government
advertising. However, at that moment the economic interests
in a commercial media system were not powerful enough to
override KMT directives. The reasons are several. At
first, no new papers were allowed to be established in
accordance with the press bans and all the existing papers
were still controlled by or affiliated to the KMT.
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Secondly, the political opposition forces derived from
Taiwan society were not strong enough to create an audience
market in which the politically independent papers could
come into existence.
According to the Taiwanese experience, competition for
audience markets may not necessarily threaten the media
marketplace of ideas, especially the papers operating in a
rapidly changing political environment. Under such
circumstances, the gap between the number of ideas in
society and the number of ideas in the media is great,
therefore, the alternative opinions and ideas are easily
introduced into the marketplace. For instance, in the early
1980s, so-called liberal papers emerged in response to the
steady development of the political opposition. These
papers deliberately ran counter to the KMT or at least
distanced themselves from the party line in order to attract
an audience which was ignored in the market. For instance,
on 2 December 1986, thousands of opposition supporters
clashed with troops at Chiang Kai-shek International
Airport. In this instance, the Independence Evening Post
was the only paper to cover that the demonstrators were
bullied by the police (Chen Kuo-hsiang and Chu Ping,
1987:209). The Independence Evening Post and the People's
Daily News enjoyed a great boost in their sales, because
they turned the spotlight on the political opposition in the
first half of 1980s.
The role that two major newspapers, the China Times and
the United Daily News played in the political transition was
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much more complex.	 Traditionally, these two big paper
groups were politically affiliated to the KMT. Furthermore,
they seemed to collaborate with the KMT in suppressing the
opposition (Lee Chin-chuan, 1991:48). This was particularly .
true by the mid-1980s.
In the late 1980s, the KMT was no longer an unified
party. Faced with a divided KMT, the political orientation
taken by these two rival papers was quite different. The
United Daily News displayed an ideological kinship with the
KMT's conservatives, while the China Times was associated
with the liberal wing (Lee Chin-chuan, 1991:47). The role
that the United Daily News played in reporting KMT's
political conflict was very controversial. For instance, it
was widely accused of participating in the KMT's internal
battles in February 1990 and November 1992, and condemned as
biased in favour of the party's conservative wing, a
grouping who directly challenged Taiwan's first native-born
president (Wealth, Jan. 1993:237 and 253).
Under the commercial media system, the economic power
with the readers is another force generated from civil
society to shape the papers' policy (Murdock, 1980:42). In
Taiwan's case, the consumers exercised little influence on
the journalistic performance. Even though, in 1977, the
United Daily News failed to cover the Chungli anti-
government riot that resulted in a subscription cancellation
movement targeted at the paper (Berman, 1992:140).
In post-martial law Taiwan, the pressure from readers
to loosen the media's ties with the KMT took place
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occasionally. For instance, hundreds of opposition
supporters gathered to throw eggs and stones at the Taiwan
Television Corporation (TTV) to protest about unbalanced
coverage on 5 April 1988 (The Independence Daily Post, 6
April 1988:1).
In May 1990, some liberal scholars campaigned to
boycott the United Daily News (Wealth, Jan. 1993:237). The
'Return Papers, Save Taiwan' campaign launched by the
opposition groups on 23 November 1992 was the most well
organized and comprehensive campaign to protest against the
United Daily News. In addition to encourage the readers to
end their subscription, the campaigners persuaded
businessmen to stop running advertising in this paper.
Accordingly, the circulation of the United Daily News
_
reduced 80,000 copies and lost 20% of its advertising
revenues during the time period of the campaigns (Wealth,
Jan. 1993:241).
Coverage of opposition movements is a specific example
of how the media have been shaped by market forces and
political influence. In Taiwan, the political opposition
movement launched by the Taiwanese to challenge the KMT's
legitimacy emerged in the mid-1970s and by the mid-1980s had
gained a strong foothold. Since the political opposition
has been viewed as a threat to KMT rule, censorship is
inevitably imposed on the media to limit the political
debate.
Generally, the press was compliant with the party in .
reporting the opposition before 1980. Firstly, almost all
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newspapers deliberately suppressed or diluted the news
regarding the opposition. For instance, when a debate about
elections to the national parliament took place on 7
December 1971 at the National Taiwan University, publicity
had been substantial and a large number of people including
many reporters attended the debate. The next day, however,
only one of over 20 newspapers reported the debate (Jacobs,
1976:786). In reporting parliamentary activities, the
opposition lawmakers hardly received media attention before
1980 (see Table 4-3, p.161). In contrast, the officials and
KMT lawmakers were prominent in the news coverage.
Secondly, before 1980 the political opposition movement
was portrayed as a tiny minority who threatened national
security and social stability. For instance, in coverage of
the Formosa Incident which occurred in 1979, the opposition
were labelled as follows: (1) they were people with a
military intention to overthrow the government (traitors,
rebels, insurrectionalists, communists); (2) they were
people with a violent tendency (insurgents, saboteurs, mobs,
militants, agitators, rioters, troublemakers); (3) they were
irrational people (psychopaths, crazy, egocentric,
conspirators); (4) they were extremists and radicals; (5)
they were criminals, not decent members of society
(gangsters, lawbreakers); (6) they were the marginal members
of society (aliens, deviants, minority, outsiders) (Chen
Sheue-yun, 1991b:290). Since the opposition was attributed
as the source of violence and chaos, the authorities were
encouraged to take tough coercive action against them,
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rather than to conduct political and constitutional reform
(Chen Sheue-yun, 1991b:307; Cheng Jei-cheng and Chen Sheue-
yun, 1991:86-87).
In the mid-1980s, the press was faced with both market
competition and a rapidly changing political climate.
During this period, only the party-state controlled
newspapers still treated the opposition as a violent
criminal group. By contrast, this negative coverage of the
opposition group in the privately-run papers was
significantly decreased.
The privately owned newspapers, such as the
Independence Evening Post and the People's Daily News began
to take a openly defiant tone with the government by the
mid-1980s.	 For instance, the Independence Evening Post
_
began to pay attention to the opposition's publicity. Its
coverage of non-violent public gatherings and mass rallies
organized by the opposition to challenge the KMT was more
extensive than the other papers (see Table 4-3, p.161).
Taking as an example the Independence Daily Post, throughout
its 1986 and 1987 coverage of mass rallies launched by the
opposition, liberal scholars' and opposition leaders'
statements were frequently quoted. In these statements,
apart from calling for respect for law and order, they
suggested that the KMT government should adopt proper
policing devices and reform the political system in order to
defuse the violent situation (Chen Sheue-yun, 1991b:314).
Apart from political information, Taiwan's newspapers
like the commercial papers published in western societies,
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began to increase non-political material including consumer
information and human interest stories in order to meet
demands from cross-sections of the readership. For
instance, in 1984, all major newspapers began to
significantly devote more space to coverage of private
affairs in order to adjust to increasing market competition.
Compared to 1975's coverage, these newspapers increasingly
carried news related to cultural, religious, entertainment,
scientific and medical affairs (see Table 4-4, p.162).
After 1988, the government-ordained 12-page limit on all the
papers was lifted, and there was an increase in the number
of pages used to cover features and news concerned with
private affairs, such as the stock market, consumer
information,	 entertainment features,	 sports,	 travel
information, leisure activities and so on (Wang Hung-chun,
1988:22). Despite this, crime news also received great
attention with, for instance, many sensationalist strategies
being employed, such as big headlines, big pictures,
investigative journalism and dramatic reports.
In sum, free-market forces can be seem to have played
a positive role in contributing to the county's political
development. However, in the late 1980s, the concentration
of ownership which started by the late 1970s has become
significant. Like the press tycoons in western countries,
the China Times and the United Daily News had sufficient
power to drive out the small and weak competitors in the
marketplace.
The big leading papers-- the China Times and the United
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Daily News began to increase their dominance in the
marketplace by the late 1970s. For instance, due to
political privilege the United Daily News acquired the
Public Forum published by an opposition politician Li Wan-
chu in 1967, and renamed it as the Economic Daily News.
Furthermore, in 1978, the United Daily News bought the
license of the Hwa Pao, and renamed it Ming Sheng Pao. The
China Times also took over the publication of the Mass Daily
and changed its name to the Industrial and Economic Times in
1978 (Wealth, April 1987:149).
In the early 1980s, the United Daily Group owned: (1)
five newspapers: three published domestically (the United
Daily News, the Economic Daily News and Min Sheng Pao) and
two published abroad for the overseas Chinese (The New York-
based World Journal and Europe Journal in Paris); (2) three
magazines: The China Tribune (an academic bi-monthly) and
The Historical Journal (an academic monthly), The United
Literature (an academic monthly); (3) a book-publishing
company; (4) one news agency: the English-language China
Economic News Service. At present, the United Daily Group
owns 4 newspapers.
At the beginning of 1980, the China Times Group owned:
(1) two newspapers: the China Times and the Industrial And
Economic Times; (2) three magazines: The China Times Weekly
( a general-interest weekly), The China Times Economic And
Business Weekly, and a Ti. S. edition of China Times Weekly
(published in New York); (3) two publishing companies; (4)
a transport firm.
	
At present, the total number of
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newspapers owned by the China Times Group is 3.
Furthermore, the prevailing market forces were
favourable to these two newspaper groups. By the early
1980s, in terms of circulation, the dominance of the two
newspaper conglomerates had become strengthened. For
example, in 1985 the United Daily News and the China Times,
each had a circulation of between 1 and 1.2 million copies
that accounted for about two-thirds of Taiwan's total
newspaper sales (Goldstein, 1985:27). In the early 1990s,
the two conglomerates controlled an estimated 80% of
newspaper sales (Wealth, Feb. 1990:144).
Furthermore, the two big newspaper conglomerates began
to attract much of the available advertising revenue. For
instance, in 1979, they collected about 35% to 45% of all
newspaper advertising revenue (Jen Pao-chin, 1987:140 and
142). In 1980, they accounted for over 50% of total
advertising expenditure on newspapers (Jen Pao-chin,
1987:120). By 1985, the two newspaper conglomerates
attracted more than 60% of total advertising revenue
(Goldstein, 1986:27). They also secured more than 70% of
the country's newspaper advertising revenue of NT$ 200
million (US$ 8 million) in 1986 (Berman, 1992:142).
In January 1988, restrictions on the publication of new
newspapers were lifted.
	
Under such circumstances, any
citizen was free to start his paper. Therefore, papers
which impartially represented consumer demands and quality
and diversity of information were expected to appear. At
the same time, through intensive competition over market
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share, a growing liberalization in reporting and press
commentary was also assumed.
After this deregulation, a process of consolidation
took place in Taiwan's press market. By the early 1990s,
the newly-launched papers which were financially insecure
and relatively small eventually lost out in the marketplace.
Only the papers which affiliated to the established ones
held enough circulation to continue publishing.
Accordingly, the most successful new papers were the United
Evening News and the China Times Express which were owned by
the two large paper groups (Wealth, Feb. 1990:126).
While the Government Information Office (GIO) issued
203 paper licenses, only 97 were actually used to publish
the newspapers (China Yearbook, 1988:1102). In 1989, among
275 licensed publishers only 50 persons ran their business
on a regular basis (Wealth, Feb. 1990:125).
The prevailing market conditions worked against the
newly-established papers for several reasons. Firstly, the
newspaper market reached saturation point in the late 1980s.
For instance, the circulation of newspapers did not sharply
increase after new papers joined the market. In fact,
multiple household purchases of newspapers declined in 1988.
Part of the explanation can be attributed to their expensive
price and homogeneous content (Wang Hung-chun, 1988:24).
Secondly, levels of expenditure in the press industry
increased, therefore the total investment required to launch
a new newspaper needs to be considered. In general, the
capital required to establish a newspaper must cover several
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aspects: costs of editorial staff, typesetting, plate-
making, working office space, and the circulation which
newspapers need to reach before they break even. In
Taiwan's case, the total costs required to establish a
newspaper in 1987 was NT$ 2 billion (US$ 60 million) (Far
Eastern Economic Review, 26 March, 1987:39). The
progressive escalation in the operating costs acts as a
barrier to entry into the market. Perhaps, the largest
constraint for new papers is the fact that the two large
paper groups have drained off much of the available
advertising revenue. Therefore, the chances of a new paper
surviving in the marketplace are relatively limited. For
instance, the Capital Morning Post was the first opposition
paper since 1963 published by a former DPP legislator, Kang
_
Ning-hsiang in June 1989. Due to difficulties in attracting
advertising, the Capital Morning Post was closed down after
only 15 months operation and with a loss of US$ 16 million
(Lee Chin-chuan, 1991:50).
For the old established newspapers, with the exception
of the two newspaper conglomerates, circulation of many
newspapers has declined, especially those newspapers who
followed the government line. For instance, in the late
1980s, the Central Daily News had a circulation of less than
100,000 copies, compared with a circulation of 140,000 in
1971 (Lee Chin-chuan, 1991:17 and 51).
In Taiwan, the party state had played a key role in
regulating the press until the easing of press regulations
in 1988. With the sharp decline in state power in 1987, the
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market, which was once viewed as the safeguard against
party-state interference, has actually become a new source
of threat to press freedom.
2. The State and Opposition Media
It is true that all less powerful groups have difficulties
in gaining access to the mainstream media. It is equally
true that they often operate alternative media to create a
sphere where their experiences, ideas and opinions are
conveyed. However, the fact that the small-scale media are
used by particular groups to communicate with society is
often neglected (Downing, 1988:168-169). In the Taiwanese
experience, the political opposition was the most important
seedbed of many alternative media. The coincidence of the
development of the political opposition which began in the
mid-1970s, building steadily until the mid-1980s, the
boundaries of the alternative public sphere were gradually
expanded.
As mentioned early, the most striking characteristic of
the press laws in Taiwan is the state's perceived right to
control and censor the media, especially the opposition
media. Under martial law, a diverse and formidable array of
censorship techniques were used by the KMT authorities to
suppress the opposition press. The opposition also
developed methods to evade the state censorship.
Because of the KMT government's tight control over the
news media, the opposition in Taiwan has traditionally been
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denied access to the newspapers and television. Therefore,
from 1960 to the mid-1980s, magazines had served as the most
important medium through which a link existed between the
public and the opposition groups. In post-martial law
Taiwan, the opposition also operated some underground
television stations to communicate their political ideas.
(1) The Opposition Press
In Taiwan's case, the opposition political movements from
the Free China Group in 1950 to the formation of the
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) in 1986 centred around
political magazines. Although the opposition is allowed to
convey its political viewpoints through magazines, there are
considerable inconveniences and high risks involved. 	 A
short life span very much characterizes almost every
magazine which is linked to the opposition. Before 1980,
opposition magazines, such as the Taiwan Political Review
and Formosa only lasted five issues. Between 1980 and 1989,
every opposition magazine published was suspended or banned
after no more than two issues (Berman, 1992:190).
1.1 The Censorship Machines
Before the lifting of martial law, the censorship of
opposition magazines in Taiwan was carried out under the
various laws and regulations relating to publications.
Censorship meant the banning or confiscation of a single
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issue of a magazine or the suspension of its publication,
usually for one year.
From 1949 to 1987, the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC)
and the Government Information Office (GIO) were two
powerful regulatory bodies which monitored opposition
publications, especially the TGC.
The publication Law enforced by the GIO of the
Executive Yuan addressed the registration of magazines.
According to Article 9, the publisher of a magazine must
submit application forms prior to publishing the first issue
to the special municipal government in whose area the
publishing establishment is to be located. This is then
forwarded to the provincial government concerned. After
screening the application and finding all the information
therein to conform with prescribed criteria, the special
municipal or provincial government shall recommend approval
to the GIO for issuance of the registration certificate.
Apart from the authority to deny registration, the GIO
is also empowered to suspend publication in which articles
are deemed seditious or likely to incite social disorder.
Article 41 stipulates that the GIO may revoke the
registration of a publication on the following grounds: (1)
that the publication is found guilty in law of sedition or
treason, or of instigating others to sedition or treason; or
(2) if continues to publish indecent articles, which are
offensive against public morals or may incite others to
commit offences against public morals, or have been
subjected to suspension for a specified period of time more
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than three times.
More importantly, the Publication Law gives the GIO the
authority to take some administrative measures against
publications which disregard judicial decisions. According
to Article 36, these administrative measures include (1)
issuing a warning; (2) imposing a fine; (3) prohibiting the
sale, distribution or importation of the publication in
question or the seizure or confiscation of the publication;
(4) the suspension of the publication for a specified period
of time; or (5) revoking the registration of the
publication.
The TGC was an arm of the Ministry of Defence and had
served as the KMT government's main tool in suppressing the
opposition press from 1949 to 1987. Thus, under martial
law, the TGC was empowered to censor publications.
According to the Provisional Regulations Governing the
Registration of Periodicals, the contents of the
publications should not as such slander the head of state,
stir up animosity between the government and the people, or
violate the national policy of anticommunist. Martial law
was replaced by the State Security Law in 1987, and the
TGC's provisions were incorporated into the Publication Law.
1.2 The Evolution of the Opposition Magazines
The opposition magazines reflected the development of the
political opposition movement that has emerged since the
mid-1970s.
	 In general, the Taiwan Political Review, a
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monthly published by a Taiwanese politician Kang Ning-hsiang
in August 1975 was viewed as the first of the opposition
magazines. Before the 1970s, there were some outspoken
political magazines, such as Free China and University.
These journals were published by the KMT's liberal
intellectuals, and even financially sponsored by the KMT,
but a hard editorial line was taken pressing the KMT
government to promote political reform and a genuine
constitutional democracy.
The Taiwan Political Review was suspended for one year,
after publishing its fifth issue. The circulation of the
Taiwan Political Review was 25,000 (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 30 Jan. 1976:19; Jacobs, 1976:787).
In 1979, magazines began to serve as the chief
organizational and ideological instruments around which the
opposition was organized. In August 1979, Formosa was
published by leading members of the opposition movements,
such as Huang Hsin-chieh, Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hung, Hsu
Hsin-liang, Lin Yi-hsiung and Shih Ming-te. Formosa
published five issues and faced the threat of confiscation
with each. Finally, Formosa was closed down in December
1979, because its publisher and editors were arrested for
provoking a riot known as the Kaohsiung Incident and charged
with an attempt to overthrow the government. The
circulation of Formosa at this time was between 62,000 and
94,000 (Lin Cheng-yi, 1989:106).
Generally, the Taiwan Political Review and Formosa
represented Taiwanese dissatisfaction with KMT rule. They
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shared the same political aims: (1) an abolition of martial
law, (2) increased civil rights for Taiwan, (3)
parliamentary reform so that representation reflects the
governing constituency, (4) direct election of the city
mayors and the Taiwan provincial governor, (5) a free press,
(6) the legalization of opposition parties, (7) amnesty for
political prisoners, (7) an independent judiciary, and (8)
removal of KMT control from schools, military and media.
However, Formosa sought confrontation with the government,
and appealed emotionally to the social discontent among the
public and based its tactics on mass mobilization. In
contrast the Taiwan Political Review proceeded with caution
and called for changes in the KMT government rule through
parliamentary politics (Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 Dec.
1979:27).
In the first half of the 1980s, because of
liberalization of civil society, a great number of new
opposition magazines came into existence. Heavy censorship
of the opposition magazines also took place during this
period. Since the opposition movement in Taiwan was always
involved in publishing magazines, the opposition press
inevitably reflected the diversity of the opposition itself.
In the early 1980s, the opposition press regained its
momentum. Furthermore, two major editorial lines emerged
from various magazines during this period. One was moderate
magazines, the other militant. The moderate magazines
included Asia, Warm Current and Progress Weekly; their
political viewpoints could be traced back to the Taiwan
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Political Review. The moderate reformers took electoral
politics as the main avenue for achieving parliamentary
democracy. Apart from criticizing the KMT's dominance and
demanding political reform, the moderate magazines also
advocated incremental reforms and acknowledged the KMT's
dominant role in the political process. By contrast, the
militant magazines emphasized the need to build a mass
movement to force reform upon an unwilling KMT and cultivate
a popular Taiwanese consciousness (Lu Ya-li, 1985:159-161).
New Trends, Striking Roots, Deep Plough, New Movement
Weekly, New Line, New Perspective and Freedom Era were
typical proponents of this approach which connected with the
journalistic tradition initiated in 1979 by Formosa
magazine.	 The militant reformers were reluctant to
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participate in the existing political system, because the
parliamentary seats open to popular electorate were so
limited.
Most magazines linked to the opposition were low-
capital and short-lived. For instance, the capital needed
to publish Formosa in 1979 was NT$ 500,000 (US$ 12,500) (The
Journalist, 9-15 Oct. 1989:16). On average, an investment
of NT$ 300,000 to 400,000 (US$ 7,500 to 10,000) was
necessary for publishing an issue of the magazine in the
early 1980s (The Independence Evening Post, 26 July,
1984:2). Between 1980 and 1985, the opposition magazines
enjoyed a boom market. For instance, during the same period
of time, some magazines achieved an impressive circulation,
and it was estimated that between 13,000 and 14,000 copies
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were sold. However, at that time any magazine at least sold
7,000 to 8,000 copies per issue. Accordingly, a circulation
of 7,000 was necessary for a weekly magazine to cover
operating expenses. In sum, a total of 400,000 copies was
available on the market in 1984 (The Independence Evening
Post, 25 July 1984:2).3
During the mid-1980s, the opposition magazines faced
heavy censorship imposed by the government. For instance,
the opposition magazines which numbered 12 in early 1985,
were down to 3 by the end of that year (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 26 Dec. 1985:30). Furthermore, between May and
October 1985, the government confiscated 976,000 copies of
various oppositional magazines. The Taiwan Communique, a
Netherlands-based publication which monitors human rights
issues in Taiwan, counted 230 actions (including the banning
of magazines and their confiscation) through the first nine
months of 1985, a large increase over the previous year (Far
Eastern Economic Review, 26 Dec. 1985:31).
The most heavily censored magazines were New Trend and
Freedom Era Weekly. New Trend published seven issues and
faced the threat of confiscation of almost every issue (The
Journalist, 24-30 July 1989:124). Freedom Era Weekly, a
pro-independence magazine, published by Cheng Nan-jung, had
22 successive titles suspended for a year, while 12
individual issues were banned between July 1987 and October
1988 (The Journalist, 24-30 July 1989:124; Seymour,
3During the 1980s, a circulation of 15,000 in Taiwan was roughly
comparable a circulation of 175,000 in the United States, in terms of
copies sold per total population (Berman, 1992:174).
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1989:59). According to the Information Freedom and
Censorship: World Report 1991, several thousand copies of
Freedom Era Weekly were confiscated at news stands. Early
in 1989, Cheng Nan-jung of Freedom Era Weekly was charged
with treason for publishing a new draft constitution for
Taiwan.
In the late 1980s, suspensions and the banning of
opposition publications had decreased but not disappeared.
According to Information Freedom and Censorship: World
Report 1991, in October 1988, the Kaohsiung City authorities
suspended the publishing licence of the monthly magazine
Taiwan Culture for one year for 'disseminating separatist
sentiment'. In February 1989, the Taipei City authorities
ordered The Movement magazine to be suspended for one year
_
on similar grounds. Between January and November 1989, the
authorities banned at least 31 issues and suspended 16
licences among the 6 opposition weeklies.
1.3 The Techniques of Censorship
In Taiwan's case, the laws and regulations taken by the GIO
and the TGC to suspend or confiscate the opposition
magazines were vague. Almost every opposition publication
was banned by the authorities under the terms of 'confusing
public opinion', 'adversely affecting public morals', or
'destroying relations between the government and the
people'. Furthermore, all the censorship actions taken by
the authorities against the opposition magazines were
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controversial. Therefore, censorship quickly became a
partisan political issue. For instance, in mid-March 1978,
a one year suspension of registration for news magazines was
imposed by the GIO citing a need to prevent publication of
inferior magazines and to aid the upgrading of existing
magazines. At the same time, the GIO also announced that
books, pictorial matter, speeches or biographies related to
government officials should be subjected to a process of
pre-publication screening by either the person involved or
the GIO. Surprisingly, this moratorium began on the first
day of March, not the day which was announced. The GIO's
decision was regarded as an excuse for declining the leading
opposition member, Kang Ning-hsiang's application for a
licence that was submitted in early March (Far Eastern
Economic Review, 12 April 1978:24).
In reality, the authorities were empowered to decide
and justify what kinds of censorship actions were taken
regardless of court decisions. Most of the time, the
authorities were even unwilling to consult with the agency
which was supposed to be responsible for the interpretation
of the administrative laws and regulations. For instance,
the Taipei City Press Division has never consulted with the
Regulation Committee before taking censorship actions
against a number of opposition magazines (The Journalist,
24-30 July 1989:124).
Under martial law, from 1949 to 1987 the TGC had been
the most important agency responsible for suppressing
opposition magazines. Several tactics were used by the TGC
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to tighten up the censorship of the opposition magazines.
First, the TGC agents and police officers were
dispatched to seize magazines in the printing shops or at
the bindery. The TGC agents might show an order which
specified an article in a given issue which had incurred its
wrath. Sometimes, they even filled in the name of the
entire banned issue in the printing shop. Then the officers
simply took away the magazines either in type-script or
finished forms (The Legislative Yuan Records, July 1984:54;
Oct. 1984:105 and 127). Sometimes, the TGC even intercepted
the vehicles which were distributing the magazines in order
to confiscate the opposition magazines (The Independence
Evening Post, 2 Nov. 1984:2). In the late 1984, typewriting
shops in Taipei were required to submit photocopies of the
_
manuscripts of the opposition magazines to the TGC (The
Independence Evening Post, 2 Nov. 1984:2). It was widely
alleged that the TGC intended to track down the authors who
worked for the opposition.
Secondly, TGC agents and police officers were regularly
sent to patrol news stands in order to prevent the sale of
banned publications. Furthermore, some administrative
measures were taken against the staffers who sold the banned
magazines. For instance, a fine of NT$ 2,400 (US$ 60) was
imposed by the police on the owners of paper stands which
were found selling opposition magazines. Since the profit
on each cover price was only NT$ 5 (US$ 0.125) in the mid-
1980s, the owners seemed unlikely to recoup the cost of a
fine through sales. Furthermore, these owners were charged
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with violating the Regulations on the Management of Mobile
Stands, rather than defying the laws or regulations
regarding these publications. Moreover, at the request of
the Taipei City authorities, owners of bus-ticket stands
signed an agreement that no opposition magazines would be
sold at their stands (The Independence Evening Post, 2 Nov.
1984:2).
1.4 Counter-Censorship Techniques
The opposition is always in competition with the authorities
over the production and dissemination of knowledge in
society. A diverse array of technical manoeuvres were used
by the opposition press to ease the realities of repeated
censorship.
At first, the opposition magazines were distributed
through underground chains. Generally, only special news
stands sold the opposition magazines, with the opposition
magazines not being on public display. The owners of news
stands only sold the magazines to customers that were
acquaintances. Also, the magazines resold a number of times
at news stands (Berman, 1992:174).
Secondly, the opposition widely adopted a policy known
as 'the spare-tyre' publication in the late 1970s to cope
with the censorship imposed by the government. The normal
practice was that publishers applied to the GIO for several
separate licences at any one time. When one magazine was
suspended or banned, another would be brought into use. In
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general, the new magazine was basically a reincarnation of
its predecessor, under a different name.	 Its staff and
editorial line remained the same (Lee Chin-chuan, 1991:36).
For example, Kang Ning-hsiang applied to the GIO for three
licenses in the early 1980. In February 1980, his The Asian
replaced The Eighties which had been suspended. After The
Asian was banned in April 1980 charged with violating the
Publication Law, The Current was published in July. Another
example is Progress which was published by the Formosa group
defence attorney Cheng Sheng-chu in May 1981. The first
issue was confiscated at the printing shop for 'incitement'
and suspended for one year. Two months after the suspension
of Progress, the publisher began to publish Cultivate. In
September 1982, Yu Ching published Outlook, a monthly, the
magazine was suspended from further publication after its
fourth issue, because of its open discussion of taboo
subjects, such the formation of a legal opposition party.
However, this magazine was continually published under the
title Outlook Series (Berman, 1992:191-192). Perhaps,
Freedom Era Weekly, known as the most heavily-censored
magazine, is a typical example of the use of spare-tyre
publications. Because of facing the government's repeated
censorship, Freedom Era Weekly legally owned 10 alternative
titles (Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 Dec. 1985:30).
Another method used by the publishers of the opposition
press to protest against the TGC's suppression was through
the lawmakers in opposition inside the national or
provincial parliaments who questioned the government's
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censorship policy. 	 Some questions concerning the TGC's
abuse of the laws and regulations were regularly raised in
the Legislative Yuan. For instance, under Taiwan's laws,
there is no provision for prior censorship. Therefore, the
TGC and the• GIO had to wait until a magazine left the
printing shop before seizing it. Moreover, while the TGC
had to authorize the decision to confiscate, the carrying
out of the raid was the duty of the municipal government.
Legally, the TGC was only allowed to issue an order to the
publishers stating the books or magazines banned (The
Legislative Yuan Records, July 1984:54 and 127; Oct.
1984:105; Feb. 1985:2). However, the TGC's chief commander
was not accountable to the parliament in accordance with
martial law. Therefore, the parliamentary action taken by
the opposition could only question and condemn the GIO's
censorship. Since the Legislative Yuan was acting as a
rubber stamp of the executive branch, the opposition's
interpellation was never a political threat to the KMT
government.
After 1985, the market for the opposition magazines was
declining. Some of the magazines were unable to survive,
due to financial difficulties brought about by the
confiscation of nearly every issue. Accordingly, each
confiscation could result in a loss of NT$ 300,000 to
400,000 (US$ 7,500 to 10.000) for the publisher (the
Independence Evening Post, 26 July, 1984:2).	 More
importantly, some of the opposition editors began to publish
many ethically and journalistically dubious stories in an
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attempt to attract public curiosity and maximize their
audience. For example, some of the opposition magazines
devoted a large amount of coverage to criticising major KMT
leaders for their allegedly corrupt private life-style.
Also, accusations of conspiratorial arrangements made by the
KMT leaders to protect their interests were made (New Line,
1986:28). As a result, due to its neglect of comprehensive
political discussion and analysis, the opposition press
seriously undermined its own credibility. In comparison to
the opposition magazines of the 1970s, the magazines in the
mid-1980s offered a significant loss of momentum for the
moral or political crusade.
(2) 'Democracy Television'
After the collapse of the market for opposition magazines,
the opposition groups came to realize that perhaps a radio
station or low-power television station would better suit
their needs. At was mentioned previously, during the mid-
1980s, Taiwan's civil society was in considerable turmoil.
Most opposition groups, especially the DPP, attempted to
articulate their political and cultural visions through
large outdoor rallies. Apart from marching in the street to
get the message across, the DPP members began to transmit
their speeches through transcripts and video cassette tapes.
Also, film makers who sympathized with the opposition began
to produce documentaries concerned with Taiwan's social
movements. For instance, the 'Green Team' used mobile VCR
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cameras to document the opposition's activities; footage
included attacks by the police on demonstrators (The Capital
Morning Post, 23-24 Aug. 1989:7). Generally, these video-
tapes were not registered with the authorities, and no .
mention appeared on the party-state dominated television.
However, the opposition groups' message still got across to
the audience through its videotape distribution network or
cable television system.
In Taiwan, the opposition has been traditionally denied
access to the electronic media. On the one hand, the
government blocked applications for new broadcasting
licenses by claiming that all frequencies had been used. On
the other hand, the party-state has been firmly in control
of the existing television and radio stations through the
appointments and programming. In Taiwan's case, three
television stations are monopolized by the party-state, even
although television networks are financed by commercial
advertising.	 Furthermore, the television's programme
schedule is centrally controlled and networked country-wide.
The government, the KMT and the military are the major
shareholders in the three television networks. The Taiwan
Provincial Government through its affiliated commercial
banks hold 48.95% of the shares of the Taiwan Television
Corporation (TTV). Also, KMT affiliated enterprises and
Taiwan commercial interests own 31.07% and Japanese
corporations hold 19.98% (Wealth, Jan. 1992:76).
Consequently, the chairman of TTV's board have always been
a prominent KMT government official.
	 Moreover, the
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Director-General is always appointed by the KMT (Wealth,
Feb. 1991:125).
The China Television Corporation (CTV) operates as a
KMT enterprise, because KMT's Hwa Xia Investment Holding
Corporation holds 70% of its shares (Wealth, Feb. 1991:115).
The Chinese Television System (CTS) is controlled by
the military. The military through its affiliated
organizations, such as the Li Min Cultural and Publishing
Company holds 45% of the shares. The remaining shares are
owned by the Ministry of Defence (29.76%), the Ministry of
Education (10.39%) and Taiwan private interests (Wealth,
Jan. 1992:77). Generally, the military has been closely
linked with the operation of the CTS network through putting
personnel with military backgrounds in top management
positions (Wealth, Feb. 1991:131).
The same picture applies to Taiwan's radio stations.
By the end of 1993, thirty-three radio broadcasting networks
in Taiwan were more or less linked with the KMT government.
The Military ran 6 stations.	 Another 6 stations were
controlled by government affiliated organizations. The
leading station, the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC)
is owned by the KMT. The BCC included 20 local stations, 3
AM and 4 FM networks. Although 20 stations were privately
owned, most of them were financially and technologically
weak. For instance, the number of BCC's transmitters is
twice the total of the 20 privately owned stations' (Cheng
Jei-cheng, 1993:109-111).
The nature of the party-state domination of the
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broadcasting industry is most clearly reflected in the news
broadcasts. In Taiwan's case, the television journalist
seldom behaves like journalists with genuine independence in
judgement and commentary. The KMT's Cultural Affairs
Department has been criticized by liberal scholars and the
DPP for constantly giving guidance to television on
sensitive issues. Not surprisingly, the contents of news
bulletin faithfully reflect the KMT line on controversial
issues. For instance, during the 1993 election, news
coverage in the television stations was still biased in
favour of the KMT candidates, although it was not quite as
unfair as the 1992 election (The Journalist, 28 Nov.- 4 Dec.
1993:49).
In addition to tight control over existing electronic
_
media, the government also constantly denied opposition
requests to set up an independent radio and television
station until the late of 1993. For instance, former DPP
legislator Kang Ning-hsiang and the present DPP legislator
Chang Chun-hung were denied their applications for radio
licenses in the late 1980s with the reason that no
frequencies were available. On the same grounds, Taipei
county executive Yu Ching failed to obtain a licence to
establish an independent station in 1989.
The opposition nonetheless disregarded the government's
restrictions and determined to establish radio and
television stations. For instance, on 30 November 1989,
DPP television with 3 networks was launched to beam DPP's
propaganda. This station was equipped with a U.S. made
153
portable television transmitter which had a 20-km broadcast
radius and was mounted on a moving lorry in order to evade
detection by the government (The Capital Morning Post, 19
Nov. 1989:1; 1 Dec. 1989:1 and 2). Furthermore, 'The Voice
of Democracy', an island-wide network of radio and
television stations was established by the DPP on 1 March
1990 to loosen the KMT's dominance of the electronic media
(The Capital Morning Post, 2 March 1990:5). However, none
of these attempts was really successful or effective.
Generally speaking, the capital needed to start an
underground radio station was NT$ 2,000,000 to 3,000,000
(US$ 80,000 to 120,000) (Wealth, May 1994:206).
More importantly, the DPP has run a series of small
cable stations, so-called 'democracy television' since 1989.
'Democracy television' is one part of the independently
operated, clandestine broadcasting stations commonly known
as the 'fourth channel'. The stations of the 'fourth
channel' have emerged since the mid-1980s. However, it was
not until the second half of 1993, that the operation and
construction of cable networks as such the 'fourth channel'
was declared illegal.
By the end of 1992, 800,000 households were connected
to the 'fourth channel'. Among them, 'democracy television'
reached an audience of 200,000 to 300,000 households.4
Like the 'fourth channel', the stations linked with
'democracy television' also carry light entertainment
4Theee figures were given by a cable TV operator who made a speech
to the Seminar on The Fourth Channel and the Election held by the Ming
Chan college on 29 November 1992.
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programmes. Apart from this, a specific political channel
is operated by every 'democracy television' for broadcasting
the DPP's political message and providing coverage of
legislative sessions on a daily basis (The Journalist, 6-12
Dec. 1992:38-46). During the election, the DPP's candidates
were given free air time to make propaganda on the political
channel (The Liberty Times, 9 Nov. 1992:5). Furthermore,
'democracy television' has served as a platform for the
grass-root movements whose voice has been absent from the
KMT dominated state television. For instance, the news
bulletin produced by 'democracy television' has concentrated
on local affairs and been presented in a Taiwanese dialect
(The Journalist, 6-12 Dec. 1992:38-46). Furthermore, much
attention has been paid by 'democracy television' to the
campaigns launched by anti-pollution and anti-nuclear
groups. Some stations also have made efforts to cultivate
the audience's Taiwanese consciousness through carrying
programmes concerned with native culture, such as Taiwanese
opera, local folk arts and architecture (The Journalist, 21-
27 Jan. 1991:74).
Before the second half of 1993, the operation of a
cable station was illegal in accordance with the Radio and
Television Law. Not surprisingly, the GIO had taken a
series of measures to suppress the 'fourth channel'.
Article 45 of the Radio and Television Law stipulates that
a citizen may set up a broadcasting and television station
only after having obtained authorization from the
authorities, otherwise, a fine of between 30,000 and 400,000
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dollars (US$ 6,000 to 80,000) will be imposed by the GIO,
and his or her entire equipment will be confiscated.
Therefore, the normal practice taken by the GIO officers was
to cut the cable and confiscate the transmitters, boosters
and converters. For instance, the GIO confiscated 160
transmitters and 480,000 tons of cable from August 1992 to
May 1993 (Wan Shui-chi, 1993:471).
Faced with the GI's harsh actions, the counter-action
taken by the opposition cable operators was to inform the
subscribers of the censors' home and office telephone number
and urge them to make complaints to the authorities on a
regular basis. 5 All in all, the relationship between the
state authorities and the opposition was developed as a sort
of dialectical control, as each tried to anticipate the
other's strategy.
CONCLUSION
In Taiwan's case, the function and structure of the mass
media are determined by the party-state. Under such
circumstances, the official public sphere in which the KMT's
ideology of anti-communism and its nationalist heritage were
articulated has been dominant.	 Nevertheless, an
oppositional public sphere came into existence in the late
1970s and widely expanded its boundaries in the span of ten
years. This public sphere was created by the political
sPersonal interviews with general manager of the Taichung Democratic
TV Station, Lai Mao-chou on 29 November 1992.
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opposition through large scale outdoor rallies and
underground media, and thus could be distinguished from the
official public sphere.
Faced with strict state control through martial law and .
press censorship, the effectiveness of underground media in
shaping public opinion is relatively small in comparison
with the officially dominated mainstream media.
	 But,
nevertheless, they did serve as an important channel for the
dissenting groups to compete with the official voice. With
the decline of state censorship in the late 1980s, the
market became the sole source of threat to the existence of
underground media. Without an adequate media policy, it
seems that chances for the dissenting groups to develop an
oppositional public sphere will be quite limited in the
future.
In general, the media can serve as an instrument for
the state to colonize civil society, or they can play an
active role in liberalizing civil society and placing the
conduct of the state under public scrutiny, or both.
Taiwan's situation confirms that the mainstream press seems
to serve the KMT's wish for it to mirror changes in society,
rather than instigate democratic development. The barriers
that prevent the mainstream papers from playing a role in
democracy are due to interlocking directorships between the
elites in the party-state and the press rather than state
censorship. In other words, the reason that the KMT has
privileges in the usage of mainstream media to directly
speak for itself is because the owners of privately-run
157
papers are politically affiliated with the KMT. The essence
of this relationship is that the KMT provides political and
economic benefits to the owners of major privately-run
papers in exchange for their loyalty. As a consequence,
traditionally the press has collaborated with the KMT in
promoting its political reality and marginalizing its
political opponents.
In the late 1980s, the interactions between the KMT and
the press became more sophisticated, because the papers were
in alliance with the deeply divided KMT. Since the papers'
elites took sides with KMT's different political factions,
that made it difficult for them to distance themselves from
the KMT's internal rifts. The role of the press in this
controversy deserves close scrutiny. However, in so doing,
research would have to involve an examination of day-to-day
interactions between the party-state and the press in news
production rather than analyzing how the party-state
structures the media. In subsequent chapters, this study
goes on to demonstrate what can be achieved by this
approach.
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Table 4-1 A typology of Taiwan's Newspapers (from 1960 to
1988)
Georgr
-aphic
scope
Ownership
Party Government Military Privately
Island
-wide
Central
Daily
News
Taiwan
Hsin
Sheng
Pao
Youth
Daily
News
China Times,
Industrial and
Economic
News,
United Daily
News,
Min Sheng
Pao,
Economic Daily
News
Region
-al
Chinese
Daily
News
(North-
ern and
South-
ern)
Taiwan
News
Journal
-
Taiwan
Daily
News
Independence
Evening
Post,
Min Tsu
Evening
News,
Great China
Evening
Post,
China Post,
China News,
People's Daily
News,
Liberty Times,
Taiwan Times,
Mandarin Daily
News
Local China
Evening
News
Matsu
Daily
News,
Kinmen
Daily
News,
Chung
Chen
News,
China
Daily
News
Rebirth Daily
News,
Shang Kung
Daily News
(Source: Cheng Jei-cheng, 1988:33; Jacobs, 1976:784. Data
have been rearranged by the researcher.)
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Table 4-2 Social Background of Publishers of Privately-run
Papers (from 1960 to 1988)
Publishers Newspapers Ethnicity Backgrounds
Wan Tih-wu United Daily Mainlander Member of
(Wan Pi-li,
Wan Pi-chen'
News
Economic
KMT's
Central
Wan Hio-lan) Daily News Standing
Min Sheng Committee
Pao
Yu Chi-chung China Times Mainlander Member of
(Yu Fan- Commercial KMT's
yung) And Central
Industrial Standing
News Committee
Keng Hsiu- Great China Mainlander Chief Editor
yeh Evening of Central
News Daily News
Wang Jung- Min Tsu Mainlander The Military
taw (Wang Evening Committee
Cheng-yung) News
Yu-Huang China Post Mainlander Member of
Nancy KMT's
Central
Advisory
Council
Wei chun-
mung
China News Mainlander Head of
Central
Daily News,
Director-
General of
the GIO
Hsieh Ying- Rebirth Mainlander The Military
Yi Daily News Committee
Hung Yung-
chu
Mandarin
Daily News
Taiwanese Legislator
Wu San-lien
(Wu Fan-
Independence
Evening
Taiwanese Businessman,
Mayor of
sang) Post Taipei
Li Jei-piao People's
Daily News
Taiwanese Businessman,
Assemblyman
Wu Chi-fu Taiwan Times Taiwanese Physician,
Businessman
(Data compiled by the researcher based on Who's Who
published by China Book Corporation in 1978 and China
Yearbook (1949-1988) published by the Government Information
Office of the Executive Yuan.)
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Table 4-3 Frequency of Coverage of the Political Opposition
in Three Newspapers, Selected Years
Year
Legislative Actions
(Interpellation)
Campaigns
IEP UDN CDN IEP UDN CDN
1956 2 3 3 1 0 0
1957 8 7 5 1 2 0
1960 4 8 6 7 13 2
1961 2 6 2 0 1 0
1971 2 0 0 0 0 0
1972 3 0 0 2 1 0
1979 17 13 10 9 3 2
1981 23 13 3 6 3 1
1984 37 14 3 14 6 1
1986 60 13 10 69 14 4
June 86- 81 16 13 60 14 6
May	 87
(This content analysis was conducted by the researcher.)
IEP: the Independence Evening Post
UDN: the United Daily News
CDN: the Central Daily News
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CHAPTER 5
STUDYING OFFICIAL-REPORTER RELATIONS:
ASPECTS OF FIELDWORK
INTRODUCTION
To fully understand state-press relations, both the
structural connection between the political establishment
and the papers and the interaction between politicians and
reporters in shaping the actual practices of creating news
products need to be taken into account.
Taking a view that news is a joint product between
journalists and politicians, the practice of participant
observation was used in order to observe how reporters
interact with politicians on a daily basis.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of
my field work which involved approximately four months
intensive research into the practices of news making in the
parliament (the Legislative Yuan) and the executive branch
(the Executive Yuan), the Kuo Min Tang's (KMT) headquarters
and the Presidency in 1992. The findings of this research
are presented in the following chapters.
The ethnographic approach is highly regarded by some
media researchers for studying news production.
	 For
instance,
	 Schlesinger
	 (1980)	 suggested that doing
participation observation within news organization is the
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most appropriate for detecting the dynamic and complex
aspects of organizational control involved in the process of
news production. Also, Ericson et. al. (1989) recommended
that long-term direct observation allows researchers to
produce knowledge of reporter-source relations on the basis
of everyday business.
The following discussion draws upon two studies in
which I was the sole researcher and did all the interviewing
by myself. The first is a study of the legislature beat
from 15 September to 31 October 1992 which was based on 15
days direct observation and interviews with 16 reporters, 4
legislators' research assistants and the directors of the
Press Office and the Stenography Office. The second is a
study of political news making in three top government
agencies from 4 November to 29 December in which 12 days
direct observation was carried out and 11 reporters and 4
information officials including the KMT's Spokesman were
interviewed. 1
 This research was supplemented by an analysis
of news content pertaining to parliamentary and governmental
reporting.
' Interviews were held with 27 political journalists in Taipei
between September and December 1992. The journalists concerned worked
for the following newspapers: Central Daily News, China Times, China
Times Express, Chinese Daily News, Economic Daily News, Hsin Sheng Pao,
Independence Daily Post, Independence Evening Post, Liberty Times, Min
Sheng Pao, People's Daily News, Ta Chen Pao, United Daily News, United
Evening News, Youth Daily News, and Central News Agency. For reasons of
confidentiality, interviews were assured that no more detailed
identification could be given.
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THE FIELD WORK
1. Warm Up
Before the study began, I began studying ethnographic
research in general and ethnographic studies of news
production in particular. In the first place, I reviewed
some articles that set out to do ethnography. Generally
speaking, the essence of ethnographic research is the
prolonged participation of the researcher in the daily life
of the people under study. Such work requires that the
ethnographer live and work with the people that he or she is
studying over a long period of time in order to empathize
with their norms, beliefs and behaviours (Agar, 1986:12;
Fetterman, 1989:4; Sanday, 1979:20).
_
Research within the ethnographic paradigm shows that
participant observation characterizes most studies, although
other data gathering techniques including archival searches,
formal interviews and questionnaire work are not excluded.
It seemed to me that participant observation research should
not be regarded as a single method. As a number of authors
suggest, participant observation seemed to be a blend of
methods and techniques. For instance, Fetterman's
Ethnography (1989), and Butters' The Logic-of-Enquiry of
Participant Observation (1976) concerning the practice of
ethnography, and McCall & Simmon's Issues in Participant
Observation (1969) illustrate a number of data collection
techniques including direct observation, formal interviews,
documentary analysis, informant interviewing and direct
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participation.	 These writers suggest that these data
gathering methods are to some degree necessary in a field
study of any complex social organization. Furthermore,
Becker (1970:39-62) and Whyte's (1955:279-358) field work
experiences also clearly show that participant observation
research must make use of observation informant interviewing
and participation with self-analysis.
More importantly, ethnographic research, as mentioned
above, places emphasis on the researcher's ability to know
and understand the people being studied from their point of
view. Only by actively participating in the life of the
observed and gaining insight by means of introspection, can
the researcher understand and reconstruct human behaviour.
The researcher, interacting with those he or she studies is
_
essential to the concept of field work. In putting together
a field study involving participant observation the
researcher becomes a research instrument. In other words,
the researcher is participating with the people being
studied in their natural life setting, and sees life from
their points of view. Some problems are inherent in using
this method instrument for gathering data and deserve close
attention.
The first problem faced by the researcher is to develop
a dialectical relationship between being a researcher and
being a participant. One of the most critical decisions the
participation observer must make is what kind of research
role he or she will play in the field. A role taken by the
researcher in the field for gathering information is a set
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of behaviours in which the researcher's self is involved in
developing relations with people. Gold (1969:30-37), Junker
(1960:32-40), Schwartz and Schwartz (1969:95-100) suggested
four types of roles that occur in some natural settings for
researchers conducting field work. Theoretically, these
range from the complete participant at one extreme to the
complete observer at the other. Between these, the
participant-as-observer nearer the former, and observer-as-
participant is close to the latter.
Observation-as-participant is a role in which the
researcher's activities are publicly known and more or less
sponsored by the people in the field. This role only
demands that the researchers establish relationships with
the people that they are studying for a short period of
_
time.
	
Therefore, these brief relationships may affect
researcher's ability to sympathy with the observed. In
contrast, participant-as-observer is a role in which the
researcher becomes involved in the activities of people in
order to conduct the observation. By performing this role,
the researcher's activities are not wholly concealed, but
some sort of pretence is necessary. Generally, these
relationships are developed through time. To some extent,
long term relationships can be a threat to the researcher's
ability to remain detached. All in all, there are no simple
set of roles for the field worker in a given situation.
But, nevertheless, the researcher still must choose the one
that best fits the situation in which people are informed
who he is.
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Another problem concerning researcher-subject relations
are the personal anxieties inevitably inherent in using the
human instrument for data-collection. Gans (1968:300-317),
Schwartz and Schwartz (1969:100-103) indicated the influence
of anxiety in any participant observation research.
In addition to learning the methodological issues of
field work, I also devoted much time to reviewing the
ethnographic approaches to the study of news production in
the political field.
As I read over some research carried out in Western
countries, I found that only a few shared experiences
relevant to my work. For example, the most recent and
comprehensive study examining the gathering of news on the
legislature, such as Timothy E. Cook's Making Law and Making
-News and R. V. Ericson, P. M. Baranek and J. B. L. Chan's
Negotiating Control, gave little attention to the actual
process whereby the research was conducted, although some
useful statements on methods of research were provided.
Furthermore, Hess (1984), Mancini (1993), Sigal (1973) and
Tiffen (1989) conducted research on reporter-official
relations in the executive branch but also failed to give a
real explanation of how the research was done.
After inspection of literature on ethnographic
approaches to the study of news, it seemed to me that media
researchers pay less attention to the basic processes of
field work. But perhaps, I should say that Philip
Schlesinger's Between Sociology And Journalism (1980) is one
of few exceptions. I found that this article was extremely
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useful in offering an insight into the use of ethnography in
the study of news production. For instance, the research
role he described provided some insightful experiences to
me, when I began to think about where I was most likely to
fit with the journalists in my own field work and as I
attempted to develop my research role. More importantly, I
learned that doing ethnography in any news organization
should be an immersion in its culture. It seemed to me that
Schlesinger's research design was never preplanned rather
it emerged from episode to episode and was sensitive to
changing patterns in British broadcasting organizations.
This kind of methodological approach was not quite the same
as the quantitative endeavour that I was familiar with.
Surprisingly enough, I found out that there was little
-
or no previous ethnographic research in Taiwan into how
reporters constructed parliamentary reporting or their work
in the executive branch. According to my own understanding,
Taiwan's media studies have been influenced by positivism.
Moreover, much effort has been devoted to conducting textual
analysis of media products or questionnaire surveys on media
consumption. Since there has been no serious interest among
media researchers in the practice of participant
observation, intellectual arguments affirming the value of
ethnographic studies are relatively limited.
In attempting to shape my research role, I
communicated with the people who are acquainted with news
production. At first, I consulted with several reporters
about journalistic routine work. The reporters I talked
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with were those who had a certain affinity. During the
discussion, they brought up some of their concerns about how
to deal with the reporters. For instance, I should remember
to speak with reporters in their own terms. Also, I should
play dumb on some occasions, or at least try not to appear
more knowledgeable than I really was. Also, I had to avoid
sounding as if I believed their work was influenced by
forces they were unable to cope with. Besides, we spent
some time in discussing how to dress for the field work on
the news beats. I was told to dress in a formal suit on
every occasion.
Secondly, I conducted participant observation within a
news organization in order to develop some knowledge of how
the political news process works. In so doing, I believed
_
that this might help me better place the activity of news
gathering on the political beats.
The best way of ensuring successful entry, I decided,
was through somebody who was a relative of the chairman of
the Independence Daily Post (IDP). The IDP is known as a
liberal paper established on 21 January 1988. But the
Independence Evening Post is Taiwan's oldest evening
newspaper established in October 1947.
Without having any difficulties, I was able to do a one
month study in the newsroom in November 1992. Usually, I
had to stay in the newsroom from 4 PM to 10 PM. I spent 2
days a week doing this for most of that period. My focus
was on selection decisions newsworkers made about news
concerning the parliament and the party-state.
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At my first editorial meeting I was introduced to the
editors. The chief editor said, 'Ms Chen is a Ph.D. student
who is studying news decision-making. She is going to be
with us for a while.' It was arranged for me to sit at a
spare desk close to the chief editor.
I attended my first editorial meeting with great
surprise, because I could hardly hear anything in the course
of their discussions, even from a very short distance. It
seemed to me that the editors were very nervous, and
attempted to keep their voices down. At that time, I could
imagine how deeply they felt uncomfortable about my
presence.
After the meeting, the chief editor told me in private
that he lectured in the Graduate School of Journalism at the
_
National Taiwan University. He allowed me to study his
newsroom as a way of paying back the profession. He wanted
me to know that there was no restriction on what I could do
in the newsroom.
After a few days in the newsroom, I found that I could
improve my understanding of decisions made on political news
by chatting with the editors before the meeting. Therefore,
I decided to come to the newsroom 30 minutes before the
meeting. My impression was that some of the editors were
happy to display to me their professional competence.
Shortly after, they began to treat me almost as a student
who was learning how to edit a paper. They would give me a
long explanation of the information flow within the news
organization.
	 Also, they would take time to answer my
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questions or point out something they thought would interest
me, even when they were really busy. I found them practical
and realistic, and developed a certain affinity with them.
2. Research Settings
As elaborated previously, ethnography is what ethnographers
actually do in the field. Doing ethnography, an
ethnographer employs a variety of methods and techniques to
describe various events, situations and actions that occur
in a particular social setting. The following sections
provide examples of how I incorporated ethnographic inquiry
into my studies on the relations between news sources and
journalists in several institutional sites.
•••
The first methodological issue of my field work was the
entrée. Cooperation from the political institutions in
general and the reporters in particular was crucial.
Apparently, the degree of acceptance by the agencies and the
individuals that I intended to deal with would shape the
breadth and depth of my understanding. I required a
relatively prolonged exposure to the research institutions
including the parliament, the KMT headquarters and the
Executive Yuan. Some measures were taken to assure that the
proposed duration of study could be achieved.
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(1) Case 1: The Legislature
1.1 Accomplishing the Entrée
In the early weeks of September 1992, I considered entering
the Legislative Yuan without assistance--simply by asking
the Press Office of the Legislative Yuan for admittance to
do research in the parliament. This thought was abandoned
soon after I discussed field research methods with some
media researchers. Almost all of them suggested that an
introduction by a parliamentary reporter was the best ticket
into the parliament. Partly, there was not enough time for
me to seek to apply for formal admittance. More
importantly, it was clearly impossible for me to understand
the workings of parliament without some insider knowledge.
_
The best way of ensuring success on access to the
Legislative Yuan came through an introduction by a
parliamentary reporter who had been on the legislature beat
for three years. In a sense, my field study in the
parliament began on 15 September 1992, when I paid my first
visit to the Legislative Yuan.
I met the reporter at one of the side doors of the
parliament. Because she had no acquaintanceship with the
security officer on duty, she was unable to take me into the
Legislative Yuan without permission. Therefore, we turned
to the main entrance to apply for admission. The reporter
showed her Parliamentary Journalist ID to the security
officers at the main entrance.	 Then we entered the
reception room.
	 Unlike her, I had to register at the
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information desk and submit my personal ID in exchange for
visitor pass. Because the parliament was not sitting, we
made a round of administration offices, legislators' offices
and the parliamentary library. Also, I was introduced to
the Director of the Press Office and his subordinates. The
introduction opened with something like this, 'She is a
teacher in the National Taiwan Normal University. Now she is
doing her Ph.D. in the United Kingdom.' Then, I was given
some leaflets including information of the names and
telephone numbers of legislators and the members of the
parliamentary corps.
On 23 September, I arranged to meet my friend and her
colleagues at the parliamentary cafe. She gave me a
Parliamentary Journalist ID for a photographer which was
issued by the Press Office to her newspaper. She said,
'This card is valid for a legislative session. Whenever you
want to approach the Legislative Yuan, you show the ID to
security officers at any entrance and go directly to the
Assembly Hall.' My question was, 'How can I pass through
the security officers with an ID for a photographer without
proper equipment?' She replied, 'Just tell the security
officers, you left the cameras in the reporters' room.' 'If
you were a good reporter, you should behave like a spy
rather than a reporter. Find your way in, even without an
ID.' I was being teased. To my knowledge, in the first
place, the reporter had intended to ask for a parliamentary
reporter's ID, but her request was refused by the
parliamentary staff. However, they made a compromise deal
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that an ID with no photo on it was issued instead.
On the way home, one of my friend's colleague said that
in his judgement, the security measures would tighten up
with the opening of the Legislative Yuan. Therefore, he
warned me that I might have to take the risk of getting
arrested by using the Parliamentary Journalist ID. He
suggested that a more appropriate way of approaching the
debating chamber was to seek permission from the legislators
and he generously offered to help.
That night, I felt that I must somehow do something in
order to gain official admittance to the parliament for the
study. Finally, I decided to contact the Director of the
Press Office as soon as possible to see whether I could
freely approach the Assembly Hall without using the ID.
The day before the opening of the parliament, I was
determined to visit the Press Office of the Legislative
Yuan. Like all visitors, I informed a security officer
about whom I was supposed to meet. After that I gave my
personal ID to the information desk. Then I went to the
Press Office and explained my intention to the director.
During the brief conversation he told me that either a
statement signed by a legislator or a journalist's ID is
necessary to gain access to the Assembly Hall. According to
the regulations, he was unable to give me a journalist's ID,
but he made a promise that whenever I requested, he was
always willing to accompany me to the Hall.
On 25 September, on the opening of the Legislative
Yuan, I visited the Press Office again.
	 Outside the
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Legislative Yuan, three groups of demonstrators were
gathering. When I arrived at the Press Office, the director
was talking to a visitor. Apparently, he could not take me
to the Hall, and therefore, I had better turn to someone in
the office for help.
According to my observation, a clerk who was busy
dealing with reporters should be the person in charge of
issuing IDs. I asked him if it was possible for me to get
into the Hall. He said, 'I am glad to help you. If I am
authorized by my superiors, I might give you a special ID
which is usually issued to the reporters who are not
regulars on the beat.'
Finally, I obtained a special card for non-regular
reporters, although it was still an illegal one. Because I
was not a journalist, the parliamentary staff had no
alternative, simply keeping my name on the record and
leaving the column for occupation blank. According to the
regulations, the special ID was only valid for the morning
session. I was told that after the morning session, I had
to come back to ask for another ID for the afternoon
session. My days in the Assembly Hall would pass in this
manner.
Ten minutes before the opening, I headed for the
Assembly Hall. The entrance at the left hand side is for
legislators. The one on the right hand side is for non-
parliamentarians. The security officers on this entrance
deliberately checked every non-parliamentarian's ID and hand
bag.
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After the security check, I climbed up the stairs to
the second floor of the Assembly Hall. Having this ID, I
could freely do my work in the reporter's rooms and the
press gallery.
1.2 Developing the Research Role
On the legislature beat, most of time I was more like a
complete observer. For instance, my activities were
completely public in the reporters' rooms and the press
gallery where all levels of information were equally
accessible to me and the reporters. It seemed that there
were no restrictions on what I could do. I was free to hang
around the press gallery, attend the press conferences, and
collect the news releases and official documents. However,
when parliament was sitting, the reporters were heavily
engaged in their work. My presence made few of them
curious. Therefore, I had no trouble remaining uninvolved
with the reporters and the legislators' daily routines.
Theoretically, in the role of complete observer, the
researcher has no chance to develop the reciprocal relations
with the group being studied (Junker, 1960:35). Soon I
faced some problems regarding my data collection.
First, there were times when I was not able to build a
good sense of the legislative process. In this instance, I
found it would be helpful to have someone with whom I could
consult. I desperately needed an informant who could help
me with floor deliberations.
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On the legislature beat, the informant was a veteran
reporter for a respectable newspaper. He lectured two hours
a week about the practices of news-making in a private
college. I was introduced to him through an associate
professor of that college. During the first conversation,
we found out that the two of us studied under the same
supervisor in the National Chengchi University. This proved
to be important in his acceptance of my work.
During the conversations, I told him quite frankly what
I was trying to do, what problems were puzzling me and so
on. After this conversation, he frequently took time to
talk to me in the afternoon. Much of our time had been
spent on the discussion of the validity of my observations.
The second problem I faced was how to get the
parliamentary reporter alone and to carry out a more formal
interview. As noted before, I was a pure observer in the
parliament which made it difficult for me to have a close
relationship with the reporters. Moreover, I had little
confidence in approaching the reporters. Because the
interview should be carried out without any rapport with the
reporters, I decided to ask for assistance from some friends
to bring me into contact with the reporters, especially at
this early stage.
On 3 October 1992, I got in touch with a news agency's
chief reporter who was an acquaintance. With his mediation
I began my first formal interview. I arranged to meet one
of his reporters in the parliamentary reporter's room.
Then, we went for coffee. As he walked with me to the
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coffee room, we got to talk about my relations with his
superior. Because the parliament was sitting, the cafe was
empty. We conducted the interview here. At first, I
briefly explained to him my study, with an attempt to ease
him into a discussion of his business I deliberately told
him of my own experience of studying abroad. In fact, I
was afraid of allowing too much of myself to emerge during
conversations, and striking a balance was difficult for a
while. He said with hesitation that he would like to have
this interview anonymously. Also, he refused to allow me to
use a tape recorder. However, he promised me that he would
explain everything to me as slowly and clearly as possible.
As my experience increased, I felt more confident in my
skill at approaching the reporters. 	 I learned to make
attempts to contact the reporters by myself. I always
contacted the reporters by telephone a few minutes after
they had met their deadlines to arrange the interviews. On
the line, I said something about myself and my research
first. Generally, I identified myself to reporters as a
graduate student from a University in the United Kingdom and
an instructor of the National Taiwan Normal University. I
described my research purpose only in broad terms: 'I was
studying the practices of news-making in the parliament.'
Then I asked for forty minutes to discuss their work with
them. Most of the reporters asked me whom I had talked to.
Nearly all told me that they were busy, but that they
were pleased to take the time. Among 16 reporters I had
arranged to interview, 2 did not show up in the first
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interview with an excuse of being really too busy. One
reporter came half an hour late. In total, I interviewed 16
parliamentary reporters from all the important papers which
covered the whole range of the political spectrum. There
was no attempt at a random sample, and I simply selected
most of the reporters who were the chief journalists of
their reporting team.
I emerged from interviews with the feeling that the
reporters deliberately prevented me mentioning their names
in my study. At first, almost all the reporters I
interviewed wanted me to keep the interviews confidential.
Only one reporter told me that he would not mind being
identified. Secondly, most of the reporters felt uneasy
about the use of a tape recorder and encouraged me to take
notes during the interviews. Fortunately, more than half of
interviews were conducted at lunch time, and because the
reporters wanted me to eat well, I was allowed to use the
tape recorder. However, I verbally assured them that I
would make any public references to them anonymous.
One thing I must add was that the reporters paid the
bills. I was told that their news organizations would cover
the expenses. On average it cost approximately US$ 20 for
two people to have lunch at the restaurant close to the
Legislative Yuan.
It seemed to me that most of the reporters enjoyed
talking about their work, although a few reporters were
rather self-conscious. The formal interview ordinarily
started with questions concerning their journalistic
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routines.	 I listened to the reporters who gave their
definition of the legislature beat and the division of
labour within the reporting team and so on. As the
conversations went on, I tried to read the reporter's
characteristics in order to adjust my interview skills.
In the later stages of interviewing, I began to probe
more sensitive matters. I asked the reporters about self-
censorship and organizational control over the legislative
news and their relationships to • the legislators. My
impression was that once the interview topics had shifted to
their personal experience, reporters were less willing to
talk about them, especially the questions pertaining to how
they established good relations with the legislators.
Generally, a tactic was used to elicit the information
that was crucial to understand certain relationships. That
is I told the reporter that these relationships were
implicit in the previous interviews, but that reporters
preferred not to state them openly. Therefore, I needed
more information from them to clarify my doubts. Moreover,
I pretended not to know certain matters which were derived
from the news media, therefore I asked for their opinion.
I found that this was an effective way of preventing the
reporter from clamming up on the questions in sensitive
areas where my relationship to the reporters interviewed was
not well enough established to directly ask their opinions
on them.
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(2) Case 2: The Executive Branch
2.1 The Executive Yuan
This time I attempted to find my way into the Executive Yuan
by myself. On 2 November, I contacted the Government
Information Office (GIO) of the Executive Yuan by telephone.
I picked on the First Division of the Domestic Information
Department which was supposed to be responsible for the news
releases coming out of the Executive Yuan. The chief of the
First Division was away for a week. Instead, I asked the
press coordinator whether I could make an appointment and
discuss my research with him on the practices of the
government's news management. After we had exchanged
information, I was told, 'I know you. We were in the same
class on the postgraduate programme at the National Chengchi
University. Of course, you are always welcome to visit me.'
This was quite a pleasant surprise.
The meeting was arranged at 3:00 PM. On paying my
first visit to the GIO, I found out that gaining access was
much easier than getting into the Legislative Yuan. Broadly
speaking, I just let the porters at the information desk
know who I was supposed to meet. The porters gave me
directions and did not bother to ask for my personal
identification card.
I made several useful contacts, and in the GIO's
reporter's room, I met another acquaintance who had enrolled
in my course several years ago. He was a reporter with 3
year experience on the beat.
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I was introduced to every reporter in the room. He
said, 'She is my former teacher. She is studying how we are
making a living here. Listen! Fellows, help her as much as
you can.' When he was finished, a reporter asked, 'Is it
true that he was your student? He is very naughty. He always
makes fun of us.'
Then I briefly explained my research to them. Every
reporter gave me his or her card politely said, 'Now, you
are our teacher.' When they found out that I did not have
a card in return they joked, 'You are Lee Teng-hui (the
President). He doesn't need a card.' I really did not feel
comfortable interacting with the reporters' room humour, it
was part of a culture I was not familiar with.
On the GIO beat, I faced a new problem in my data
-
collection. That is that only a tiny part of the reporters'
activities were open to my observation. It was quite a
contrast to the parliament where I could witness most of the
activity of reporting.
It was surprising to me that the reporters here were
not allowed to conduct daily journalistic work in the
Executive Yuan. Instead, the reporters made their rounds in
the GIO which was located one street away from the Executive
Yuan. I also found out that no local reporter could
interview the Premier on public or private occasions. All
news events taking place in the Executive Yuan were released
by the GIO. For such reasons, the GIO's news conferences
were the only occasions that allowed me to see reporter-
source relations on the GIO beat.
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Unlike parliamentary reporters who were always on the
beat, here the reporters came to the GI's reporters' room
from 4PM to 6PM. Outside of the press conferences held by
the GIO on a regular basis, the normal practice of getting
their work done was by making contact with sources by
telephone. Since the reporters did their work in separate
phone rooms, attaching myself to them seemed impossible.
Moreover, the spatial arrangements of the GIO's
reporters' room made it very difficult to join in with the
reporters' daily conversations. Here, the reporter had his
or her own desk, and during working hours, there was no
vacancy for me. Generally, the individual reporters
preferred to take me aside to talk. Again, this measure
kept me from knowing the reporters' daily routines which I
_
was really interested in.
While conducting the ethnography, I began to think that
a formal interview would be a more effective data gathering
technique than direct observation, especially in a situation
where I could not see and experience much. Formal
interviews would allow me to elicit more information
regarding the reporters' news gathering activities behind
closed doors, but any formal interview had its down side.
Formal interview materials were, unlike direct observation,
obtained in conditions somewhat removed from the natural
setting. The fact that I could not observe fully the GIO
had worried me a lot through my field work there.
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2.2 The KMT Headquarters
2.2.1 Gaining Entry
At the KMT headquarters, gaining entry was more difficult
than the GIO. At first, I tried to telephone the KMT
spokesman, also the Director of the Cultural Affairs
Department, to ask if he could see me. Unfortunately,
because he was busy with the coming parliamentary election,
it was very difficult to reach him.
The time available to carry out my research on the KMT
headquarters was limited to 30 days. Therefore, after my
last effort on 7 November 1992, I made up my mind to ask a
reporter to take me in. On 10 November, I phoned a reporter
whom I had met at the GIO at 11:30 PM. He wanted me to ring
back, because he had to file a big story around midnight.
After a short discussion, we came to the conclusion that by
hiding my research role, I could enter into the KMT
headquarters more easily.
The next morning we met in front of the KMT
headquarters. When I was waiting for the reporter on the
street corner close to the KMT headquarters, a security
officer came and asked me to leave. I felt ill at ease at
this intrusion. Apparently, he never noticed that I was
standing on public property. I thought that every citizen
could stay there whenever he or she liked. At that moment,
the reporter came and showed his journalist's ID to the
security officers in front of main entrance. 'She is my
colleague. She is on a pre-job training.' said he. Then
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the two of us reached the reception room. When I submitted
my personal ID to a security officer, he stared at me and
asked, 'Are you in the teaching profession?' I must confess
that it was somewhat awkward to reply that I was no longer
a teacher. The reporter took over the conversation, he
explained, 'She is my colleague. She is on a pre-job
training.' Shortly after, the security officer gave us each
a card that allowed me to hang around in the courtyard of
the KMT headquarters.
This way of gaining entry became a source of anxiety.
Quite often, I felt so guilty about deceiving people that I
was hesitant in entering the KMT headquarters . Usually, I
had to walk around Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall for 10
minutes in order to get up my courage, yet remain relaxed
enough so that the reporters would be glad to have me
around.
On 9 December 1992, I had one of my most vivid and
unpleasant memories of my field work. When we arrived at
the main entrance, I was not allowed to get in. The main
reason was that the reporter told the security officer that
I was a former student of the Director of KMT's Department
of Cultural Affairs and that I was invited to attend the
news conference. The security officer denied my access
vehemently, because he was not informed by his superiors on
this matter. At that moment, the reporter did most of
talking. He tried hard to persuade the security officer to
confirm with his superiors. But I decided to talk to
someone who was on a higher level. I waved to an officer
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who stood on the door step. He came forward and asked,
'What is the problem here?' I took a deep breath and said,
'Dr. Chu told me last week, I can come to his news
conference today. But this officer was not informed.' He
smiled consent and told the security officer, 'Let her
register at the information desk.' A few minutes later, I
approached him to express my appreciation. He talked to me
in private, 'I saw you interviewing Director Chu last week.
You are a reporter, aren't you?' It was difficult to
explain to him that I was not. I avoided answering the
question directly. But I assured him that Director Chu was
my teacher in the National Chengchi University and that I
had graduated from the University's Journalism School.
2.2.2 Developing the Research Role
The reporters usually interviewed the senior politicians
before and after the KMT's Central Standing Committee
meeting. Therefore, most of the time the reporters were
waiting in the briefing room or hanging about in the
courtyard, as the meeting went on.
At first, the reporter who took me there introduced me
to the reporters inside the briefing room like this, 'She is
an instructor of the National Taiwan Normal University. She
is working for her Ph.D. in the United Kingdom.	 Her
research aims to show how we do the work here.' Some
reporters knew who I was already, because they met me
previously in the GI's office, however most of them did
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not.	 I learned the names of the reporters, although I
always had some difficulties in doing that.
To remain uninvolved was not easy on the KMT beat,
because the briefing room was so small. I simply could not
just sit and listen, and take notes. In the very early
stages, my role as an observer in the room did make some
reporters curious and a bit self-conscious. For instance,
during a discussion about a story on the reactions to a
National Policy Consultant's resignation, a reporter made a
lot of complaints against his superiors and some reporters
joined in with these discussions. During the conversation.
suddenly a reporter turned to me and said, 'Don't make this
part of your thesis.' I realized that I had to take part in
conversations in order to minimize the reporters' reactions
to me being there.
On this occasion, my role was participant-as-observer.
In theory, that is the role in which the researcher's
observer activities are subordinated to activities as a
participant (Gold, 1969:35; Junker, 1960:36). Since I
decided to take a more active role, I faced the problem of
involvement. It was bothersome to me how much spontaneous
participation was possible as part of the group without
endangering my neutrality. I learned that it was not
difficult to be spontaneous when the conversations dealt
with subjects which were not related to my study (for
instance, the reporters' room humour, or reporters' personal
matters, such as how to prepare for the entrance examination
for doing a Ph.D. in Journalism). But when the discussion
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turned to topics I was studying, like actual daily reporter-
editor relations or reporter-source relations, I had to be
careful to keep aloof. Generally, skimming over the major
newspapers before entering into the KMT headquarters was
necessary. In so doing, I could easily engage in and follow
the reporters' conversations.
It seemed that this role only allowed me access to some
kinds of information and not others. Soon I learned that I
was not able to see the whole range of reporter-source
relations only through participant observation. A notable
example occurred on 10 November 1992. After ending my
morning field work at the KMT headquarters, I bought three
evening papers. I was quite surprised by the news stories
concerning the KMT's morning news releases published by the
China Times Express. At least, I was certain that the China
Times Express's front page headline story was unlikely to
have been written by reporters I was talking to on the KMT
news beat that morning. Part of the reason is that the KMT
spokesman had refused to comment on this matter at the news
conference. According to my observations this exclusive
story was developed neither by a car-door interview nor by
telephone, as no reporter in the reporting team had portable
telephones. My problem was how and who had produced this
story?
There was another problem in doing the field work under
these conditions. That is I always had to struggle to
record my research data after a day's work. In an effort to
minimize reactions, I eased the situation by not taking any
189
written notes. Because the conversations between the
reporters moved quickly and were fragmented, I felt it
difficult to make mental notes during the conversation.
With a few exceptions, I always managed to make a few notes
right at the end of my work in the KMT headquarters.
Sometimes, I sat in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall's
garden to dictate notes on my micro-cassette recorder. More
often, I went to the canteen in the National Central Library
located two blocks away to write down the key points of my
observations. But most of the details were developed from
memory after I had gone home in the late evening.
Since I regularly met the political reporters doing
their work on the GIO and the KMT beats, I had no difficulty
in arranging formal interviews. Most of the formal
interviews were conducted between 3:30 and 4:30 PM. That
was an hour before the reporters made their rounds on their
beats. Most of the time we met in the coffee shop near to
the GIO. A few reporters were interviewed in the GIO or at
the KMT headquarters.
Eleven reporters I had interviewed seemed to love to
talk about current political affairs more than their work.
I was informed about some inside stories concerning power
struggles among the senior officials. Of course, the
reporters wished to remain anonymous in my report.
Strategies used in interviewing were similar to those
used in dealing with the parliamentary reporters. I started
with questions related to factual details (e.g. how the
reporters made their rounds on the beat). Then the topic
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shifted to more sensitive matters (e.g. how did they
establish good relations with the high-ranking officials?
how did they make the senior officials more accountable to
the press? etc.)
It seemed that the reporters were willing to explain
how the reporters from other news organizations had dealt
with these sensitive matters. While some of them had
tactically avoided to tell me their own stories.
CONCLUSION
In this final section I shall endeavour to generalize about
my field experiences with the journalists and their sources.
Basically the problems encountered in researching news
production overlap to a considerable extent with the
dilemmas found in most observation studies.
There are some specific aspects peculiar to
ethnographic studies carried out in Chinese society. It
seemed to me that the most effective way of gaining entry to
political institutions was through informal contacts. For
instance, my affinity with the reporters allowed me to
outwit the institutional obstacles and facilitated my access
to the parliament and the KMT headquarters. Furthermore, my
acquaintance with the officials allowed me to have
advantages in gaining access to certain human or material
resources. In my judgement, my acceptance by some of the
reporters and the officers was facilitated, because we had
been at the same university or had mutual acquaintances. In
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fact, I never encountered a negative response from the
reporters and officials during my field work, even if not
all of them were interested in my research. Perhaps, it is
reasonable to say that the reporters actually enjoyed being
studied.
Generally speaking, I engaged in three kinds of
research roles in my field studies. In parliament, I
performed as a complete observer on the press gallery and
observer-as-participant in the formal interviews. In
contrast, in the Executive Yuan and the KMT headquarters, I
had to join with the reporters in some of their daily
business in order to get material. Therefore, I had to
devote much effort to learning the norms, roles and beliefs
that the reporters had when covering their news beat.
However, I enjoyed being accepted by the reporters who
worked in the Executive Yuan and the KMT headquarters. To
some extent, they let me share in their professional and
political frustration, and even their personal grievances.
This experience was not evident in my parliamentary field
studies, because I acted as a pure observer and was not
allowed to develop close relations with the parliamentary
reporters.
Theoretically it has been assumed that the longer the
participant observer remains in the social setting, the more
knowledgeable he or she becomes about the people being
studied. Classical ethnography requires from two to six
years or more in the field (Fetterman, 1989:18). Most
ethnographers, regardless of their theoretical perspectives
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agree that at least a year is required for doing
ethnographic studies (Sanday, 1979:20). However, there is
often no natural end-point for a field study. In my own
study, long-term continuous field work was impossible. I
was restricted by the four month permission authorized by my
sponsor for returning to Taiwan to collect data. In total,
I spent four months on several political news beats. I only
spent six weeks at the KMT headquarters, but I encountered
a series of unprecedented leadership conflicts in Taiwan's
politics during this period. These accounts are at the
heart of my study which aims to understand the issues
involved in government news management. Moreover, I left
the legislature beat as the parliament completed a
legislative session. This seems to be an acceptable
minimum. However, this compares unfavourably with Ericson
et. al. (1987) 200 research days and Schlesinger's (1980)
several periods of observation at the BBC, not to mention
classical community studies such as Whyte's (1955) four
years in Cornerville.
I was never certain that I saw or heard everything I
should have during my study, or even if I understood
everything accurately. No matter how hard I tried, I still
found that conducting ethnographic research brought with it
a fair amount of uncertainty. For instance, in the
parliament I constantly worried about the flow of research
activities, because I had to be in many places
simultaneously in order to study the reporter-politician
relations properly. This being impossible, I had to make a
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choice of what to study every day. At the same time, I took
the risk of having missed something elsewhere. Usually, I
found that if I missed something, I always went back to talk
to the reporters concerned. But, what I lost by not being
there did worry me a lot.
Research roles were another problem in my own field
work. Having some knowledge of journalists' daily routines,
I thought that I would have no difficulties in deciding on
the use of a particular type of role in advance. However,
once I was in the field, I realized that this was wishful
thinking. When I was at the KMT's headquarters, I had to
make some forms of adjustment. All these problems I had
never faced in my previous studies.
It seemed to me that carrying out the research role is
not always a problem of scientific inquiry. It is worth
stressing that it has to be considered as a personal
problem. Initially, I was beset with severe doubts about my
ability as a field worker. This was due in part to the fact
that I had no previous field experience. Nevertheless, I
had an educational background in journalism that was
directly relevant to my research problem. But that was not
all. I was told by colleagues that I lacked some of the
personal elements which were crucial to be a effective
fieldworker. For instance, I was not sociable, active and
intelligent enough to communicate with the reporters and the
politicians. I admit that I am not the kind of person who
could fit into a news situation and develop friendly
relations with news people within a short period of time.
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But it seemed that I had some special personal qualities
which made it peculiarly easy for me to get reporters to
talk. One reporter who I had interviewed said that she
found me an easy person to talk to. Another reporter told
me after the interview that he was willing to give me
confidential information because I looked like a honest and
sincere type of person. I mention these instances not to
show off my interview skills. But these instances
demonstrate that the researcher must be able to take on the
character of an intimate conversation, even if the interview
is conducted in a formal way.
In addition anxiety, whatever its source, inevitably
affects the ability of the observer to play his or her role
(Gans, 1968: 300-317; Schwartz and Schwartz, 1969: 100-103).
-
So, I would like to offer a final word about being sensitive
to anxiety that stemmed primarily from my personal make-up.
For example, I do not agree with the idea that the only way
of getting honest data is to be dishonest in getting it.
Therefore, during my field studies, I did strongly feel
guilt about deceiving the authorities in trying to gain
access. Taking the example of my field work at the KMT
headquarters, my anxiety over pretending to be a reporter
never led me to physically withdraw from there, but I must
confess that my own anxiety may have led me to perceive the
security measures as more intense than they actually were.
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CHAPTER 6
REPORTING THE PARTY-STATE
INTRODUCTION
The idea that the government is accountable to the public
lies at the heart of the process of democracy. By
performing as a watchdog on government business, the press
is seen as central to the democratic process. To perform
this function, the press must remain independent of
government. Due to the growing state intervention in news
practice through censoring or manipulating political
information, the media have difficulties in conveying
adequate, relevant and diverse information (Habermas, 1989;
Keane, 1990).
	 Consequently, this can make the ordinary
citizen more vulnerable to manipulation by government.
Government efforts to control the flow of information
on which the press depends for news production are crucial
in the relationship between the media and politics. In
research into the dynamics of state-press relations on a
routine basis, a number of studies, such as Hess (1984),
Murphy (1978), Sigal (1973) and Tiffen (1989) attempt to
describe how the administration manages the conduct of news
gathering, and Jones (1993) and Seymour-Ure (1989) try to
depict how top government administrators deal with
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broadcasting. In addition, Cockerell, Hennessy and Walker
(1984) and Seymour-Ure (1991) provide a historical account
on British media relations with government. There seems to
be a growing consensus that government is heavily involved
in the manufacture of news through the practice of public
relations. It deliberately provides the journalist with
information which is reportable as news. Therefore, some
journalists dependent on government services tend to accept
official views without further investigation.
Taking a view of the dialectic of control of news
production, this chapter aims to describe how and why
politicians and reporters negotiate control over the
practice of journalism in defining news during the
democratic transition in Taiwan. In doing this, a study of
the process of news coverage of national politics in the top
administration agencies is conducted.
THE PARTY-STATE'S PUBLIC RELATIONS MACHINES
In Taiwan, the ruling party Kuo Min Tang (KMT), the
Presidency and the Executive Yuan compose what is known as
the party-state. Formally, the 1947 constitution specifies
a National Assembly as the embodiment of popular
sovereignty, a president as chief of state and five Yuan
(councils)--administrative, 	 legislative,	 judicial,
examination (of government personnel) and control (of
government performance). In reality, the structure of the
party-state	 combines	 Leninist,	 presidential	 and
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parliamentary systems in an ambiguous way. The party
chairman, the President and the Premier are the most
powerful politicians who steer the whole state machinery.
Generally, the party chairmanship is very important because
the party legitimates and coordinates the entire system, and
provides the arena for cultivating and selecting all
institutional leaders. The premiership is the operative
executive post in charge of the government which includes
economics, finance, planning, banking, transport, all public
and large private corporations, and commercial associations
and labour unions. According to the constitution, the
Premier is appointed by the President and accountable to the
Legislative Yuan. At present, Lee Teng-hui has commanded
the political system by simultaneously holding the post of
party chairman and president since 1988. Hau Pei-tsun who
was appointed by President Lee with the consent of the
Legislative Yuan in May 1990, resigned in February 1993
after the general election.
As noted above, the party-state includes three key
institutions in the political system: the Presidency, the
Executive Yuan and the ruling party Kuo Min Tang (KMT). But
the Presidency is excluded from this study. The relations
between party-state and the press are grounded in the
institutional sites of the Executive Yuan and the KMT
headquarters.
The Presidency established a Spokesman's Office in
April 1991. Before that, the Government Information Office
(GI) of the Executive Yuan was responsible for the
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Presidency's public relations. However, because a spokesman
made several misstatements at news conferences, the
Presidency's Spokesman's Office has not held a news
conference since August 1991. 1
 In •practice, the press
handout is the principal routine channel through which most
information passes from the Presidency to the reporters.
Moreover, the reporters are allowed to make contacts with
the Presidency in person or by telephone, but they are
confined to the Spokesman's Office. By comparison, the
relations between reporters and the Presidency are less
reciprocal than the Executive Yuan and KMT headquarters.
Therefore, only the big newspapers, such as the China Times
and the United Daily News, assign reporters to the
Presidency on a day-to-day basis.
1. The Executive Yuan Case
The Executive Yuan is the administrative arm of the Republic
of China (ROC) government. Its organizational structure
consists of eight ministries, seventeen commissions,
councils and bureaux and the Central Bank. Also, the
Executive Yuan supervises the administration of the
municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung and the Taiwan
Provincial Government which in turn directs the
administrative work of local governments. The Executive
Yuan sets the policy for all levels of government. In this
The information was given by the reporters on the Presidency beat.
(see Interview, reporter, 10-11-92:p1 and 11-23-92:p3)
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study, the news gathering activities in the sub-
organizations of the Executive Yuan, such as ministries, are
excluded.
In reality, the Executive Yuan's news policy is to set
the rules governing disclosure through routine and formal
channels, rather than allowing reporters to make contacts
with the officials directly. The strategic control of news
in the Executive Yuan is exercised in two ways. Firstly,
some strategies are employed to tighten controls over
reporters' access to the civil servants inside the Executive
Yuan. Secondly, information about the Executive Yuan's
plans and activities is channelled through the Government
Information Office (GIO).
(1) Restricted Access
Generally, no area of government activity at the Executive
Yuan is available to be directly scrutinized by a reporter,
because no reporter is allowed to observe the routine work
of the executive organizations and the subordinate
departments at the Executive Yuan. Since Hau Pei-tsun was
nominated as the Premier in May 1990, no requests for
interviews made by the local newspapers have been granted.
Furthermore, the news stories about the Premier's
activities, such as the greeting of foreign heads of
government, delivering speeches to civil associations in the
private sector, giving instructions to subordinates, or even
chatting with ordinary citizens, are all released through
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the GIO.
To control information at source, the Executive Yuan
set up a standardized channel for reporters to get access to
civil servants during office hours. But, this rule does not
apply to the Premier.
Asking for entry to the Executive Yuan, the reporter
has to register at the reception desk and request
permission. Then a special identification card is issued.
Generally, the reporter is allowed to visit only one office
each time. The purpose of this tactic is to track down the
person who might be the source of any leak.
'In practice, I prefer to reach the sources by
phone rather than go to the office. I know that
if I conduct a face-to-face interview inside the
Executive Yuan, I might put them in a vulnerable
position when the authorities seek any leakers.'
(Interview, reporter, 21-12-92:p1)
As a consequence, in reporting the Executive Yuan, the
reporters visit the GIO instead. Generally, they have to
visit the GIO every day which is segregated from the
compound of the Executive Yuan.
'By comparison to other government agencies, the
Executive Yuan is a place that is really quite
difficult to get into. Frankly, we are trapped in
a place which should be the news beat for media
correspondents, rather than for political
reporters. In the GIO we can hardly witness any
official business directly, and whatever we have
is second-hand information.' (Interview, reporter,
11-26-92:p3)
(2) News Management of the GIO
The Executive Yuan is the agency which has equipped itself
with the most sophisticated public relations machine in
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Taiwan. The GIO has been the mouthpiece of the Executive
Yuan since the 1960s. The GIO has played a double role in
dealing with the media. On the one hand, the GIO is
responsible for the government's news releases and
propaganda activities. On the other hand, the GIO is the
governing body of the media in accordance with the
Publication Law and the Radio and Television Law.
1.1 The Settings
Most reporters make a daily visit to the GIO to check
what news has happened on their beat. Routinely, the
reporters spend two to three hours in the GIO's reporter's
room. The reporters from early evening newspapers usually
_
come around 9 AM. The reporters from dailies come at 3 PM.
The reporters' room is a spatio-temporal arrangement by
which the reporters are kept together. Within the
reporters' room, the reporters conduct their business. They
have their own desks, they can use facsimile machines,
telephones, photo copier machines, and they can read
newspapers and magazines. Moreover, they can contact their
sources using phones supplied on their desks or in private
phone booths. Very often they go to a room next door to
chat with press officers or to request information.
Occasionally, the Government spokesman, the GIO's Director-
General comes to the reporter's room to give a briefing
around 6 PM, but on that occasion he will not make hard
news.
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More importantly, within the reporter's room the
reporters make friends and enemies. They pass gossip and
share secrets. Through exchange of information with
colleagues on the beat, the uncertainty and tensions built
by denial of access to the Executive Yuan are relieved.
'In the absence of the reality out there to be
reported, I am always uncertain about what is
going on there. Further, I am lacking information
on where the others go and what kinds of
information they get. Having a chance to chat
with colleagues is very important to me, because
I listen to what they say and compare this to what
I have that prevents me from the omission of
significant details.' (Interview, reporter, 26-11-
92:p3)
Some standard operational procedures are set up by the
GIO to govern the reporters' activities and exercise control
over information. These procedures include providing
handouts, and organizing press conferences and briefings.
Actually, for reporters on the beat accomplishing entry
is rather easy. Every reporter can enter into the GI's
building without asking for a permit. Furthermore, the
reporters, no matter who they work for, have equal access to
GI's news releases. Reporters can collect any handout at
the reception desk and they can take part in each press
conference. At the press conference, there are no assigned
seats and no restriction on the right to ask questions.
1.2 News Releases
To prepare information for the news media is the major
activity of the GIO's Domestic Information Department. Four
press officers are in charge of this matter.
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Not surprisingly, the GI's production of news releases
is an organizational and political accomplishment. In the
first place, the press officers encounter almost all the
bureaucratic aspects associated with the Executive Yuan.
Then they construct a second-hand account and channel these
through handouts and press conferences to the news media.
Not surprisingly, the 'news' released by the GIO is a
product which best advances the government's interests. The
information given by the GIO is a special kind of 'reality'
within which sensitive information is restricted, and the
politically embarrassing issues are hidden. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that the press officials inevitably
exercise political selectivity in what they have observed
and what they have described.
_
'The GIO will not be adverse to the press... A
spokesman should release as much information to
the press. If the reporters can get information
from the spokesman, they won't hunt for news from
someone else. Moreover, they won't construct the
stories based on their own imaginations....
Therefore, my advice is to feed them enough
information that may prevent a more uncontrolled
and damaging search by reporters. For example,
when I chaired the first news conference last
year, I revealed whatever I could say about the
meeting of Executive Council. I remember many
colleagues were so worried about my up front
performance. I was told the news conference was
quite different from the previous cases.' (Public
speech, GIO's Director-General, 9-11-92:p2)
1.2.1 Handouts
Since the GIO is the principal public relations machine of
the ROC government, it is hardly surprising that it produces
a mountain of news releases. For instance, according to the
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GIO Annual Report, 658 news releases and 26 additional
releases were issued in the first 6 months of 1992.
Generally, handouts are the version of events
constructed by press coordinators at GIO's Department of
Domestic Information based on their second-hand data or
direct observations. The four press officials all with a
background in journalism are responsible for this matter.
Also, each handout must go through three stages of
perfunctory approval inside the department. On matters of
special importance, the handouts must be cleared by the
GIO's Director-General.
In practice, the GIO's handouts are divided into two
categories. One common topic of the handouts is the
Premier's daily routines. Generally, the press coordinators
_
are assigned to take part in and cover the stories of these
accounts. Another kind of handout is associated with the
news conferences held in the Executive Yuan. These handouts
are constructed by the press coordinators based on the
verbal accounts given by the Government spokesman at the
news conferences and the information provided by other
agencies.
No reporters are allowed to cover the Premier's daily
routines, such as greeting chief politicians of other
states, delivering speeches to civil associations from the
economic, industrial or academic sectors, giving
instructions to his subordinates, or even chatting with
ordinary people. All activities are described in a verbal
or in a written form by the press coordinators and given to
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the press.
'We do have difficulties in allowing the reporters
to cover the premier's routines. For example, we
did not let the reporters take part in the
meetings of "Premier Versus District Officials",
because the room was too small and lacking space.
But we attempted to release the handouts as soon
as possible after each meeting. As for the
reporters working for the early evening papers, we
gave them a verbal account that should guarantee
that they could meet their deadlines.... Also, we
let three networks' cameramen shoot their film at
the beginning of meetings.' (Interview, press
coordinator, 4-11-92:p1).
Practically, most of the GIO's releases are simply
brief recitations of some facts about the Premier's daily
routines. However, in order to save the reporters time the
information in handouts is arranged in an inverted pyramid
style. In each handout the most newsworthy bits are
presented first, then details of lesser significance follow
_
in descending order. Also, some handouts are couched in
extremely narrow and stylized vocabulary.
'I usually tailor my messages to the requirements
of journalists' formats. By doing that, I have to
try to keep myself up-to-date on what the
reporters think and want. To chat with reporters
in the reporter's room is an important way of
knowing their news values and working habits.
Also, some of the information comes from
nonsystematic reading. Often, I study our daily
clips in order to know what gets reported and how
it is being reported. For instance, the extent
that handouts are rewritten by the papers.'
(Interview, press coordinator, 4-11-92:p2)
The Premier always plays the leading character in the
news releases about his daily routines. For instance,
reporting the meetings is almost entirely a matter of
reporting what the Premier said. Generally, the common
style of a news story begins with a speech which is a
general summary of the Premier's expectations of and
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instructions to the audience. Then follows a sequence of
paragraphs which function as a category for eliciting the
Premier's political perspectives rather than for describing
the setting of the meeting. Since what the Premier said is
the main theme of the story, within this category only one
or two paragraphs give information about time, place and
other participants' viewpoints. By contrast, the majority
of paragraphs contain information about the premises and
arguments of the Premier's speeches.
'In the meetings, for example "Premier Versus
District Council Officials" the officials from the
local council raised some questions. But, most of
their opinions are rather fragmentary. By
comparison to the Premier's statements, local
officials' opinions are far less significant. I
think the reporters will agree with me on this
point.' (Interview, press coordinator, 11-26-
92:p2)
In the GIO's news stories, the audience's responses at
the meeting are hardly revealed. For instance, a handout
which contains information about the Premier attending a
seminar, the audience's voices are reported, but they are
represented in a passive way. In this news story, only one
audience voice is mentioned and phrased as follows:
'Responding to a question about reducing postal
rate of delivery of publications, Premier Hau Pei-
tsun said that the government must consider the
cost and benefit of the postal system....'
(Handout 002, 3-12-92).
1.2.2 Press Conferences
At the GIO, press conferences are held on a regular basis.
The press conference is designed to consolidate reporters'
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views about the important meetings held in the Executive
Yuan.
The press conference of the meeting of the Executive
Branch Council is the most important one, because the
Executive Branch Council is the highest policy making organ
of government. This news conference is scheduled on every
Thursday at 11:30 AM half an hour later than the meeting.
The second news conference associated with 'The Joint
Meeting of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs' is
held every Saturday at 11:30 AM. Besides that, a news
conference of 'The Meeting of Policing' is held biweekly on
a Thursday at 4 PM. The GI's news conferences typically
last for 30 minutes.
Ten minutes prior to the news conference, the Executive
Yuan reporters gather in the GIO's news centre. Although
there are no assigned seats in the news centre, no reporter
sits in the front two rows. Generally, the whole news
conference is tape recorded either by the GIO or by the
reporters.
The GIO's news conferences proceed as though a
government spokesman is giving a speech, rather than the
reporters questioning him. In practice, the government
spokesman is always in control over the ongoing dialogue at
the news conference. He spends more than 20 minutes in
delivering his messages, then only answers one or two
questions raised by the reporters. As for the reporters,
they always listen politely and no one imposes outrageous or
combative questions. It seems that the reporters docilely
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accept the government spokesman's perspectives, because they
hardly attempt to penetrate or probe a given comment in
detail, not even to start a debate with the government
spokesman. Overt collusion between the government spokesman
and the reporters is never the case.
'We are very competitive on the beat. Therefore,
we are unlikely to share important information
with each other. If I have a splendid question,
I am definitely not going to raise it at the news
conference. You know on that occasion, if I ask
the question, everyone is going to have the
answer. As a consequence, it inevitably creates
a silence among us.... The reporters from early
evening newspapers are more likely to raise
questions, even an exclusive one, because they can
get their stories printed after the news
conference. Generally, if their topics were
newsworthy, the reporters from daily newspapers
will keep pursuing them in the afternoon.
However, some of the reporters just rephrase the
stories printed by the early evening papers.'
(Interview, reporter, 5-11-92:p2).
Apart from professional reasons, psychological barriers
play a large part in preventing reporters from raising
questions at the news conference. Consequently, no reporter
imposes outrageous or combative questions on the government
spokesman.
'Why do the reporters avoid asking questions at
the news conference? Frankly speaking, preventing
themselves from sharing confidential information
with others is just part of the reason. You see
I am reluctant to ask questions in public, because
I am not used to it. Ultimately, I am afraid an
unsubstantiated question will cause me
embarrassment in front of colleagues. I can be
sure that some reporters are besieged by this
psychological barrier.' (Interview, reporter, 27-
10-92:p2).
For instance, after every news conference when the
government spokesman ends the news conference and steps down
from the platform, a dozen reporters push forward and gather
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around him for a few minutes of questions and answers. The
reason behind the practice is that the reporters feel more
free and easy to raise questions on this occasion, rather
than that the government spokesman is more frank in giving
information.
At the news conference, the government spokesman is an
objective and impersonal narrator. His pattern of story-
telling coincides with the proceedings of the Executive
Branch meeting. But, matters in connection with the meeting
are not communicated naturally. It seems that the
government spokesman deliberately heightens the legitimacy
of the KMT government and the Premier. Legitimacy means
that the government is naturally the right one for society,
and that the officials rightly hold and exercise power. In
story-telling, the legitimacy of an authority can be created
by using official language, referring to collective
decisions, using a respectful tone and minimizing
jurisdictional and procedural disputes (Paletz and Entman,
1984:82-83).
At the news conference, the government spokesman
always rationalizes time by condensing the meeting into a
neat package. The normal practice is that the government
spokesman starts with a very brief introduction of the
proceedings of the meeting, and follows this by discussing
information under a series of headings 'The Current Public
Opinion Briefing', 'The Routine Working Report',
'Examination of and Debate on Ordinances' and 'The
Nomination'.
210
Under each heading, the government spokesman highlights
and emphasizes the Premier's activities at the expense of
other cabinet members' activities. Furthermore, he not only
conveys the specifics of the Premier's statements, but he
also always treats the Premier with a great respect. For
instance, the government spokesman always uses neutral or
unmarked terms such as 'say', 'mention', and 'ask', and
descriptive verbs such as 'urge' 'appeal' and 'address' to
describe the conversational contexts between the Premier and
his cabinet, but, he never uses more controversial terms
such as 'refute' or 'squabble'. Therefore, the Premier's
image presented in these contexts is that he is a rational,
persuadable, considerate and responsible politician.
For example, when the government spokesman gives
_
information about 'Recent Public Opinion', he pays little
attention to the contents of the report. On the contrary,
the government spokesman gives a great deal of detail about
how the Premier responded to this matter, such as what
questions were raised by him, what instructions were given
by him and what decisions were made by him and so on.
'In the meeting, I briefed on some issues which
were salient in the newspapers recently. Taking
the example of the Formosa Plastics Corp. case, I
explained to the cabinet why Mr. Wang Yung-ching
decided to make investments in communist China.
After my report, some cabinet members gave their
opinions. Then the Premier concluded this case on
the following grounds. The Premier said that the
government would base itself on existing
principles when we tried to develop economic
relations with communist China. The Premier
demanded the ministers evaluate this case
carefully. Apart from small business, the figures
counted by the government showed that the number
of medium and large size enterprises that invested
in communist China was increasing. He stressed
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that the economic policy of trade with communist
China should be able to secure the independence of
our economy....' (Field notes,26-11-92:p1)
Under the rubric 'The Routine Working Report', a report
made by ministries, commissions or subordinate departments
of the Executive Yuan, the government spokesman uses the
same tactic again. That is, in the government spokesman's
stories little attention is devoted to depicting the
activities of other cabinet members. Also, the cabinet
members are always endowed with a . passive voice, because
their views hardly appear, unless they echo the Premier's
questions.
'Following up my briefing, the analysis of
"Economic Trends in Taiwan" made by the Council
for Economic Planning and Development proceeded.
Of course, some cabinet members commented on this
matter. After that, the Premier said that
although Taiwan's economy picked up in October, we
still had to remain cautious. He constantly
mentioned that social stability including
political stability was the driving force for
Taiwan's economy. Recently, some statements made
by the candidates in their election campaigns
seemed to destabilize our society. Therefore, he
said that he had to highlight the significance of
political stability on every occasion....' (Field
notes, 11-26-92:p2)
In the period allocated to the 'Examination of Debate
on Ordinances', the government spokesman ties up the process
of discussion and emphasizes the collective nature of
decisions. For example, when the government spokesman
depicts a debate on a bill, he deliberately gives a summary
report rather than the full discussion which includes what
everyone has said. It is no surprise that the Premier's•
comments, opinions, expectations and instructions are
elucidated in detail and conclude the discussion. By
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contrast, he rarely specifies the cabinet members' names or
their utterances. Furthermore, it seems that the
discussions have been carried out through a rational and
efficient process by which everything has gone smoothly and
harmoniously and without any procedural disputes or
individual frustrations.
(3) Reactions to GIO's News Management
As has been elaborated, the GI's news releases are the only
bureaucratic and open reality on which reporters can make a
direct observation. In practice, the reporters heavily rely
on the GI's news releases for doing their routine work,
although they may be sceptical of the spokesman's intention.
/1.
'I think the spokesman system is a necessary
device for any modern government agency, because
it ensures that we can get the basic information
we need. Of course, we can not completely rely on
the government news releases, because partisan
argument in the releases is expected, mistakes and
half-truths are unexceptional. Truly speaking,
some spokesmen even tell outright lies. I don't
like the spokesmen who always remedy their stories
by making a denial of what had been said. If the
briefings must be off-the-record, he just makes a
direct request to me not to print it. Definitely,
I will not break the rules of the game.'
(Interview, reporter, 10-12-92:p1)
In general, there is no dramatic difference in media
coverage of GIO's news releases. A high degree of
uniformity in the coverage implies that the media are
telling the public what the government wants them to hear.
Unanimous reportage reflects that the reporters here are
less energetic in their search for other information to
elaborate on the GIO's news releases, although reporters,
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who are professionally proud, deny this.
'As you know, the reporters working for the big
two papers are always faced with a severely
competitive circumstance. How can I just depend
on the formal channels and hand in the GI's
handouts all the time? Also, I am a person who
really commits oneself to the profession.
Therefore, I always attempt to develop my stories
through my own networks of sources.' (Interview,
reporter, 21-12-92:p1)
'My newspaper is identified as a liberal and grass
roots one. Under the newspaper's politics, I
always take a critical stand to reading the GI's
news releases. From a political viewpoint, the
GI's news releases always show people the bright
side of their stories. This kind of ideology is
unacceptable to my superiors. Further, from a
professional viewpoint, the press coordinators are
simply not skilful enough to deal with news items.
For example, the GI's handouts are not only
restricted to primary facts and rule out
background information, but also full of jargon.
In my opinion, these stories desperately need to
be reworked.' (Interview, reporter, 3-12-92:p2)
The executive Yuan receives extensive media attention
(see Table 6-1, p.267). When news coverage across the
papers is examined, the evidence shows that the party-state
owned papers, such as the Central Daily News (KMT owned),
the lisin-sheng Pao (government owned) and the Youth Daily
(military owned) serve as a conduit for the Executive Yuan.
Table 6-1 (p.267) shows that the GIO's releases about
the Premier's daily routines receive extensive coverage in
these papers. As already mentioned, the reporters are not
allowed to observe the Premier's routines, therefore, any
news in connection with the Premier all depends on the GIO's
releases. Under most circumstances, party-state owned
papers simply duplicate the GIO's handouts with small
changes in the order of paragraphs. As for coverage of the
GI's news conference, much attention is focused on the
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Premier's instructions. Generally, the reporters frame the
stories by combining the spokesman's verbal account and the
GI's handouts. However, in their stories no additional
information obtained from other sources is used to
scrutinize the official accounts or to make them more
sophisticated or more accessible to the reader.
The papers published by the two large media groups, the
China Times and the United Daily News also devote much of
their space to printing the GI's news releases. They cover
most of the GI's handouts which contain information on the
Premier's routines. Unlike party-state owned papers, the
two big papers seldom publish GI's handouts in full,
instead they cut down the size of each handout. Moreover,
the GI's handouts are rephrased. For instance, the
.1M
.elsorters Terite the lead and make some changes in the
order of the release.
When the reporters cover the news conferences held by
the GIO, they tend to develop the stories based on the
spokesman's verbal accounts, rather than relying on the
handouts issued in the late afternoon. Generally, the
government spokesman's verbal accounts are framed as
straight news to which no additional information from other
sources is added. However, if the given account is
significantly newsworthy, the reporters will write a by-line
story, a so-called supplementary news analysis. In this
supplementary story, the reporters put the official account
into a broader context. More importantly, they produce the
kind of information that would fully support the official
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information, especially the Premier's statements.	 For
example, at the 19 November 1992 news conference, the
government spokesman announced that a panel headed by the
Deputy Premier was being set up to study the issue of
cabinet resignations at the Premier's request. In response
to this announcement, the United Daily News reporter
featured a story in which the Premier's decision was
positively appraised. He stated that the Premier had chosen
the right person and the right time to tackle a fundamental
institutional problem. Therefore, he argued that whether
the Premier intended to resign or not was no longer an
important issue. The China Times reporter also wrote a
feature story on this matter. At the beginning of the
story, the reporter repeated the Premier's comments on
cabinet resignations that had been given on numerous public
occasions. He pointed out that the Premier had decided to
resign after the election. Furthermore, an anonymous source
was quoted as indicating that the Premier was a responsible
politician. For example, in order to campaign in the
national election as a united party, the Premier would take
full responsibility in tackling the problems over which the
party was divided, especially those concerned with his
personal business conduct. Finally, the reporter concluded
that the Premier was a most diligent campaigner for KMT
candidates in comparison to his predecessors.
In comparison, the spectrum of the China Times'
coverage is wider than the United Daily News. While the
United Daily News almost exclusively depended on the GI's
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releases, the China Times carried another two stories on
this matter. In these, the opinions of legislators from
both parties and a scholar in constitutional studies were
printed. With the exception of the New KMT (KMT's faction)
legislator who was on the same side as the Premier, the
other legislators were from the opposition party and the
Wisdom Alliance (KMT's faction) and both stressed that the
cabinet should resign after the national election.
In contrast to the papers noted above, the Independence
Daily Post and the Liberty Times, so-called liberal papers
paid less attention to the GIO's news releases. At first,
the GIO's handouts which related to the Premier's routines
hardly appeared in these papers. Moreover, these papers
devoted less space to covering the GIO's news conferences.
In general, only one or two news stories given by the
government spokesman got into print. Most of these stories
were associated with the problems of the political structure
or with trade policies with communist China. The normal
practice of identifying themselves as a liberal paper is to
feature a story in which the official viewpoints are
interpreted or criticized. For instance, on 20 November
1992, the Independence Daily Post ran a two-paragraph story
to cover the government spokesman's announcement about the
panel organized to examine the issue of cabinet
resignations. Also, a by-lined story written by its
Executive Yuan reporter was printed. In this story, the
reporter indicated that the Premier's intention was to stay
in power after the national election.
	 She used the
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Premier's statements which were made in the parliament and
at the annual press conference to support this argument.
She also predicted that the panel would come under a great
deal of political pressure. The Liberty Times reacted
negatively on this matter. In a feature story, the reporter
(not the reporter who covers the Executive Yuan) argued that
the cabinet should resign after the national election.
Therefore, there was no point in setting up a panel.
Furthermore, it was observed that cabinet members studying
an issue related to their own future would always lack
credibility. Generally speaking, the statements given by
alternative sources, such as liberal scholars, and the
opposition party were used regularly by liberal papers to
contrast with the official viewpoints.
An unusual instance which happened in the Independence
Daily Post on 5 November needs clarification. On 6 November
1992, the Independence Daily Post reproduced three stories
issued by the GIO, including a handout which described the
Premier's speech to the local officials (see Table 6-1,
p.267).
'The Executive Yuan reporter was on vacation. I
was assigned to cover the GIO's news conference
for her. Besides that I still have to take care
of my own beat.... There was not enough time for
me to handle everything. Therefore, I simply
passed on the GIO' handouts to the editorial
desk.... Also, yesterday was a rather slow news
day.' (Interview, IDP reporter, 6-11-92:p1)
The essence of news is timely and urgent. In this
instance, the scarcity of manpower had undermined the
quality control of news production. It is evident that
without sufficient time, manpower and the raw materials, any
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news organization will fail to defend its own news policy
and journalistic professional practices. Since the press
heavily relies on the GIO for news and information and may
pass its message to readers relatively cursority, the press
is subject to political influence.
(4) GIO's News Management: A Special Case
Let us consider the first occasion that the Premier agreed
to meet the press in 'Asking Questions' on television.
'Asking Questions' is produced by Taiwan Television
Corporation (TTV).	 It is a 60-minute pre-recorded
programme.	 The object of the programme is to provide
information, and consists of an interview with a politician
_
which takes up the whole of the programme.
Generally, the interview is carried out by three
reporters from the electronic or print media. The guest
interviewee in this programme is the senior official of the
executive branch of government. The key speaker is TTV's
chief reporter. The case in question began in mid-November
1992. The GIO notified TTV that the Premier would like to
appear on 'Asking Questions', and that the programme should
be broadcast on 6 December. According to a previous
agreement, the video-taping of the news conference was
scheduled for 3 December, but one day before the programme
was due to be made, the Premier decided to postpone it until
4 December (TTV Weekly, 20-26 Dec., 1992:127).
In the political structure of the Republic of China,
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the Premier is second in importance only to the President.
Due to the fact that the guest interviewee was such a
celebrity, TTV declined to have reporters as interviewers,
and opted instead for the chief editors of national
newspapers. The so-called 'big three' papers were invited
to take part in the programme. They were the chief editors
of the China Times, the United Daily News and the Central
Daily News. 2 The key speaker, TTV's own chief reporter,
remained the same for the programme.
It is reasonable to argue that this interview was a
vehicle for political persuasion. The rules of the game
regarding such matters as (1) the engagement of the Premier
to appear on the programme, (2) the topics to be covered in
the programme, and (3) the precise content of the broadcast
were all laid down by the GIO.
The questions used at the conference were formulated by
the three chief editors and TTV's chief reporter. Then a
complete written list of questions was sent to the GIO to
seek prior approval from the Premier a week before the
programme was recorded. Furthermore, on 3 December, the key
speaker and three interviewers spent 30 minutes with the
GI's Director-General exchanging detailed information about
the procedure of the interview.
At the GI's Domestic Information Department, intensive
preparation was undertaken with a team of press coordinators
a week before the video-taping. The press coordinators
2The China Times and the United Daily News are published by two
private media conglomerates, and the Central Daily News is a party-owned
newspaper.
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spent 3 working days developing answers to the questions on
the list.
'This was different from the annual news
conference. At the annual news conference,
questions were not anticipated. Therefore, we
recruited a team of professors in the fields of
social science from leading universities. The
professors were requested to draw up a list of
questions which were more likely to be raised and
prepare responses. But, this time we were told to
prepare recommended responses for the Premier.
Some of the information come from systematic
reading that included speeches made by the Premier
at the Legislative Yuan and on public occasions.
Other information come from data provided by the
subordinate agencies, such as....' (Interview,
press coordinator, 9-12-92:p1-2)
On 3 December, the Director-General of TTV inspected
studio 5. At his request some old props were replaced. He
also told his subordinates to bring a new chair from the
meeting room for the honourable guest (Ming Sheng Pao, 5-12-
92:12).
On 4 December, the Premier, accompanied by the GIO's
Director-General, arrived at TTV at 3:40 PM. The Director-
General of TTV remained with the Premier in the studio
throughout the video-taping.
After the interview, the Premier reviewed the film as
had been arranged. Because he was not satisfied with the
last part of the programme, the production team had to come
back to the studio and resume the video-taping. At the same
time, a team of 12 press officers stationed at TTV produced
a written text of the interview.
The reporters on the beat were not allowed into the TTV
studio while the programme was being recorded. Instead,
every newspaper received a package of information from the
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GIO at 11 PM. This package contained a news story and the
full text of the conference. Also, at the GIO's request two
copies of a 10-minute film of the conference were edited by
TTV and given to two networks: China Television Corporation
(CTV) and Chinese Television System (CTS).
This evidence shows that the rules governing the
interview were designed to let the Premier say what he
liked, rather than to make the Premier answerable to the
public. Therefore, the interview amounted to the Premier
making a speech to the interviewers rather than the
interviewers questioning him.
At the news conference, interviewers were given very
little speaking time to challenge the Premier. In contrast
the Premier was allowed unlimited time to reply. Further,
when the Premier was giving information, no interruption was
allowed by the interviewers. The Premier could therefore
elicit his opinions and expectations at great length.
In 60 minutes only 12 questions were raised. The
average duration of each question was a mere 30 seconds. By
contrast, the average duration of the answers was 5 minutes.
More importantly evidence derived from this series of
interactions suggests that the Premier was put in a position
where no interviewer violated the politeness principle and
no one attempted to threaten his face.
The Topics Covered in the Programme
1. You are the most prominent politician in the
country, what sort of beliefs do you hold?
2. The general election campaign will formally start
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within 2 days. This is the most important election since
the implementation of the constitution, and people are very
concerned about it. What sorts of expectations do you have
about the election? And what kind of influences will the
election have on the development of democracy and the future
of the nation?
3. Recently, we have heard people say that there is a
discrepancy between public opinion in the south and in the
north. From your visits across the whole country do you
think this discrepancy really exists? Furthermore, as head
of government how are you going to deal with this matter in
policy-making?
4. During the election campaigns our attention was
drawn to the fact that candidates, not just those of the
opposition party, but even some ruling party candidates
challenged you in order to appeal to the voters. What are
you going to do with regard to this matter?
5. Premier, the six-year National Construction Project
was mentioned earlier in the programme. I think people are
very concerned about the financing of the project. What
stage is the project at? Will it be completed in 1996 as
scheduled? What sort of objectives can be achieved?
6. During the election campaign, some candidates of
both parties have criticized you in order to appeal to the
voters. Recently, the cabinet's resignation has been asked
for and a team was organized by the Deputy Premier on your
instructions to examine this problem. Now they are about to
reach a final decision. What is your opinion on this
matter?
7. At the latest meeting of the Executive Branch
Council, you told your cabinet members to prepare for the
next 3-year term. A lot of public attention is currently
focused on this matter. People would like to know the
answer to the question 'Premier, are you willing to remain
in your position?'
8. We have been making some progress in developing
relations with communist China. What direction do you
foresee future developments taking? By what means can we
secure stability?
9. Earlier, you talked about the stability and security
of the Taiwan Straits. Also, in a meeting, you discussed
this matter with managers from the industrial and economic
sectors. You said that stability is desperately needed in
Taiwan and that stability of the Taiwan Straits is one of
three types of stability. Can you give more details about
the tactics we are going to employ to maintain the stability
of the Taiwan Straits? For instance, how are we going to
deal with this matter in the three critical areas of
interaction with communist China, politics, the economy and
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culture?
10. I would like to ask the Premier a question in
connection with foreign policy. Recently, I interviewed the
heads of state of some countries in south Asia. They
expressed a sincere desire to develop relationships with our
country. However, on the domestic scene, political disputes
have been one factor influencing foreign policy. For
example, the ideological confrontation between independence
and unification. I would like to ask the Premier, 'What do
you think about our foreign policies? And what concrete
policies should be pursued?'
11. Continuing on this topic, making foreign policies
has of course to be closely tied to developments in the
international situation. Since the Soviet Union collapsed,
some structural transformations in the international order
have taken place. It seems that economic geography is going
to replace political geography. How do you think we can
step in and adjust to this changeable international order?
12. Sorry, we are running out of time, so I am going to
ask the final question. When you were appointed Premier,
your career began to move from the military into the
political domain. At that time there was for a brief period
a rather sceptical atmosphere in our society. But, since
the end of that short episode right up to the latest
polling, your popularity has been at a peak. People seem to
have accepted you already. Recently, you have continuously
addressed the notion 'love Taiwan'. Can you spend some time
in telling us what kind of person you are? What kind of
affection do you have towards this piece of land?
Examples given above show that the interviewers'
utterances were always in the form of a 'question', with
which they elicited information from the Premier. Generally
speaking, no directive form was used by the interviewers to
request the Premier to provide information.
In particular, all questions raised by interviewers had
a preface relating to the Premier's opinion, for example,
what he thought or felt about a particular state of affairs.
By this strategy, the Premier was given ample space in which
to answer the questions. For instance, when the Premier
talked about foreign policies, he was able to say what the
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policies were and what he felt about them.
Furthermore, interviewers were most formal and polite
in the manner in which they framed their questions. For
example, in many cases, the questions were phrased in a
neutral open-ended manner. In many cases, the interviewers
simply asked what the policy was and what was the Premier's
opinion of it. Questions concerning shortcomings in
government policy or the Premier's opinion on government
malpractice were never mentioned. As a consequence, the
Premier was put in a position where he was able to publicise
and promote government policies, while he was never forced
to defend his policies, so there was no risk of his losing
face.
Generally, there was no major negative reaction made by
_
the reporters on the beat towards the GIO on this matter.
On 3 December, some reporters expressed their complaints to
the government spokesman in the corridor. The reporters
asked for permission to be in the studio when the news
conference was video-taped, although they were not allowed
to conduct interviews. The government spokesman replied
that he would pass their requests on to his superiors.
(Field notes, 3-12-92:p4)
On 6 December, the day after the televised news
conference, some reporters, especially the reporters from
local news media, argued with the press coordinators at the
reporter's room. Because the GI's news releases about the
televised news conference were issued at 11 PM, they simply
could not meet deadlines. (Field notes, 6-12-92:p2)
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'Because we are on the front line, we are always
faced with reprimands from the reporters.... The
rows started in the late evening of 5th December.
The film making was finished at 5:30 PM, and the
news story was completed at 6:30 PM. But my
superiors were busy reviewing the film, so I could
not get prior approval from them. Otherwise, the
news story could have been filed earlier.
Besides, my colleagues spent a lot of time putting
together the full transcript of the conference.
Anyway, it was our fault, we should have issued
the news story earlier.' (Interview, press
coordinator, 9-12-92:p1)
Generally speaking, the majority of newspapers took
this incident seriously. This study examines 7 newspapers
located on both sides of the political spectrum. Two of
three party-state owned papers ran a headline story on the
front page and printed the interview in full on the third or
fourth page. The government owned Hsin-sheng Pao put the
GIO's news release on its front page, but no full text of
-the conference was given. Because the paper's deadline was
10 PM, it was not possible to print the full text of the
conference, which came in at 11 PM. The party-state owned
newspapers reproduced completely the GIO's news releases
regarding the conference.
Of course, the full text of the conference was printed
by the two big newspapers whose chief editors were invited
to carry out the interviews. Unlike the party-state
controlled papers reproducing the GI's news release, they
rephrased it and published it as the headline story on the
front page. Furthermore, the United Daily News printed
another story written by its media correspondent, in which
the Premier's good performances in answering questions was
described by TTV's chief reporter.
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In contrast, the liberal newspapers, such as the
Liberty Times and the Independence Daily Post portrayed the
televised news conference differently. No full text of the
conference was given in these papers. The Independence
Daily Post ran a front page story based on the GIO's news
releases. But the theme of their news story was focused on
the Premier's opinion of the cabinet resignations. Also, 3
short stories by the paper's political reporter were printed
on page 9. In them, the reporter described the GIO's
interference in the televised news conference in general and
depicted the unhealthy development of relations between the
Premier and the news media in particular. Finally, she then
pointed out that the role of the press in a democracy should
come under public scrutiny.
In this instance, the media took part in a game in
which the rules were set up by the government. To some
extent, these news organizations deliberately traded their
journalistic independence to please senior politicians in
order to carry out their news gathering tasks. However,
they failed to see this was evidence of how thoroughly they
themselves functioned as a conduit for government
propaganda.
2. The KMT Case
The Department of Cultural Affairs (DCA) is the KMT's public
relations machine. Also, the DCA and the Taiwan Garrison
Command were the two most powerful media governing agencies
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up until the mid-1980s. Covering the news regarding the
KMT's headquarters, the reporters come to the DCA's
reporter's room routinely to collect handouts, confirm some
information with the KMT's spokesman (also Director of DCA),
or attend briefings. But if the reporters want to interview
the other party workers, they have to visit the headquarters
which is located a few miles away from the DCA. Permission
is needed to visit the KMT's headquarters. First reporters
have to show a special identification card which is issued
by the Government Information Office to the security
officers at the main gate. Then, they have to register at
the information desk in the reception room. Only after that
are the reporters allowed access to the office located on
the first block of the building.
In reality, the KMT's Chairman (also President of the
ROC) hardly gives interviews to the news media, except
foreign correspondents. 	 Furthermore, requests for
interviews with the KMT's Secretary-General should be
arranged by the DCA, however the reporters prefer to
intercept him in public places and ask him to say something.
(1) Reporting the Meeting of the Central Standing
Committee
Covering the meeting of the Central Standing Committee (CSC)
is relatively important for the reporters here. Under the
KMT constitution, the CSC is a decision-making centre. The
CSC has 31 members who have the most prestigious positions
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in the KMT hierarchy. The CSC meets every Wednesday at the
KMT's headquarters.
1.1 Settings
The reporters arrive at the KMT's headquarters around 9 AM.
In front of the main gate, the reporters have to show an
identification card to security officers. Then they have to
register at the information desk in the reception room which
is right behind the main gate. In the reception room, a
special identification card is issued. Furthermore, cameras
or tape recorders are checked and labelled.
Strictly speaking, the reporters' activities are
confined when they cover the CSC meeting.	 That is the
11.
reporters are only allowed to stay in the courtyard and at
the door step of the KMT's headquarters.
1.2 Press Conferences
The press conference for the CSC's meeting is held on every
Wednesday morning at 10 AM. The KMT spokesman meets the
reporters after the meeting. The news conferences last 15
to 20 minutes.
Generally, all news organizations are equally served at
the news conference. No seat is assigned. The spoken texts
of routine reports made by the government agencies or the
legislature are delivered before the news conference.
At the news conference, the spokesman dominates the
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scene completely. Most reporters tape-record the
spokesman's statements in order to verify their notes later.
Occasionally, one or two questions are raised after the
spokesman's briefing.	 However, no reporter asks sharp
questions. Therefore, the spokesman is never under any
pressure to answer questions. One exceptional instance took
place on 10 November 1992. At that news conference, one of
the United Evening News reporters made an interruption to
request the spokesman to change the circler of announcements,
because he was unlikely to meet the deadline. His request
was granted.
Generally, the spokesman tells his stories based on the
proceedings of the meeting. He opens the conference by
briefly mentioning the title of a routine report made by the
government or the legislature in the meeting. Then he
states the responses given by the CSC members. Finally, the
chairman's decisions are highlighted and marked as a
conclusion. It seems that the rhythms of his stories are
rather monotonous.	 In other words, no participant is
portrayed vividly in the spokesman's verbal accounts. For
example, the spokesman always reads the chairman's speeches
after the introductory phrase: 'the chairman's decision
is....	 Therefore, the chairman's instructions are never
conveyed in an active way by using transitive verbs, such as
'the chairman says', 'the chairman replies' and so on.
'At first, the Chief of the Council of Labour
Affairs, comrade Chao Shou-po made a report on the
policy of foreign labourers in the meeting. Then
comrade Sheu Sheng-fa commented on it. He said,
"The Council of Labour Affairs had performed well
in arbitration of industrial disputes. Therefore,
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there were no major industrial actions taken by
the unions over the past years....". Finally, the
chairman's decision was on the following grounds.
"The Council of Labour Affairs should properly
introduce the foreign labour force in order to
cope the problem of labour shortage. Furthermore,
the foreign workers should be properly managed in
order to maintain social stability....".' (Field
notes, 25-11-92:p2)
One canon of the spokesman's briefing is to stress the
collective decisions at the expense of any individual
members' opinions. At the news conference, the spokesman
always announces the meeting's decisions. Sometimes, a
summary of individual member's reactions is released, but
the spokesman never discloses who said what in detail.
Moreover, the CSC members are treated with respect in the
spokesman's verbal accounts. In the spokesman's stories,
the CSC is a rational and efficient body, because any
jurisdictional and procedural disputes never appear however
complex the reality of the situation may be.
1.3 Interviews
Since the reporters are allowed to stay in the courtyard,
their chances of success in obtaining the information
generated from outwith the formal channels are increased.
The common way of getting news is to intercept the CSC
members and conduct short interviews when they are attending
or leaving the meeting. But the reporters have no chance to
meet the President and the Premier, because they enter the
main building through a side door. Most reporters confirmed
that this kind of interview is a good way to cadge
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information from heavyweight politicians. Under certain
circumstances, some reporters would choose to wait on the
door step in order to have access to the politicians rather
than attend the KMT's news conference.
'I know some CSC members are still inside the
building. I prefer to stay here. It does not
mean that they will talk. But, at least I get a
chance to conduct the interviews. You see, I
always prepare a list of more than ten questions
in my pocket.... The colleague is going to tape-
record what the spokesman says for me. Otherwise,
I can wait for the DCA's handouts.... However, no
big case was discussed in today's meeting.' (Field
notes, 9-12-92:p2)
Sometimes, the reporters use this occasion to get the
politicians' reactions on some matters which are not related
to the CSC's meeting. For instance, on 9 December, the
reporters were busy interviewing the CSC members. Some
members were asked .to comment on the resignation of a
National Policy Advisor.
More commonly, on this occasion the reporters'
essential task is to get detailed information from CSC
members about the tenor and content of the meeting. In
practice, the information derived from quick interviews is
more suitable in adding 'colour' to the DCA's releases,
rather than to reframe the DCA's stories in a different way.
The reason is that this kind of interview only lasts a few
seconds, therefore, sophisticated interpretations are not
possible.
Another tactic adopted by the reporters to get inside
stories on the CSC's meeting is to interview the
participants by telephone. This can even involve reporters
asking the CSC members to take notes for them at the
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meeting, with the reporters conducting a telephone interview
afterwards.
Looking at the coverage of the CSC's meetings held on
11 November and 2 December 1992, the evidence shows that any
KMT/press connection taking place outside the formal
channels is not unusual, despite the fact that the CSC
members are not allowed to talk to the press.
'Some of the CSC members love to talk to the
press, and they always deliver some messages to
the reporters after the meeting. If you stay in
the headquarters' courtyard long enough, you will
find out whom the reporters choose to favour....
As I know, some members even took notes in the
meeting, then gave them to the press.' (Interview,
information officer, 9-12-92:p1).
'The News Release Guidelines of the Central Committee
Meetings' have been implemented by the KMT since November
1988 in order to clamp down on the unauthorized disclosure
of information and to seal off potential leaks (The
Journalist, 28 Nov.- 4 Dec., 1988:72). According to its
guidelines, any discussion and decisions made in a CSC
meeting is classified as top secret, therefore, no
participant is allowed to leak any information to the press,
or harsh disciplinary action will be taken.	 If it is
necessary, the DCA is the unit which is responsible for
public disclosure.
A notable case in which reporters got sources to cover
the CSC meeting for them took place on 10 December 1992.
That CSC meeting was expected to make a decision on how to
punish the 7 KMT legislators who failed to follow the
party's policies. Two KMT rebels were charged with
advocating a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy. At Question
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Time in the Legislative Yuan that policy had been viewed as
the opposition Democratic Progressive Party's separatist
slogan. The other five legislators were accused of
violating party policy by approving cutting the stock
transaction tax when they convened a session of the
Legislature's Finance Committee.
At that news conference, the principles of collective
responsibility and of the secrecy of the decision-making
process were tightly adhered to by the KMT's spokesman. Not
surprisingly, he announced what decisions were made on the
matters in the meeting. However, information about what the
CSC members discussed or how they reached their decisions
was withheld. At a reporter's request, the KMT spokesman
released the list of names of those who took part in the
debates, but he refused to give any statements from
individuals.
However, that afternoon, stories about the heated
debate between the KMT chairman (the Taiwan-born president)
and conservative CSC members were carried on the front page
of the major evening papers, except the Independence Evening
Post which was solely dependent on the KMT's releases. For
example, the China Times Express and the United Evening News
vividly described the debates on how to punish KMT rebels in
their headline stories in terms that never appeared in the
spokesman's verbal account. In these stories, the
interactions between the chairman and some KMT conservatives
were depicted as an eye-witness account. It seemed as if
the reporters had actually attended the meeting.
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'A private source leaked the story to me.... We
expected that the CSC's meeting was going to have
a whole-hearted debate on the punishment of the
KMT rebels. Therefore, one day before the
meeting, the team of political reporters decided
to ask for some help from a private source.... The
private source is an old friend who has been very
reliable and cooperative. Also, the private
source is a knowledgable person with a good
memory. We can depend on this person's mental
notes.... In this case, we deployed three
reporters at the scene, and one behind the scenes.
The former had to interview the CSC members when
they were arriving or leaving the meeting. Also,
they had to cover the KMT's news conference. The
latter was responsible for making contact with the
private source and writing up the source's
dictation.' (Interview, reporter, 23-11-92:p1)
This example shows what can be done to contextualise
official briefings when resources are invested in fuller
reporting.
(2) The Coverage, of the CSC's Meeting
In this instance, apart from the DCA's releases, the two
major evening papers, the China Times Express and the United
Evening News simultaneously printed another story on the
debates among participants in the meeting. The story was
based on information from interviews and direct observation.
The stories in the United Evening News and the China Times
Express are illustrated as follows.
The United Evening News 	 The China Times Express
Li Huang said, the issue
of 'one China one Taiwan'
closely relates to the
fundamental principle of the
party; the party should deal
with this matter carefully.
Sheng Chang-huang argued
the same. He quoted Li Rui-
Li Huang said, recently
most of the CSC members had
been consulted by the chief
of security of the
Presidency, and they tended
to agree that the punishment
in the two cases should be
equal. The party headquarters
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huan's warning that Beijing
will crack down on any action
seeking an independent Taiwan
by force. Then he urged that
the CSC should severely
punish the two legislators
who advocated the 'one China
one Taiwan' policy.
Li Kuo-ting expressed
his concern in this case and
agreed with the proposals
made by the others.
Then Premier Hau gave
his three viewpoints on this
matter. He said, he
personally did not take sides
on the disciplinary matter.
But he insisted that the
important thing was whether
the two legislators sincerely
regretted their actions. He
stressed that the government
should reject the 'one China
one Taiwan' policy, because
it	 threatened	 Taiwan's
security.
	 Through the
episode of dealing with the
'one China one _Taiwan'
matter, ordinary people would
understand that one China
policy is essential to our
society.
Hsu Li-flung expressed
his concerns on the 'one
China one Taiwan' matter.
But, Chairman Lee Teng-
hui said, one China should be
referring to the Republic of
China. He ruled that the
punishment needed to be
evaluated again by the
party's	 Evaluation	 and
Discipline Committee.	 He
also instructed the Political
Division	 to	 study	 the
definition of 'one China'.
Premier Hau left for the
Sun Yat Sen Memorial Hall at
11 AM before the meeting
ended.
should explain the reason
that the punishment proposed
by the Evaluation and
Discipline Committee was
different.
Sheng Chang-huang made a
long statement. He stressed
that . the assertion of
Taiwanese independence will
threaten Taiwan's security.
He cited the communist China
propaganda chief Li Rui-
huan's saying that Beijing
will stop Taiwan from getting
independent,
	
even	 with
'bloodshed'.
	
He said, the
Chinese communists are
closely watching how we deal
with this issue. If the KMT
failed to take this matter in
hand,	 then	 serious
consequences are expected.
Chairman Lee said, since
many comrades were on the
list waiting to give their
opinions, he suggested that
the case be returned to the
Evaluation and Discipline
Committee for further
investigation.
Li Kuo-ting raised his
hand and said, the two cases
should be passed
simultaneously, rather than
one being delayed.
Premier Hau said, since
the chairman had made the
decision, he should not say
anything. But, the event of
'one China, one Taiwan' had
occurred at Question Time, so
he was obliged to make a
supplementary statement. He
said, the KMT has opposed the
policy of 'one China, one
Taiwan' since 1949. Also,
the chairman gave several
announcements on this matter.
Apparently, the party's stand
is clear, no member should
defy it. He said, the
disciplinary action proposed
by the party's Evaluation and
Discipline Committee should
be able to give people a
clear idea that the KMT's
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policy is 'one China'. The
KMT should reach a consensus
that it opposed a 'one China,
one Taiwan' policy, because
it could endanger 20 million
people's welfare.
Chairman Lee said, some
people speculated that the
KMT's one China means the
People's Republic of China.
But he made a firm
announcement that 'one China'
should be the Republic of
China.
Hsu Li-nung said, the
two cases should be
simultaneously taken into
account, rather just
considered as one case. He
insisted that the 'one China,
one Taiwan' policy was
nothing short of advocating
Taiwanese independence. It
would	 have	 serious
consequences.
Chairman Lee stopped
Hsu's arguments and said, the
case of 'one China, one
Taiwan' would be returned to
by the Committee for review.
He said, 'Now, we discuss the
5th case.'
Hsu continued with his
arguments, he said, if only
one case was passed, the
outcome would be serious. He
opposed that only one case
was taken into account.
KMT's Secretary-General
Soong said, if the meeting
decided to return two cases
to the party's Evaluation and
Discipline Committee, he
suggested that the party had
better find someone to
replace him. He said, this
matter will create
difficulties for the party in
the election campaign.
Here is a breakdown of the order of interactions among
the CSC members with the news stories published by the
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Sheng Chang-huang
Li Kuo-ting
The Premier
Hsu Li-flung
The Chairman
newspapers mentioned above.
The United Evening News
Li Huang 	
The China Times Express
Li Huang
Sheng Chang-huang
The Chairman
Li Kuo-ting
The Premier
The Chairman
Hsu Li-flung
The Chairman
Hsu Li-flung
KMT's Secretary-General
Examples given above show that the rhythms of both
stories are very similar, with the exception of the
statements made by the KMT's Secretary-General. This
appeared in the China Times Express, but not in the United
Evening News.
'Any statement made by the KMT's politicians on
that occasion should be newsworthy. I agree that
the China Times Express did a better report than
my paper on this matter. Actually, our reporters
missed that piece of information, rather than it
being killed by the editors.' (Interview, UEN
editor, 17-11-92:p1)
In this case, the handouts which contained the
information previously given by the KMT spokesman at the
news conference were available at 6 PM. In responding to
the China Times Express' coverage on the chairman and the
secretary-general's statements which it had not been
authorized to release, the DCA issued two pieces of
information to the news media later in the evening. These
were the transcriptions of verbatim speeches made by the
chairman and the secretary-general in the morning's meeting.
This measure was an attempt to stop the reporters pursuing
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their stories through second-hand channels (Hsin Sheng Pao,
11 Dec. 1992:2).
Generally speaking, this case received extensive
coverage in the daily papers. Furthermore, the study of
seven daily papers' coverage of this event showed that there
was a high degree of uniformity among them. In other words,
the papers, regardless of their politics, reproduced the
DCA's news releases and the China Times Express' story
regarding the disputes of the CSC.
At first, apart from the Independence Daily Post, the
other papers reproduced the full text of the chairman's
speech on the front page and the secretary-general's was
printed on page 2 or 3. Unusually, the Independence Daily
Post published the secretary-general's verbatim speech, and
included a brief story on the chairman's speech written as
a DCA news story.
'Of course, if I knew the chairman's verbatim
speech text been sent in the late evening, I would
have definitely got it into print. It was the
reporter's negligence. That night, she insisted
on handling this case by herself, therefore, no
other reporter knew that DCA had released that
piece of information.' (Interview, IDP chief-
editor, 13-11-92:p1)
Secondly, each daily paper also reported a story which
depicted the disputes between the chairman and some
conservative members at the CSC meeting. Generally, these
stories were framed in a way which was very much like the
story in the China Times Express. When the contents of
seven newspapers were scrutinized, the evidence suggests
that the rhythms of all these stories were very much like
the China Times Express, although some sentences were
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paraphrased and a few detailed contexts were added. The
reasons for this unanimous reportage are partly because the
dailies simply reproduced the KMT's releases, and partly
because they directly duplicated the China Times Express'
stories.
'I admit that some reporters from daily papers
might check it (the news disclosed by the evening
newspapers) with a private source or the KMT
spokesman. In this case, I think most reporters
just directly made a copy from the China Times
Express.... After the story appeared in the early
evening papers, during the whole afternoon no
complaint was made about this disclosure. That
means this story is fair. Therefore, we are safe
to make a subsequent report.' (Interview,
reporter, 12-11-92:p1)
In this case, there is a general and rather uncritical
reproduction of the story which is uncontested by the
authorities. However, this process introduces another
problem regarding journalistic professionalism. That is to
what extent a published story can be reproduced without
attribution. All in all, that fact that Chairman Lee and
Secretary-General Soong's statements were reproduced
verbatim in the dailies reflected that the reporters lacked
an occupational ideology which allowed them to defy the
KMT's news management. They played a passive role in
reporting authorities and they often recorded the
information without interpretation, not mentioning or
seeking opposition testimony and facts.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON THE BACKSTAGE
With the aim to break through the news control imposed by
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the Executive Yuan, the reporters always have to cultivate
rapport with news sources. Routinely, the reporters make
contacts with their private sources in order to remedy
misinformation or add to the information received from the
official news outlets. For instance, in the cases mentioned
early, private sources are mobilized to do the reporter's
work.
On the front stage, the relationships between reporters
and politicians are always adversarial, except with the
spokesmen. In Chinese political culture, the leading
members of the KMT have no tradition of personal contact
with journalists. They might interact with publishers,
perhaps only limited to the party-state owned papers and the
China Times and the United Daily News, but rarely with
reporters. This is certainly a matter of social status.
Traditionally, the top ranks of the bureaucracies in Taiwan
are staffed with older officials. Therefore, the senior
politicians in the ruling circles are generally much older
than the reporters. More importantly, in Chinese culture,
leaders are proclaimed to be deserving of respect (Pye,
1991:16-18). Of course, they are generally immune to harsh
criticism from the media. As for civil servants, they are
reluctant to talk about their business in public. In
general, they incline toward reticence in dealing with the
news media. Legally, according to the Civil Servant Service
Act, Article 4 stipulates that civil servants are not
allowed to disclose official business.
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1. The Reporters Make Efforts to Cultivate Politicians
Since the high ranking officials, such as the President and
the Premier, have insisted that news must be released by the
spokesman and have deliberately avoided seeing journalists,
their subordinates, especially the civil servants located in
the Executive Yuan and the Presidency have to be self-
restrained in dealing with reporters.
To visit an official in his office is one way to obtain
information, but it is not the most important one. In
reality, the reporters are unlikely to conduct a face-to-
face interview with a senior official, because the chances
of this being granted is small. As was mentioned above, the
President and the Premier rarely give interviews to domestic
reporters. Also, other senior government executives such
as, the Vice-President and the Deputy Premier, seldom meet
the news media.
'As far as I know, no interview was granted by the
Deputy Premier, except last year he met the press
corps once.' (Interview, reporter, 23-11-92:p2)
Furthermore, because of being afraid that the
authorities might track down their sources as leakers, the
reporters hesitate to interview the low-ranking officials in
the Executive Yuan or the Presidency. Therefore, they
prefer to reach their sources by phone.
Instead of having a face-to-face encounter with the
senior officials in the office, the reporters intercept them
in a public place. But, the reporters are not allowed to
approach the President and the Premier.
	 In practice,
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certain occasions are targeted by the reporters on which
they can confront senior officials and try to conduct a
sound-bite interview. These occasions are meetings held in
honour of a special event, or for a discussion on certain
public policies and also parties organized to commemorate a
birthday, a retirement, a marriage, and even a funeral.
In practice, the reporters make an effort to get to
know a politician's routines. Generally, they contact the
individuals who are functional or in physical proximity or
both to the senior officials. There are a number of ways
that reporters find out about the movements of a politician.
First, the reporters request the information from the
GI's press officers or the secretarial staffs of the senior
officials. Some reporters even try to get the information
from the official's chauffeurs. But most reporters admit
that the Executive Yuan and the Presidency is a closed
system, and difficult to get information from.
Secondly, the reporters seek the information from other
administration agencies which are considered to have a more
open information system, such as the departments under the
Executive Yuan (except the Ministry of Defence), the
Legislative Yuan and many organizations in the private
sector.
Finally, a systematic reading of news announcements in
the newspapers serves as an important channel for the
reporters in getting information about the whereabouts of
politicians.
'Every morning, I will look through the
advertising items of "The Funeral Announcements".
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Because it contains a list of celebrities who are
going to take charge of funeral honours
symbolically, I can get some ideas of who is going
to show up on that occasion. At that moment, I
might go there and get them to say something, even
just few words. I know it will not get enough
information to write a story. Also, it is not
very polite to rush to interview with someone
before or after a memorial or funeral. But, I
don't have any choice. On the beat, it is so
difficult to hold them down.' (Interview,
reporter, 5-11-92:p1)
Although the officials always keep a distance and are
reluctant to deal with reporters publicly, it does not mean
that interactions between the reporters and the officials
are ruled out. On the contrary, they are transformed into
private situations.
Many modes of interaction between the officials and the
reporters are enacted in private situations. Generally,
conducting an interview at the senior official's home or
other private place rarely happens. On these beats, the
telephone interview is the most important and popular method
used by reporters to obtain confidential information.
In daily routines, the reporters attempt to contact the
officials by phone in the late afternoon, especially around
6 PM, when the officials hold daily meetings and go back to
the office. Otherwise, the reporters have to reach the
senior officials by phone after 9 PM, because by that time
the officials will have returned to their residence.
Generally, ringing a senior official in the late evening is
considered as the most productive way of doing journalistic
work.
'I take phone calls from reporters at home every
evening from 9 to 11 o'clock. Approximately, I
have to answer 20 to 30 phone calls each night.
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I always say, "why don't you raise your questions
at the news conference?" The reporter replies, "I
don't like colleagues to know the questions and
the answers as well."... Sometimes, because of no
new development of state affairs, I have to repeat
the same thing on the line over and over again.'
(Public speech, GI's Director-General, 9-11-
92:p2)
To make private contacts is always a matter of
friendship. Friendship is probably the most common factor
mentioned by the reporters in contributing to their news
gathering process. What this actually means is that
friendship represents a special connection with the
officials which is an essential part of news gathering,
because based on this relation the reporters can facilitate
entry to controlled and restricted situations.
'We are not talking about the legislators who are
always kind to the news media. I feel that the
officials in tbe government agencies are very
cautious in dealing with the press, especially the
officials at the low bureaucratic levels.
Therefore, a telephone interview is granted, it is
always a deliberate agreement to trade favours.
Also, if a piece of information is given, not to
mention confidential information, it always
symbolizes some kind of trust relationship or
friendship.' (Interview, reporter, 26-11-92:p2)
'Here, I can not meet the official directly and I
can not hang around in front of them. Therefore,
there is always a shortage of chances to make
contact with politicians, especially the low-
ranking officials. Generally, I can meet the
senior officials on some occasions, but I always
have difficulties to make the acquaintance of low-
ranking ones.' (Interview, reporter, 9-12-92:p1)
Of course, friendship is a state which is achieved
through repeated interactions over time and producing good
quality work which omits the contact's name.
'Generally, to cultivate rapport with officials is
a time consuming task, you have to accumulate it
bit by bit through routinely repeated
interactions. Further, you have to demonstrate
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your own credibility by producing good quality
work. First and foremost, you have to bear it in
mind to drop their names in your news stories.'
(Interview, reporter, 26-11-92:p2)
'I have been on the beat for 10 years. Long
tenure on the beat always offers an advantage in
making contacts with officials. The first step in
establishing rapport is to chat with them. I
always use any chance I can find to chat with the
officials, especially low-ranking officials in my
spare time. I use the affiliation networks, such
as friends, classmates, teachers and relatives to
gain access to the officials. When I chat with
them, the topics are not limited to news items.
I think something related to academic work is a
good way to start talking. Of course, by doing
this I have to study the official's
backgrounds....Since a connection is established,
I can ask them for some information. This type of
information is always helpful to me in eliciting
on-the-record information from other sources, such
as the spokesmen or official documents.'
(Interview, reporter, 10-11-92:p1)
A reporter's chances of success in making contacts with
the officials in private situations are very much dependent
on the identity of his or her employer. Generally, the
reporters from the two newspaper conglomerates, the China
Times group and the United Daily News group which hold more
than two-thirds of the readership market always have
advantages in establishing rapport with the officials. By
contrast, the papers with a small circulation which include
party-state owned papers and so-called liberal papers are
short of resources to engage in a process of public
relations with politicians. Therefore, they always feel it
difficult to feign closeness with the officials.
It has been mentioned above that most officials try to
keep their distance from the news media, therefore, the
relationships between the reporters and the politicians have
to be deliberately cultivated. Actually, it can not be
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denied that many efforts have been made by the two big
newspaper groups to encourage this. For example, the
superiors at the two groups often encourage their reporters
to set up relationships with politicians. 	 Therefore, a
certain financial allowance is provided to the reporters for
engaging in social activities with politicians. Also,
certain types of travel which are required as a means of
producing socializing among reporters and the officials are
financed. Furthermore, the senior staffs of newspapers,
such as publishers or chief editors, arrange parties
regularly in hotel facilities where their reporters and
politicians can chat with each other. Finally, the owners
of these papers Wang Tih-wu and Yu Chi-chung have been
heavyweight members of the ruling party since the 1970s.
_
Because of the employer's affiliation networks, the
reporters from these papers always have a great advantage in
gaining access to the senior officials. In conclusion, all
these tactics mentioned above are used by the news media to
tackle the problems of spatial segregation and psychological
distance between the reporters and the officials in order to
facilitate their news gathering activities.
As for the reporters from liberal and the party-state
owned papers, the chance of confronting officials in private
situations is less than if they worked for one of the big
newspapers. Part of the reason is these papers lack
financial support or affiliation networks to make contacts
with the officials. Another is that these papers have a
small circulation and are presumed to have no great impact
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on public opinion, therefore, they have difficulty in
getting the officials' attention. But for the liberal
papers, such as the Independence Daily Post, the
Independence Evening Post and the People's Daily News, their
anti-government ideology is also a burden to the reporters
who seek a rapport with government officials.
'I do have great difficulty in getting access to
officials on the beat. Because of spatial
segregation, I couldn't meet the officials. Since
they don't know me, how can I expect them to
answer my calls. Further, because of my paper's
ideology, the officials are always sceptical of my
intentions. Therefore, even if they answer my
telephone calls, they won't give me the same type
of information that they give to the reporters
from the big papers. Suspicion always exists
between the government officials and my paper.'
(Interview, reporter, 3-12-92:p2)
'The Independent Evening Post has been identified
as a native Taiwanese paper since the 1970s.
Needless to say, many officials hold the belief
that the paper's editorial guidelines never come
into line with the government, therefore, they
always keep a great distance from us. But, I
think, it is simply a question of time. If you
make attempts to get the officials to remember who
you are not who you work for, you will make some
friends.' (Interview, reporter, 10-12-92:p1)
2. The Politicians Exploit the Reporters
2.1 News Management through Background Briefings
News management encompasses more than the press release and
the press conference. The channel of background briefing is
widely used by senior politicians to disclose the
information they want, when they want. As for the political
reporters who are situated in a rather closed information
system, such as the Presidency, the Executive Yuan and the
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KMT headquarters, they inevitably take part in the rules
which are laid down by the people in politics.
'Under most circumstances, the officials here are
reluctant to give any comment.... More
importantly, the officials here always persist in
speaking for background only and are unwilling to
have news stories attributed to them, therefore,
I can not help but drop their names and simply
quote from an anonymous source....If a given item
is newsworthy, I will confirm with the government
spokesman, or other suitable officials, such as
the Premier's Secretary-General.' (Interview,
reporter, 23-11-92:p2)
News gathering taking place on these occasions is a
game played by the reporters and the senior officials, the
rule of thumb based on the gentleman's agreement among them
to keep the politician's name out of their report. However,
the name of the source is only unknown to the readers.
Either the politicians or the reporters who know the rules
of the game have no difficulty in reading between the lines
and identifying the source.
'In theory, information given by officials in a
public place is allowed to be attributed. But, it
is not always the case. For example, on 22
November, we covered the story about the President
and the Premier playing golf. We were not allowed
to follow through the whole game so we had to wait
after the game started. At that moment, the
President's private secretary conducted a
background briefing on many political issues.
Conventionally, it was supposed to be off-the-
record, but it seemed that he was not to float an
idea or to disclose something on purpose.
Therefore, the reporters on the beat decided to
get the story printed. Of course, we still
followed the rules of the game that his name was
dropped. You have noticed that The New Journalist
reporter attributed his name in the story. The
President's private secretary wanted me to pass
the message to this reporter that he was not happy
about her performance.' (Interview, reporter, 9-
12-92:p2)
'I think every political reporter knows that most
of the unattributed stories associated with the
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Presidency are given by the secretary for
background only. He is very close to the
reporters. Because he is such an important source
for us to request information about the President,
we simply can not detach ourselves from him.'
(Interview, reporter, 23-11-92:p2)
Coverage of the Incident of Lee-Hau's Talk is a good
example of how reporters pursue news for anonymous
publication. In this instance, a series of behind-the-
scenes discussions on the issue of Cabinet resignations were
held by the President and the Premier. From 24 October to
25 November 1992, the President met the Premier four times.
It was widely speculated that the aim of the talks was to
settle political conflicts and cement consensus within the
ruling party. Therefore, the talks of the top
administrators were regarded as politically sensitive.
During that time, thg formal news channels including GIO,
DCA and the Presidency's Spokesman's Office were keeping
silent on these matters. Therefore, most reporters pursued
the news through their own networks. Needless to say, if
the reporters must rely on confidential informants, they
have to follow the rule that the informants are giving
something on a non-attributable basis. Therefore, the news
stories about the talks of the two administrators were
printed without attribution of the source. For example, an
exclusive story reported by the China Times on 3 December
used the same tactics without attribution. In this front
page headline story, its Executive Yuan reporter pointed out
that the Cabinet would resign after the election, because
the Premier had accepted the recommendations made by the
panel group. However, no named source was given in the
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story.
In general, the reporters use the quotation and
attribution of information obtained from private contacts
with caution. In their news stories, the sources are
commonly attributed to 'an informed source', 'high-ranking
officials', 'political circles' and 'YMT sources'. Also, no
attribution is given to indicate the source's agency.
Some examples show that information provided by the
background briefings are commonly published without
attribution to the source by name. But the reporters often
suggest the backgrounder's identification in their stories
through divulging the name in a vague attribution, such as
'a high-ranking Presidency official'.
More importantly, taking the example of the Incident of
Lee-Hau's Talk mentioned above, it clearly demonstrates that
the papers were exploited by the top administrators for
engaging in a private dialogue. On 27 November 1992, the
United Daily News which has been affiliated with the KMT
conservative wing led by the Premier printed a front-page
exclusive story about a private discussion between Chairman
Lee and Premier Hau on the issue of Cabinet resignations.
The story was quoted from an anonymous source and
highlighted that Chairman Lee said to Premier Hau that he
ruled out the issue of Cabinet resignations after the
national election in a private meeting. There was strong
speculation that the KMT conservatives deliberately used the
United Daily News to control ownership of this issue.
In the late afternoon, the Central News Agency (CNA),
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a party-owned news agency, released a news story to deny the
United Daily News's report:
, (CNA: Taipei) According to the informed source,
KMT Chairman Lee Teng-hui discussed the issues of
Cabinet resignations with Premier Hau Pei-tsun
recently.
A local paper said Chairman Lee told Premier
Hau that the cabinet had no need to resign in the
coming year. But, a source of high ranking
authority told the reporter that he knew there was
a discrepancy between what the Chairman said and
what was reported.
The reporter was told, Chairman Lee said,
because the issue of Cabinet resignations has not
been specified in the constitution, he would like
to discuss this matter after the national
election.'
This story was written by the chief-editor of the
Central News Agency at the request of the Presidency in
order to attack the unfavourable coverage made by the United
Daily News.
'Our chief-editor wrote that story by himself in
accordance with the instruction given by the
Presidency. To my knowledge, that story was
dispatched without passing the editorial desk for
final approval.' (Interview, CNA reporter, 5-12-
92:p1)
A huge majority of papers prominently carried the CNA's
story. In this instance, the United Daily News ran the
CNA's story on its second page. Meanwhile, it carried a
headline story and featured it to defend its previous
coverage. In the headline story, the statements made by the
authorities were presented to confirm that its previous
story was correct. However, the source of information was
attributed to 'a high-ranking authoritative source'. The
feature story was written by its Executive Yuan reporter,
who elaborated the Premier's attitude towards the issue of
resignation. Not surprisingly, she featured and attributed
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her story to an anonymous source.
The United Daily News' rival, the China Times tended to
avoid involving itself in the KMT's internal rows. It only
ran a front page headline story on this matter. In this
story, its Presidency reporter pointed out why and how the
Presidency sought to correct the unfavourable report. She
also divulged the source of the coverage in a vague
attribution as 'the Presidency official'. However, in this
story the reporter just mentioned another paper without
identifying the United Daily News by name.
The party-state controlled papers, the Central Daily
News and Hsin-sheng Pao printed the CNA's story on their
front page. The military-owned paper, the Youth Daily has
been viewed as having a close relationship with the Premier.
It printed the CNA's story on page 2 and carried another
story quoting from a high-ranking official of the Executive
Yuan in order to balance the report.
The Liberty Times has its tradition of supporting the
Presidency. Therefore, it seems that the Liberty Times had
distorted this event in a partisan way. It devoted the full
front page to covering this matter with the content skewed
toward the KMT's liberal wing. The CNA's story was the main
headline and followed by three stories. In them, an
anonymous official of the National Assembly and two
legislators of both parties argued that the Premier should
resign after the election.
The Independence Daily Post was probably the only paper
in which the United Daily News was mentioned by name. A
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headline story was published on page 3 within which its
Executive Yuan reporter explained how and why the Presidency
requested the CNA's chief-editor to file the story.
Furthermore, she indicated that this story was to remedy the •
United Daily News report. However, the Independence Daily
Post attributed its story to a Presidency official.
In accordance with the canons of good journalism, news
stories should be attributed to named sources. In theory,
an attributed story means that the reporter and the source
are making a joint commitment to tell the truth, because the
public are allowed to judge the validity of a story against
the source's subsequent actions. Giving private
reassurances to politicians not to be named, the reporters
also provide opportunities for politicians to evade their
responsibility in disclosing authentic information. As a
consequence, they might be less hesitant to float ideas
including half-truths or outright lies. Meanwhile,
reporters who lean heavily on information announced on a
non-attributable basis, also make themselves more open to
manipulation.
'If someone is going to justify the problem of
source anonymity, the fact that the reporters are
denied access to the news sources must be taken
into account. The political reporters are always
in a dilemma. On the one hand, we are faced with
great pressure from the boss that we have to get
our work done every day. On the other, we are
faced with an extremely restricted situation
within which whatever we can do is in a rather
limited way.... We have to try very hard to
develop private contacts and go beyond the
routines of government news releases.... If
sources know they can talk without being directly
quoted, we can get more pertinent information.
Moreover, we may enlarge the public domain of
knowledge, because we can tell people things which
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the government does not want them to know. For
example, the top government agencies always
attempt to cover up leadership conflicts between
the Presidency and the Executive Yuan. In fact,
the politicians should be there to be criticized.'
(Interview, reporter, 10-11-92:p1)
'We accept the information on non-attributable
basis, we have to pay a price that we might run
the risk of being manipulated for certain
purposes. To my knowledge, some of the media were
used by the politicians to manage the crises
during last year's political struggle.'
(Interview, reporter, 23-11-92:p3)
Moreover, the anonymous nature of news leaves the
reporters with greater flexibility to construct the
substance or format of their stories. Since there is no
named source which is available to the public to verify the
given stories, it is very likely to encourage the reporters
to amplify or dilute the information which they get.
'I agree that the tactic of withholding
attribution to the source by name is a necessary
device used by reporters to get confidential
information in political circles. Nevertheless,
I think to some extent that is against our
professional duty. In my organization, every
reporter is required to write down the sources'
names for internal reference, when an unattributed
story is filed. For certain news items, which
touch on political disputes between the Presidency
and the Executive Yuan, the reporters have to
explain to their superiors who are the news
sources 	  Of course, the abuse of background
briefings has existed for years in political
circles. If the information is passed on for
background only, I will use it critically. That
is I will consult with other relevant sources and
get the information verified, although most of the
time things do not go so smoothly. Time is one of
the issues. If I suspect that I might be the
instrument of other people, I will kill the story.
But, I will let my superiors know the whole
picture.... However, I have to point out that
many reporters are abusing the use of the tactic
of non-attribution. As far as I know, a lot of
unattributed news stories reported by colleagues
are figments of journalistic imaginations.'
(Interview, reporter, 21-12-92:p1)
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The anonymous source has been permanent in the news
stories regarding Taiwan's politics. The reporters'
practice of disguising their source has resulted in
tremendous harm being done to the reader's knowledge and
understanding of politics. It is this knowledge which is
essential for them to participate in Taiwan's transition to
a democracy.
2.2 The Party-State Attacks over the Offending Coverage
Generally speaking, the news media are not all equally
favoured by government officials, especially those media
which continue to write critical reports on government
policies.	 A feature of Chinese political culture is a
preference for compromise rather than confrontation
(Winckler, 1984:484
government agencies
troublesome media.
).	 As a part of Chinese culture,
seldom take harsh action against the
Moreover, the routine controversies
between the government and the press are always conveyed in
a manner that is known only to themselves, not to the
readers.
'In our society, some papers always take an
adversarial stand towards the government. Also,
some of their stories are constructed wholly
without any foundation. Some government officials
are irritated by these papers, and say, "You are
the Director-General of GIO. Can you do something
about these baseless stories?" I have to declare
that the GIO does not interfere in or control
journalistic practices in any circumstances....
When I asked a reporter, "Why did you write such
a politically biased story?" the reporter
answered, "Running a paper is for the purpose of
revolution....". These papers believe that no
government business is good business. Therefore,
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whatever has been done by the government must be
indiscreetly subjected to adverse criticism....
Personally, I don't agree with their paper's
politics. Also, I believe their performances are
harmful to our society. However, recently I
realized that it was a price to be paid for the
process of democratization.' (Public speech, GI's
Director-General, 9-11-92:p4)
'My job is to serve reporters. If the news can be
announced, I announce it. If it can not, I have
got to watch what I say.... Some papers have their
own political stands on reporting the KMT. For
example, after the news conference, they have to
seek other information from someone else, and add
to my news releases. I hesitate to say that they
produce politically biased stories. But I have to
point out that there is always a strong
discrepancy between the DCA's news releases and
the press coverage on these matters.' (Interview,
DCA's Director, 19-11-92:p1)
2.2.1 The Routine Measures against Troublesome Papers
The high-ranking government agencies, apart from the Defence
Department seldom take the news media to court. Therefore,
the distribution of handouts and the arrangement of press
conferences to verify or deny stories are considered as the
strongest actions taken by government executives in
reprimanding the media.
'For instance, on 19 October 1992, we held a
special news conference. At the conference, the
government spokesman announced that a headline
story published in today's evening paper misled
readers. The government spokesman told reporters
on the beat, the Premier never said that the
government considered cracking down on the pro-
independence movement by force during Question
Time in the Legislative Yuan. Although the
spokesman only mentioned an evening paper at the
conference, I think everyone on that occasion knew
that he pinpointed the Independence Evening Post.'
(Interview, press coordinator, 10-12-92:p1)
In this instance, the GI's press conference was
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published by all the major newspapers. However, only the
Youth Daily, a rival of the Independence Evening Post, and
its sister paper, the Independence Daily Post, identified
that the Independence Evening Post was the paper concerned.
Another example shows the Presidency taking action
against the offending media. On 24 November 1992, the
Presidency's Spokesman's Office issued a handout to every
news organization correcting a biased report made by a
certain paper. Again no paper was mentioned by name in the
handout.
'The Presidency's Spokesman's Office made an
announcement yesterday. The office said,
President Lee Teng-hui telephoned the Taiwan
Provincial Governor, the Taipei City Mayor and the
Kaohsiung Mayor on his behalf to pay a visit to
the newly elected legislators on 20 December. The
Office stressed that the purpose of this visit was
to consult with legislators on the issues of
public policy, rather than on the nomination of
the new Premier. The Spokesman's Office said the
announcement was aimed at verifying a certain
paper's report.' (Presidency's handout, 23-12-92).
After examining papers published on 23 December, it
becomes clear that the Presidency had pinpointed the Liberty
Times. On 23 December, the Liberty Times carried a story
about the Taiwan Provincial Governor visiting the newly
elected legislators. In the final part of the story, its
Taiwan Provincial Government correspondent quoted from an
informed source the prediction that Governor Lien was very
likely to be the nominee for the premiership, and that on
this trip he was expected to consult with the legislators to
obtain their consent for his nomination. It is not
surprising that most papers were very cooperative in
publishing the Presidency's announcement. They carried this
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matter on the second page, either in full or merely
rephrased it. By contrast, the Presidency's announcement
was never printed in the Liberty Times.
Under most circumstances, some moderate actions, such
as making complaints to the reporter concerned or his or her
superiors, or seeking a correction, are taken by high-
ranking government agencies to deal with issues of incorrect
coverage.
'Most of the time, we just talk to the reporter in
person in order to find out why he or she produced
such a story. After that we might decide whether
to notify his or her superiors.... Sometimes, we
do post a letter to the editor and request a
correction to a story. For example, on 30
November 1992, the China Times printed our letter
on page 13. Of course, this letter was put in a
less significant place in comparison with the
story in question. However, the 15th Article of
the Publication Law stipulates that the letter
which demands corrections or rebuttal should be
published on the same page as the story in
question originally appeared. But it does not
specify how much space the rebuttal letter should
be allowed.' (Interview, press coordinator, 10-12-
92:p2)
2.2.2 A Special Case: The Rows between the Presidency
and the United Daily News
The disputes between the Presidency and the United Daily
News provide us with a good example of how politicians deal
with offending media. The United Daily News, the flagship
of Taiwan's largest newspaper group has been viewed as a
conduit for the KMT's conservative wing which openly
challenges the President's 'one China' policy.
In political circles, it has been circulated that
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Premier Hau always disregards the Independence Daily Post,
the Independence Evening Post and the Liberty Times, and
President Lee dislikes the United Daily News (The
Journalist, 21-27 Feb., 1993:91). In fact, the United Daily
News has been in trouble with the Presidency for years. In
November 1992, the tensions reached a peak. The Presidency
intended to cancel subscriptions to the United Daily News in
November 1992. At least, the President's personal secretary
has no longer subscribed to the United Daily News since
October 1992 (Wealth, Jan. 1993:252). Furthermore, in a
meeting with the Democratic Progressive Party's Caucus on 9
February 1993, the President told an opposition legislator,
'I no longer read that paper (the United Daily News), don't
you too?' (The Journalist, 14-20 Feb., 1993:52).
The Li Rui-huan Incident mentioned above, triggered a
series of controversies not only between the Presidency and
the United Daily News, but also with the liberal papers and
the United Daily News.
On 11 November 1992, during the meeting of the KMT
Central Standing Committee, conservatives called for the
crushing of pro-independence voices within the party by
heavily disciplining two maverick legislators. A CSC member
quoted a Beijing official's statement which was printed in
the newspapers on 29 November 1992, and he argued that
communist Chinese was ready to 'shed blood' to maintain a
unified China. Therefore, the surging of the pro-
independence movement would give an excuse for Beijing to
invade Taiwan.
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But, Chairman (also the President) Lee Teng-hui
responded by criticizing some KMT members who he claimed,
were using Beijing's threat to suppress their comrades.
Furthermore, Chairman Lee asserted that the Beijing
official's remarks were misinterpreted by a certain local
newspaper. He condemned the paper as deliberately
misleading readers.
'According to my (the chairman) understanding of
what Li Rui-huan recently said, there was not the
serious threat which Sheng (Chang-huang), a member
of the KMT Central Standing Committee had
described. The reporters on that occasion should
be aware of this matter. But a certain paper
published a horrible story to threaten ordinary
people here....' (DCA's handouts, 11-11-92)
In the President's comments, no paper was identified by
name. Furthermore, on 29 October, Li Rui-huan's remarks
that communist China,, would use any means to prevent the
independence of Taiwan were reported in a majority of
papers. However, the President's comments were widely
interpreted as referring to the United Daily News.
For example, on 23 November 1992, some pressure groups
led by the Taiwan Association of University Professors
(TAUP) in response to the President's comments launched the
'Return the Paper to Save Taiwan' campaign to persuade
ordinary people to boycott the United Daily News. The
campaigners accused the United Daily News of being
'Beijing's mouthpiece' on the Li Rui-huan's matter. They
urged readers to drop their subscriptions and to display the
label of 'We Don't Read the United Daily News' on their
front door. The campaigners also visited and called on
companies in the industrial and economic sectors to stop
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running advertisements in the United Daily News. On 16
December, TAUP held a public gathering to mark an end to the
campaign. They claimed that the circulation of United Daily
News had decreased by 80,000 since the campaign had started.
(Field notes, TAUP's meeting, 16-12-92:p4)
Finally, the President's criticisms ended the dispute
between the United Daily News and liberal papers, such as
the Independence Evening Post, Independence Morning Post,
Liberty Times and People's Daily News. On 26 November, the
United Daily News printed two announcements on page 3. In
the first announcement, its solicitors demanded that TAUP
should stop the libellous campaign immediately and make a
public apology within 3 days, otherwise, the United Daily
News would sue them for libel. In the second announcement,
the United Daily News warned 4 papers mentioned above that
no story in connection with TAUP's campaigns should be
published, or legal action would be taken. On 29 December,
the United Daily News sued TAUP for libel in court. At the
same time, it ran 4 pages denying the accusations.
In this instance, the United Daily News' rival, the
China Times, and the party-state owned papers avoided
involvement in the row, although their reporters agreed with
the President's comments on the coverage of the United Daily
News. However, no effort was made by these papers to
publish TAUP's campaigns.
In conclusion, gentle measures have been taken by the
party-state against the media, when it views their coverage
as unfavourable. The party-state usually avoids naming the
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specific offending media. In addition, the media seem to be
willing to collaborate with the party-state in not being
fully open about the direct and indirect pressures that are
brought to bear on their work. In so doing, the papers
evade their responsibility for offering information which is
intelligible to the public.
CONCLUSION
News is a joint product of the interaction between
politicians and reporters. In Taiwan's case, the
relationship between reporters and the politicians is not
one of equals, and it is not surprising that the dominant
role is enjoyed by the politicians.
The party-state has its historical connection with the
media through control over ownership or by interlocking
directorships. Since the media are largely controlled by
KMT loyalists, the KMT politicians are privileged in their
access to media to achieve the outcome they desire.
The exercise of public relations in exerting controls
over the flow of information which the press depends on for
the production of news is characteristic of every
government. The normal practice of public relations
conducted by the government is to increase the supply of
information on the one hand, and the attempt to control the
information released and limit the access on the other
(Bruce, 1992; Cockerell, Hennessy and Walker, 1984; Gandy,
1982; Hess, 1984; Parenti, 1993; Sigal, 1973; Tiffen, 1989).
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In Taiwan's case, the party-state's public relations machine
functions on the same principles. The strategies used by
the KMT government in dealing with the media are to exclude
the reporters from encountering government business, with
all information being released by its spokesmen.
Perhaps, the fact that reporters are denied the
opportunity to contact top administrators is the most
distinguishing characteristic of Taiwan's journalistic
practice. Due to the division of social status, the senior
politicians have no tradition of dealing with journalists.
Therefore, their publicity is mediated through their
spokesmen.
In Taiwan's case, the press office staffed within the
state bureaucracies offers an opportunity for the reporter
to make contact with politicians on a face-to-face basis.
Having no personal contacts with the top administrators can
significantly alter the nature of journalistic performance.
In reporting the party-state, the reporters are reduced to
an utter dependence on what the spokesmen have said about
what the Premier and the President have said, but without
attribution.
Furthermore, the KMT government limits the political
information communicated. Apart from covering up any
embarrassments, the party-state's public relations machines
aim at projecting a sense of the greatness of leadership to
the ordinary citizens. The content of the news releases
fully reflects this intention in which the message projects
the good character of leaders, rather than a disclosure of
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substantive government practice.
More importantly, the reporters seem to perform a
rather passive role in interrogating the work of government.
In Taiwan, the reporters are deferential to political
authority. The reason that the reporters faithfully
reproduce the official line is in a large part due to self-
censorship. For instance, reporters rarely refuse to accept
government information. At news conferences, they act as
uncritical scenographers for the information given by
spokesmen for the party-state. Therefore, they seldom try
to probe or challenge the spokesmen and make them more
answerable. In response to the supplied information, the
reporters seldom try to search for other sources in order to
place what the spokesman has said within a broader context
and make the message more intelligible to readers.
The series of briefings and leaks are central to the
routine interactions between politicians and reporters in
the production of news. Carey (1986:152-158), Cockerell,
Hennessy and Walker (1984:120-141), Hess (1984:75-94), Sigal
(1973:111-114), and Tiffen (1989:97-119) well illustrate in
their case studies that governments have widely employed
these tactics to manipulate the information in accordance
with their own private interests. In Taiwan, background
briefings serve as an important channel through which
reporters work to gain more information. In so doing,
reporters inevitably trade some of their journalistic
independence for access to sources which help them to carry
out their news gathering tasks. The reporters who enter
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into this kind of exchange give the politicians another
stake in manipulating political information. Since the
information is made for background use only, the source
remains concealed. Thus, politicians are allowed to evade
the responsibility of being accountable for their
disclosures. Moreover, the reporters fail to take
responsibility in telling readers that their stories are not
the figments of journalistic imaginations.
The prevalence of source anonymity in Taiwan's
newspapers has had a detrimental effect on the readers who
manage to understand government business. In fact,
reporters pursue the news for anonymous publication that has
limited the dialogue between government and the public. In
other words, the public who lack a knowledge of political
practices and journalistic conventions are being
misinformed. They have difficulties not only in putting
names to anonymous sources, but also in considering motives
hiding behind their conduct. The fact that the public play
no role in assessing the authenticity of political and
journalistic conducts is a formidable obstacle in the
mobilization of an active informed citizenship.
Active citizens are essential to a rigorous democracy,
but a participatory public needs to be nurtured in an
environment where more and better information is provided.
One role of the media in a democracy is to offer a space
within which the citizens can question the politicians and
voice their own experiences. Obviously the Taiwanese press
still has a long way to go to achieve this objective.
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Table 6-1 News Coverage of the Executive Yuan
Date GI's news releases Newspapers
Party-
state run
Privately-run
Items CDN HSP YD UDN CT IDP LT
06- Premier's daily 2 1	 1	 1 1	 1 1
11- routines
92 Press conference
1. Premier's
instructions
2 2	 3	 3 2	 2 2	 2
2.	 Bills 1 1
20- Premier's daily 2 2	 2	 2 2	 2
11- routines
92 Press conference
1. Premier's
instructions
4 1	 2	 3 4	 3 1	 1
2.	 Bills 4 1 1	 1 1	 1
3. Appointments 3 1
4. Routine reports 1 1	 1	 1
24- Premier's daily 3 3	 1	 3 2 1
11- routines
92 Press conference
1. Premier's
instructions
3 3	 3	 3 3	 3 1	 2
2.	 Bills 3 1
3. Appointments 1
29- Premier's daily 2 1	 2	 1 1	 1
11- routines
92 Press conference
1. Premier's
instructions
3 3	 2	 4 3	 2 2	 1
2.	 Bills 2 1 1	 1
3. Appointments 2 2	 2
4. Routine reports 1
CDN: The Central Daily News
HSP: Hsin Sheng Pao
YD : The Youth Daily
UDN: The United Daily News
CT : The China Times
IDP: The Independence Daily Post
LT : The Liberty Times
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CHAPTER 7
REPORTING THE LEGISLATURE
INTRODUCTION
The principal characteristic of representative democracy is
the existence of an institutionalized opposition which has
a reasonable opportunity at some stage of becoming the
government. Generally, the legislature is the key area in
which the opposition challenges the government.
The Parliament in Taiwan is central to this study of
the media's relationship with politics. The Parliament is
a contestable site in which dynamics of political forces
come into existence. The complicated symbiotic
relationships among all political parties introduce a new
dimension of power contestation that is distinct from the
Executive Yuan and the Presidency when media impact on
politics is assessed.
By taking a view of dialectical control in a study of
media impact on politics, political news concerning the
executive branch is seen as the product of a process of
negotiation between, and mutual construction by, reporters
and politicians (Hess, 1984; Sigal, 1973; Tiffen, 1989). By
comparison, the impetus behind parliamentary reporting is
much more complicated. In parliament, reporting politics is
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an endeavour accomplished by reporters and various sources,
such as politicians who are characterized as a heterogenous
group, separated by conflicting interests, and pressure
groups or lobbyists.
Cook (1989), Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989) and
Robinson (1984) spotlight how the reciprocal influence
between the media and parliament affects the course of
politics. In parliament, the media are exploited by
competitive political groups in order to accomplish
legislative goals or to help the parliamentarians get re-
elected. Ultimately, effectively and regularly employing
the media has become an inseparable part of legislation.
The media function of public enlightenment is at the
heart of democratic theory. Parliamentary relations with
the media which involve substantial ambivalence provide an
opportunity to assess the reality of these claims.
The core of this chapter examines how the members of
parliament who have unequal political capital attempt to
control information, and how this may affect the political
information which the people in Taiwan receive. In so
doing, a two-month ethnographic study was conducted in the
Legislative Yuan to discover the strategies used by both the
ruling party Kuo Min Tang (KMT) and the opposition
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to advance their
political interests.
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THE LEGISLATURE BEAT
The Legislative Yuan, the highest legislative organ of the
party-state,
	
functions like the parliament in a
representative democracy. It has a number of parliamentary
powers enshrined in the Constitution. In Taiwan, the
Executive Yuan's president, usually referred to as the
Premier is appointed by the President, and requires the
consent of the Legislative Yuan.
The Executive Yuan must present to the Legislative Yuan
an annual state-of-the-nation report and an annual budget
three months before the fiscal year begins. Members of the
Legislative Yuan may question the Premier and any cabinet
ministers on policy matters and administration. Moreover,
the Legislative Yuan holds authority over a broad range of
government bills.
Although the Legislative Yuan functions like the
parliament in a representative democracy, it is less
powerful and to some extent is not independent of the party-
state. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, from
1949 to 1986, the Legislative Yuan was firmly controlled by
the ruling party, the Kuo Min Tang (KMT). In keeping with
the KMT's claim to be the only legal government of all
China, two thirds of the seats in the Legislative Yuan were
held by the legislators who were elected on the mainland in
1947. Before 1992, the parliamentary elections were viewed
as supplementary to those last held by the KMT on the
mainland in 1947.
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Secondly, according to the structure of the KMT, the
legislators are subservient to the party authorities. In
practice, meaningful discussions on legislative bills often
take place in a private caucus organized under the auspices
of the KMT where party leaders can crack the whip. Although
the KMT legislators can use question and answer sessions to
question and criticize the government, this legislative
strategy does not pose a political threat to the Premier or
to his cabinet members. It merely provides an avenue for
discontented legislators to air their views or to seek
clarification on some government business (Tien Hung-mao,
1989:141).
Thirdly, effective opposition has never existed in
Taiwan over the past four decades. The largest opposition
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), only had
twenty legislators in the parliament before 1993.
Therefore, the DPP has had little influence on the
legislative process.
After many years of acting as a rubber stamp, the
Legislative Yuan is now becoming more independent. In the
1992 legislature sessions, all legislators elected from the
mainland were retired. The remaining legislators who were
Taiwan-elected now act more autonomously, because they are
accountable to their voters.
Growing factionalism is an index of the increasing
independence of the Legislative Yuan. Recently, legislative
politics on Taiwan have been characterized by factional
realignments within and between political parties.
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Generally speaking, previous inter-party disputes and recent
intra-party rivalry within the KMT reflected the historical
tension between the native Taiwanese and the mainland
Chinese who came to Taiwan forty years ago. For instance,
at the legislative session in 1988, the 92 KMT legislators
including a bloc of 21 Overseas Chinese representatives
divided into factions. The Wisdom Coalition which claimed
45 members was the KMT's largest faction. Almost all were
native-born Taiwanese. The Wisdom • Coalition's rival, the
New KMT Alliance claimed about a dozen members, most of whom
were second generation mainlanders. A newer, less
ideological group called itself the Parliamentary Reform
Association claimed 51 members. Most of the members of this
faction were also members of the other two factions. The
DPP in opposition also split into factions, though its 18
legislators tend to cooperate in parliament more so than
their colleagues at party headquarters.
By the end of 1992, with the differences between the
factions becoming increasingly well-defined, the
parliamentary actions on both the floor and in committee
looked like a three-legged race between the DPP's softer
pro-independence line, a 'One China' wing of the KMT
advocating unification with the mainland and a 'Taiwan KMT'
which endorsed the 'Two China' concept. This parliamentary
ecology is now more complex than previously, where debates
focused on the government's 'One China' policy and the
opposition's 'One China, One Taiwan' response. Viewed in
this way, the legislative Yuan has become a contestable site
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where the opposition in general, the KMT mavericks in
particular,	 frequently	 challenge	 the	 party-state's
fundamental principle. Under such circumstances, the
Legislative Yuan provides a real social setting which is
central in any study of the relationship between the media
and politics.
1. Seeking a Legitimate Space in the Legislative Yuan
As the parliament became more independent, the coverage of
news from the Legislative Yuan developed. The parliamentary
press corps grew considerably. For instance, during the
90th Legislative Session which was between September and
December 1992, there were 105 journalists from 58 news
_
organizations on the beat.'
Generally speaking, it is rather easy for news
organizations, such as newspapers, radio and television
stations to deploy their reporters to the Legislative Yuan,
although advance permission is required. The normal
practice is for each news organization to have a legitimate
space in the parliament and to submit their list of
parliamentary reporters to the Press Office three weeks
before the opening of the Legislative Yuan. In democratic
theory, the legislative activities should be open to the
public and the press. In Taiwan, the reporter's right of
access to the parliament is recognized, but the parliament
'The figures are counted by the research based on The Directory of
the Parliamentary Press Corps in 90th Legislative Session which was
published by the Press Office in September 1992.
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still holds the power to decide the conditions of that
access.
Access granted by the Press Office vary from one type
of news organizations to another. In comparison with
newspaper and broadcasting reporters, magazine reporters
have more difficulty in gaining access to the parliament.
'We only give IDs to the reporters who are
licensed. Legally, magazines are not eligible to
apply for journalist cards, because magazine
reporters are not licensed by the Government
Information Office. According to the Government
Information Office's definition, the licensed
reporters are those who are working for newspapers
and the electronic media. But, the newspapers are
confined to the journals which are published daily
or at regular intervals of six or less than six
days in accordance with the Publication Law.
Generally, the political journals or magazines are
published every week or longer than that,
therefore, their reporters are unable to obtain a
license from the Government Information Office.
So, we cannot issue the ID to magazine reporters'
(Interview, Director of the Press Office, 1-10-
92:p1)
Furthermore, the number of reporters who are allowed to
be regulars on the beat differs from newspaper to newspaper.
The big newspapers who publish 48 pages per day, and those
which concentrate on covering political affairs are allowed
to dispatch more reporters to the beat. Nevertheless, 5
reporters from any one news organization is the maximum.
'We have to set up some criteria to limit the
number of reporters who are regulars on the beat.
Otherwise, each news organization would send a
great many reporters to the Legislative Yuan. I
believe, all news organizations are equally
favoured.... At present, we give 5 journalistic
cards to each of following papers: the United
Daily News, the China Times and the Independence
Daily Post. By comparison, the two big papers
(the United Daily News and the China Times)
publish more news regarding the Legislative Yuan
than the other papers. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that they will need more
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reporters to cover the parliament. The
Independence Daily Post is a special case. The
Independence Daily Post is a paper which only
prints political news. It always devotes a huge
amount of space to reporting the parliament. We
still allow the Independence Daily Post to have 5
reporters on the beat, although it just publishes
24 pages a day.' (Interview, Director of the Press
Office, 1-10-92:p1)
If the request for conducting journalistic work in the
parliament is granted, each reporter in the reporting team
is issued with a journalist's card. Normally, the
journalist's card is valid only for a legislative session.
Taking an example, the card which designated the 90th
Legislative Session was valid only from September to the end
of December 1992. Having this card, the reporter can
register with the press corps in the parliament. Also, he
or she is allowed to gain access to all parts of the
parliamentary building. More importantly, the reporters can
occupy a legitimate space at every open sitting whether it
is held on the floor of the Legislative Yuan or in
committee.
Strictly speaking, without this journalist's card
issued by the Press Office, reporters, especially magazine
reporters, are still able to do their work in the
parliament. But they have to seek a series of admittances.
Firstly, the reporters can approach the Legislative Yuan as
a visitor. As a visitor, they have to enter into the
Legislative Yuan through the main entrance not the side
doors. Then they have to register at the information desk
and get a visitor ID. With this ID, they are allowed to
visit certain parts of the building, and are mainly
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restricted to the administrative offices. However, another
identification card is needed, when they intend to reach the
legislator's office.
Secondly, if the reporters attempt to gain access to
the parliamentary proceedings which take place on the floor
or in committee, they have to seek permission from the Press
Office. Generally, a special journalist's card is given
that is only valid for the morning session or the afternoon
session. In other words, the reporters who want to stay in
the press gallery during a legislative day have to report to
the Press Office twice.
Although the Legislative Yuan is able to establish the
rules by which reporters' right of access may be restricted,
this does not mean that the parliament controls the
•••n
journalist. In comparison with the Executive Yuan where the
reporter's access is denied, the Legislative Yuan is seen as
a happy hunting ground for journalistic enterprise. On the
legislature beat, the reporters are legally guaranteed
access to the formal legislative process, except the closed
sittings. Formally, the parliamentary reporters are
excluded from the closed sittings which are convened to
discuss confidential matters relating to national defence
and foreign relations. However, the reporters seem to have
little difficulty in knowing what goes on behind closed
doors.
'As a matter of fact, almost no secret can be held
in the Legislative Yuan. Here, I don't have to
fall on my knees to get the work done. In
general, just a few closed sittings are held in
the parliament. Moreover, if a reporter has a
close relationship with the legislators, he or she
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has no difficulty in penetrating this secrecy.
For instance, some closed meetings were held to
examine the budgetary bills regarding defence and
foreign relations in the last legislative session.
To be honest, I obtained the white paper of the
defence budget before the meeting. It was leaked
by a convenor of the National Defence Committee
who has been a close friend of mine for years.'
(Interview, reporter, 16-10-92:p3)
'The reporters can interview the legislators after
a closed meeting. There is no doubt, the
legislators love to engage in self-publicity.
They will disclose something, such as how they
attempted to establish the ownership of a special
issue in the meeting and how decisions were
brought about and so on.... We don't want to
shut off the flow of confidential information,
therefore the disclosures are always treated as
unattributed stories. The Legislative Yuan is a
place which is saturated with publicity.'
(Interview, reporter, 12-10-92:p2)
The legislature beat is an environment where a
diversity of information is available (Ericson, Baranek and
Chan, 1989:182-184)._ In Taiwan, the Legislative Yuan is
also a place where a variety of political forces fight to
secure publicity. Here, the media are valued by the
legislators, especially the opposition DPP legislators who
are short of media resources needed not only to accomplish
a policy-related goal, but also to advance their own
careers.	 Therefore, legislator-reporter relations are
certainly cultivated by both sides.
2. The Symbiotic Relationships among Reporters
To some extent, the power of the Legislative Yuan dictates
journalistic practices. That is particularly true when the
manufacture of news becomes subservient to the rhythms of
the parliament. In reporting the legislature, some special
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arrangements are adopted by the media in order to schedule
their work in accordance with the parliamentary proceedings.
A reporting team is necessary for covering the legislation
which simultaneously proceeds in various locations. For
instance, during the 90th Legislative Session in 1992, 10
newspapers, 3 television networks and one news agency
deployed a reporting team in the parliament.2
A reporting team consists of two to five full time
reporters. One reporter usually • having long tenure is
designated as a chief and functions as a liaison person with
the desk editor in the main newsroom. On a daily basis, the
chief of the reporting team is expected to call the chief
reporter of the political division in the main newsroom
before the early editorial meeting at which the team has to
report its work on that legislative day. More importantly,
he or she is responsible for informing the desk editor at
any time when they feel a piece of a legislation may require
reactions from other political beats. Also, he or she is
expected to be available at all times, when the desk editor
has to assign reporters to cover stories which require
parliamentary commentary.
In practice, the legislative reporters enjoy
considerable autonomy from the main newsroom, especially the
reporters from evening newspapers who file their stories
directly on the beat without having to return to the main
newsroom.
	
As noted previously, the reporting team is
2lbid: 1.
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required to keep in touch with the desk editor regarding
story developments. However, it is rare for the main
newsroom to give orders to the reporters directing them to
work on a particular part of the legislative process or to
interview specific legislators. Signs of autonomy include
the fact that most stories dealing with legislative actions
are generated by the reporting team rather than by the main
newsroom.
Reporting on the legislature is not only labour
intensive, but also time consuming. When the Legislative
Yuan is sitting, the reporters are required to work seven
days a week from 9 AM until the late afternoon. After that,
the daily reporters have to return to the main newsroom to
write up the stories until midnight. The members of the
reporting team meet after each day's work to discuss what
will be the most important scheduled events or the following
day and decide who will cover what stories and what subjects
are worth focusing attention on. Generally, production
expectation is high on the legislature beat. On average, a
reporter team often files more than ten stories in a
legislative day. That can be between 7,000 to 10,000 words
a day.
The division of labour within the reporting team is
clearly structured. From Monday to Saturday, the
parliamentary reporters have to cover stories located
elsewhere in the parliament. Of course, much attention is
devoted to covering the formal legislative process, such as
actions and decisions taking place on the floor and in
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committees. In reporting the floor deliberations scheduled
on Tuesday and Friday, the division of labour in the
reporting team is in accordance with the official phase
structures. In other words, the reporters are rotated from
one to the other to monitor the continuing legislative
proceedings. Covering legislative actions carried on in
committee that are scheduled on a Monday, Thursday and
Saturday is more complex than those events which take place
on the floor. In general, there are several committees
which hold their meetings simultaneously during a
legislative day. Therefore, the division of labour is based
on the political significance of the Committees concerned.
Most of the time, the Education Committee, the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Committee and the Frontier Affairs Committee
_
are deemed less newsworthy than the others. 	 More
frequently, the parliamentary reporters have to request from
the main newsroom that special reporters are assigned for
assistance.
In addition, the parliamentary reporters have to cover
party caucus meetings that are seldom held during office
hours. For instance, the KMT caucus holds their meeting on
every Tuesday between 7:00 and .8:00 AM. The DPP caucus
schedules its meeting every Tuesday at noon. The
legislators of the KMT's factions, the New KMT Alliance and
the Wisdom Coalition meet on a regular basis. In reporting
the routine meetings held by all political parties, the
division of labour is very much dependent on the paper's
political orientations. 	 Normal practice is that the
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reporters who are responsible for covering the KMT and the
DPP are separate. Big papers rich in resources can
therefore assign 4 reporters to cover the KMT (the KMT
caucus, the New KMT and The Wisdom Coalition) and the DPP
caucus on a daily basis. However, the party-state owned
papers tend to fully concentrate on the KMT and its
factions, no reporter is assigned to cover the DPP caucus.
On Sunday while the Legislative Yuan is not sitting,
the parliamentary reporters still have to attend the news
conferences. In addition to individual legislators, some
interest groups or parliamentary watchdogs, such as the
Foundation of Parliamentary Observation, routinely call a
press conference to publicize their reactions to
parliamentary politics. Moreover, demonstrations or
petitions launched by social groups in front of the
Legislative Yuan are also expected to be reported by the
parliamentary reporters.
Many channels are used by the parliamentary reporters
to detect what will be the most potentially newsworthy
events in the Legislative Yuan. At first, the formal
agendas which organize parliamentary work are used by the
reporters as guidelines in sorting out newsworthy events.
Secondly, information provided by Caucus leaders of both
parties before the proceedings and the previous experience
and knowledge that the reporters have of the legislative
proceedings help them to anticipate events. Thirdly, the
reporters study the prestige papers, such as the United
Daily News and the China Times. The daily reporters also
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pay attention to evening papers, such as the United Evening
News and the China Times Express in order to find out what
events in the morning session are viewed as big events and
how these events may be developed further.
Since the parliamentary reporters are bombarded by a
huge volume of legislative actions, they feel under pressure
to make sure they get the story that everyone else is
covering.	 This is particularly true of reporters from
financially weak newspapers. Therefore, some small
newspapers have to cooperate with other news media in order
to overcome their scarcity of manpower and materials.
'Although I am the only full time reporter
representing my paper in the Legislative Yuan, I
am still expected to get the story which everyone
else is covering.... With all the activity in the
parliament, chances are relatively high that you
could be accused of missing a big story. No
doubt, I must have a cooperative relationship with
colleagues from other papers, especially those
working for the party-state owned papers. For
example, they are willing to lend me their
notes.... As far as I know, with the exception of
the reporters from the big papers who may feel
under pressure to get an exclusive or to do an in
depth report, most colleagues on the beat are
likely to cover every story.'	 (Interview,
reporter, 28-10-92:p1)
Generally, the newspapers with similar political
affinities are more likely to cooperate with each other.
They often exchange information and reporting tasks during
or after the working day. Also, they share readily
available information.
'We, the reporters working for public papers (the
party-state owned papers) have an affinity with
one another. Part of the reason is that we don't
have sufficient personnel to cover all the
activity in the parliament. Ultimately, we are
all working for the government, there is no reason
why we cannot cooperate with each other.... Under
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some circumstances, without having the cooperation
of colleagues, we simply would be unable to
accomplish our work. For example, because of my
paper's ideology, one of the KMT faction, the
Wisdom Coalition always keeps our reporters at a
great distance. Generally, we have to get our
work done through colleagues who are close to this
group. However, as they are KMT legislators, not
the opposition we cannot ignore them.' (Interview,
reporter, 2-11-92:p2)
The cooperative and competitive relations among the
reporters is also reflected in the division in the
legislature corps. For instance, the reporters who work for
party-state run newspapers and those who work for big
newspapers and liberal newspapers always occupy separate
reporters' rooms. The former group frequently do their
stories together. Sometimes, they even exchange privately
developed information. By contrast, the cooperation between
the reporters from big newspapers and liberal papers is less
significant. Although they frequently exchange ideas
through chatting with each other in the reporters' rooms,
conducting reporting tasks for one another seldom takes
place.
3. The Symbiotic Relationship between Legislators and
Reporters
At the Legislative Yuan, the relationships between reporters
and legislators is based on mutual dependence. Legislators
need publicity, while reporters need news. Therefore, under
most circumstances, the reporters and the legislators
perform valuable services for each other.
In contrast to civil servants, legislators are more
283
aware of the importance of publicity. The means used in
pursuit of establishing rapport with the reporters on the
beat are sophisticated. Generally, the research assistants
direct considerable efforts towards cultivating contacts and
good relations with reporters.
'It is less difficult for the research assistants
to get along with the parliamentary reporters,
because we are the same age and the same
background.... I learn to deal with the paper
reporters through experience. The relations with
reporters must be worked at on a daily basis. For
instance, when the Legislative Yuan is sitting,
very often I am hanging around the reporter's
rooms to getting to know what the reporters are
doing, what they are telling each other about
legislative actions. By contrast, some reporters
always come to the legislator's office to have a
chat or ask for information. But, I always
initiate contacts.... I am playing some sort of
liaison role. I try to give the reporters easy
access when they want it to my boss.' (Interview,
Legislator's research assistant, 24-11-92:p1-2)
In addition to working for the legislators, the
parliamentary research assistants also act as a research
assistant to reporters. They constantly supply reporters
with information, thus establishing a relationship which
could be beneficial in future dealings.
'Having a good relationship with reporters, I
always attempt to facilitate the reporter's job by
providing information. I supply useful
information to the reporters so that they can
develop news stories. Before I took this job, I
was a parliamentary reporter for four years.
. Because of my extensive experience as a reporter,
I have gained the trust of reporters and have an
insiders knowledge of their work. When I provide
the reporters with knowledge about certain
legislative actions, they trust me as providing a
reliable newsworthy product. Sometimes, I
disclose news which is still developing. Also, I
will tell them where to look for information, even
advise on who are the most appropriate sources.'
(Interview, Legislator's research assistant, 1-12-
92:p2)
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Apart from constantly feeding reporters with useful
knowledge, some legislators deliberately cultivate good
relations with reporters by inviting the reporters to
private parties or giving them expensive gifts. In general,
the legislators frequently socialize with reporters who are
of the same political orientations.
'For Chinese having luncheon or dinner together is
a popular way of getting business done. I have
been encouraged to engage in public relations
practices with politicians, therefore, my expense
allowance is subsided by my employer....
Generally, most of the legislators are well off
economically, and they will not let me take care
of the bills.... On average, I have lunch with
the legislators, or staffs of the parliament at
least two to three times a week.' (Interview,
reporter, 27-10-92:p3)
'I have received gifts from legislators in the
past. Actually, the presents are never expensive
ones, each costing about NT$ 2,000 to NT$ 3,000
(US$ 80 to US$_ 120). But we are acting like
friends, on certain occasions, I also have to
return the favours.' (Interview, reporter, 21-10-
92:p1)
'It is very common here that the legislators
banquet the parliamentary reporters. Some of the
legislators entertain the reporters who have the
same political orientations with a Karaoke
evening.... To my knowledge, the reporters who
attended the banquet hosted by a newly elected
legislators a few years ago were given a small
diamond.... Some legislators even gave gold coins
to the reporters.' (Interview, Legislator's
research assistant, 21-11-92:P1)
Furthermore, some legislators even provide personal
facilities at the Legislative Yuan to support a reporter's
job. For instance, a legislator allows a reporting team
from a respectable paper to occupy his office either to do
journalistic work or simply to take a rest. In general, the
Legislator's office is furnished, facilities include
telephones and closed circuit TV.
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Under most circumstances, reporters rely on legislators
to create the events or provide the observations that can
become the basis of a story (Ericson, Baranek and Chan,
1989; Cook, 1989). However, some parliamentary reporters
are also involved in legislative matters. In the United
States, some reporters did serve as an information source,
or as a supporter of legislation for their psychological
rewards, even in some small way (Denton and Woodward,
1980:293). By comparison, Taiwan's parliamentary reporters
are much more involved in legislative matters whether they
aim to facilitate news making or to establish rapport with
legislators.
'Indeed, some reporters often turn to us for help,
when they have difficulties in doing their stories
on certain occasions. For instance, a reporter
was assigned to.cover the beauty contest of Miss
China. She was sceptical of the authenticity of
the scores....	 Afterwards, my boss issued a
written interpellation about this matter
immediately, and questioned the Minister of
Interior on the floor later. Because the matter
was raised in the parliament, the reporter could
file her story with no hesitation.... One way of
discovering scandals and developing the issues for
question and answer sessions is in accordance with
the information which is provided by the ordinary
citizens. Reporters are also ordinary citizens,
they have a right to have their voice heard.'
(Interview, Legislator's research assistant, 24-
11-92:p1)
Apart from serving as an information source to the
legislators, some reporters even work for the legislators as
a private assistant or as an image maker. This information
is used to help legislators develop legislative strategies.
In return legislators help the reporters to push the stories
they want or provide financial assistance.
'Parliamentary reporters providing their opinions
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to the legislators is quite common here. It has
been an open secret that some reporters work for
the legislators as a part time research assistant.
On a daily basis, these reporters develop
questions that the legislators will use in answer
and question sessions. In so doing, a reporter
can get his or her political opinions through the
parliament. Also, he or she can make some money.'
(Interview, Legislator's research assistant, 21-
11-92:p1)
'Day in and day out the reporters and the
legislators are working in a symbiotic
relationship. Therefore, the reporters may feel
it difficult to distance themselves from the
legislators, especially those who are from the
same ideological background. The reporters depend
on someone to suggest news, not surprisingly, the
reporters do something in return. For instance,
some colleagues on the beat did engage in
campaigns which were taken up by the legislators
to win posts in the parliament. As far as I know,
when legislator Hsieh Sen-shan was running the
election of the speakers last year, one reporter
organized the campaign for him.' (Interview,
reporter, 11-11-92:p1)
As already discussed, the reporters and the legislators
perform valuable services for each other. However,
fundamentally adversarial relationships between the
reporters and the legislators do exist. In the Legislative
Yuan, partisanship is distinctive in the practice of
journalism. There is a self-selection process between the
legislators and reporters, with the policy taken by a paper
binding reporters to certain legislators and not others.
For instance, the reporters from the party-state controlled
papers collaborate with the KMT legislators, because they
have a political affinity. In contrast, these reporters do
not cooperate with the DPP legislators, because they are
ideologically opposed.
'As a reporter from the public papers (the party-
state owned papers), I always feel it is difficult
to make contacts with the non-KMT legislators,
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especially the DPP legislators. My paper has a
definite political line- they are strongly opposed
to the assertion of an independent Taiwan.... The
DPP has received negative coverage in my paper,
and they are unwilling to talk to me. At least,
the experience taught me, they will not give me
information in detail, because they believe that
the information is going to be used against
themselves.' (Interview, reporter, 1-11-92:p2)
There is no doubt that the reporters from party-state
papers keep a great distance from the non-KMT legislators,
especially the DPP. It is also true that the DPP
Legislators pay less attention to the reporters working for
the party-state owned papers. However, faced with a deeply
divided KMT, the whole picture of reporter-legislator
relations has become more complicated. The papers have
definite preferences and prejudices not only toward the
political parties, but also the factions within a party.
For instance, the reporters from the party-state owned
papers are not equally favourable to all KMT legislators.
The military-run paper, the Youth Daily is viewed as
politically oriented towards the New KMT Alliance.
Therefore, its reporters are more or less excluded from the
New KMT's rival, the Wisdom Coalition.
'In the meantime, I (the party-state run paper
reporter) also have trouble in doing stories on
the Wisdom Coalition. The members of the Wisdom
Coalition always think my paper is taking a stand
which is favourable to the New KMT. Therefore,
they won't talk much to me.' (Interview, reporter,
1-11-92:p2)
Generally, the legislators are reluctant to seek
remedies, because they believe that no remedy is effective.
Correction of press coverage by the various legislators is
considered a laborious and fruitless task.
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When the legislators are faced with problematic
coverage, some measures are taken against troublesome
papers. More typically, the legislators retaliate against
unfavourable treatment by making complaints to the reporters
or editors or through seeking a correction.
'How do we deal with distorted coverage? First,
we contact the reporter concerned in an effort to
understand why the unfavourable story came about.
If we find out the reporter lacked the knowledge
to handle the news, we'll contact senior editors
in the paper to request reassignment of an
experienced reporter. Anyway, most of the papers
deploy a reporting team here.... Seeking remedies
for unreasonable coverage is in vain. In fact,
prevention is the best way of minimizing distorted
coverage. In the first place, the information
should be given as adequately as possible. We
have to prevent it happening in advance of
reporting. We are reluctant to take legal action,
because fighting a court battle is time and labour
consuming.' (Interview, Legislator's research
assistant, 1-12-92:p3)
_
'In addition to talking to the reporter
immediately, we also seek out the chief reporter
or editors. We phone the chief reporter to ask
for a correction. It is very difficult to obtain
a retraction or apology from the press.
Personally, I believe that issuing a letter to the
editor is a more effective and practical remedy.
The papers prefer to print the letter than to make
a correction to the original story. Making a
correction to the previous story means that the
papers have to admit that they make mistakes. The
acknowledgement of error is a matter of losing
face. It is a matter of undermining the paper's
credibility.... However, in the pursuit of remedy
through the letters to the editor is a process of
a negotiating and renegotiating. Most of the
time, the papers won't print the complete letter.'
(Interview, Legislator's research assistant, 24-
11-92:p2)
Sometimes, the legislators reduce cooperation with the
offending reporters by the denial of access. Also, they
give scoops to favoured reporters.
'Complaining always makes things worse. If you
complain to the papers, you just dig the hole
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deeper. You simply can not win your reputation
back.... According to my own experience, the
press seldom run corrections. For instance, we
made a complaint against The Journalist through
the letters to the editor, but no response was
given.... As far as I know, the legislator who I
am working for rarely takes legal action against
the offending paper. Commonly, he just refuses to
be cooperative with the reporters who cause the
problem. For example, the reporter from the
Independence Evening Post was denied access to
further interviews. Moreover, he always releases
the confidential or exclusive stories to friendly
papers only. These releases often produce the
hottest news stories.' (Interview, Legislator's
research assistant, 4-12-92:p2)
However, no legislator tries to obtain a retraction
through the National Press Council, because it has no powers
to regulate the papers. More importantly, legal action is
hardly taken by the legislators against the reporters or the
papers.
In the Taiwan experience, a special measure has been
taken by the legislators against unfavourable coverage.
Here they attempt to seek cooperation with the offending
papers' rivals and have them publish a direct complaint.
For example, on 27 November 1992, the Liberty Times
published the Wisdom Coalition legislator Huang Chu-wen's
letter on its 3rd page. In this article, legislator Huang
condemned the fact that the Wisdom Coalition had been
mistreated by some papers. Although no paper was mentioned
by name, legislator Huang stated that he gave full support
to the 'Return Newspaper, Save Taiwan' campaign. At the
same time, the Liberty Times also published the news stories
concerning the 'Return Newspaper, Save Taiwan' campaign
launched by the pro-independent group against the United
Daily News on the same page.
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Furthermore, on 28 November 1992, the Liberty Times and
the Independence Daily Post simultaneously ran a story on
the letter issued by the leader of the Wisdom Coalition,
Legislator Lin Yu-hsiang. The Liberty Times even printed
the complete text of the letter. In the letter, Legislator
Lin accused the United Daily News of giving harmful coverage
to the Wisdom Coalition legislators. He also threatened to
withdraw political advertising from the United Daily News.
The reasons why a paper allows itself to be used by
politicians to attack rivals lies in its political
sympathies. To some extent, the press gives space for those
parliamentarians who are of the same political substance, as
they are allowing room for the politician's manoeuvres.
REPORTING THE LEGISLATURE
At the Legislative Yuan, floor deliberations encompassing
the Premier's Question Time and debates on a great many
bills on various subjects take place in the Assembly Hall.
As has been mentioned previously, the parliamentary
reporters have a designated space in which they work within
the Assembly Hall.
Generally, the journalistic activities are confined to
the second floor of the Assembly Hall. There are two
reporter's rooms which have telephones, facsimiles and
closed circuit TV to facilitate distributing information.
Furthermore, the press gallery is arranged at the upper
level of the floor between the public gallery and the
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official government gallery. From the press gallery, the
reporters can observe the legislative actions proceeding on
the floor from behind the glass shield.
In reporting floor deliberations, the parliamentary
reporters always rely on performative accounts of the
legislators and the cabinet members. They rarely bother to
search for other personal sources or use the documentary
detail which is available to them.
In practice, the reporters break down the formal
legislative process into discrete phrases based on the
manpower available. For instance, in covering the opening
of the Legislative Yuan, one reporter is assigned to do the
stories on the Administrative Report delivered by the
Premier. Then all the reporters in the team take turns in
covering the question and answer session which proceeds
after the Report. Generally, one reporter is responsible
for attending a session of questions and answers which
proceeds with the debates between a legislator and the
Premier and several cabinet members. The reporters assigned
to the scene have to act as stenographers. By contrast, the
stand-by reporters gather in the reporters' rooms. On
certain occasions, the stand-by reporters have to interview
the legislators who are involved in the heated debate on the
floor. This interview is conducted downstairs through the
parliamentary staff who pass messages to the legislators on
the floor. Furthermore, stand-by reporters are responsible
for covering informal press conferences chaired by the
legislators in the reporters' room. However, most of the
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time they stay in the reporter's rooms either chatting with
each other or watching the closed circuit TV.
1. Reporting on Non-Legislative Actions
Public relations are used by the legislators to gain media
attention in the parliament. It seems that the legislators
make more effort to attract the media than the government
executives.
In the past, some un-parliamentary behaviour has been
conducted by the opposition as a legislative tactic to
highlight the issue that the structure of parliament was
unreasonable and as a flamboyant tactic to capture media
attention. For example, bedecking themselves with slogans,
hijacking the speaker's rostrum and jumping on the table
were common measures taken by the DPP legislators to
paralyse the formal legislative process and demand the
retirement of 80 old guard legislators who had not stood for
election since 1947.
Fist fights between the opposition and the KMT
legislators which turned legislative proceedings into a
farce received prominent coverage in the news media.
Therefore, the dramatization of legislative actions has been
viewed as a tactic used by legislators from both parties for
ensuring media coverage since the mid-1980s.
'To some extent, I agree that the DPP legislators
do dramatize their legislative actions in order to
attract media attention. But, as journalists,
when we ask why the DPP is engaged in violent
behaviour on the floor, the fact that the
structure of parliament was unreasonable should be
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taken into account. Under previous quorum rules,
the DPP was kept from using parliament to spread
its message, therefore, it had to carry out un-
parliamentary behaviour to break through the
blocking devices set up by the ruling party....
For commercial purposes, the legislative actions
which can generate conflict have the advantage of
getting the coverage. To my understanding, a
great many readers are interested in reading the
stories about the brawls between the KMT and the
DPP, rather then the rational discussion between
the two parties. However, as a journalist, I
prefer to take this matter cautiously. On the one
hand, I would like to tell readers that some
legislators were physically abused on the floor.
On the other hand, I would like readers to be
informed that the parliamentary rules were unfair
to certain parties. I disagree with the self-
censorship policy previously launched by
television networks when they deliberately wanted
to purify the legislature news of violence on the
screen.' (Interview, reporter, 16-10-92:p3)
Since the retirement of old guard legislators in
December 1991, the violently un-parliamentary behaviour
carried out by the _DPP has decreased. At present, the
legislators have become more skilful in the use of un-
parliamentary behaviour to generate publicity. For
instance, instead of bedecking themselves with slogans, the
DPP legislators often display a poster on the rostrum on
which information pertaining to the questions which they
have asked of the Premier is highlighted. Generally, most
of the legislators in opposition have difficulty in getting
their message across through television, especially as
television reporters deliberately silence their voices.
Therefore, the exhibition of the message on the rostrum
could provide a chance for them to do this when the
legislative actions are in the spotlight.
Another tactic used by the legislators to win media
coverage is to create a heated debate with the Premier. By
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doing this, the tone and style of the floor performance are
deliberately cultivated. For instance, when the legislators
conduct the debate on the floor, they tactically use strong
emotional language and exaggerated gestures in an attempt to
create an intense atmosphere.
Some public relations practices are carried out by the
legislators to enforce the legislative strategies and to
capture media attention. For instance, some legislators'
assistants regularly come to the press gallery and the
reporter's rooms to issue hand-outs 15 minutes before the
legislative process proceeds. In these hand-outs, subjects
and detailed topics of questions which will be asked in the
question and answer session are specified in the hope that
this would make it easier for reporters to understand
_
details of their proposals.
A special tactic adopted by legislators to secure
publicity is to launch an informal news conference in the
Assembly Hall linked with legislative actions. First and
foremost, the format of the news conference is designed to
save the press time and effort. For instance, the press
conferences are scheduled to coincide with the reporters'
working times, and only last 15 to 20 minutes. Furthermore,
the news conferences are less formal, without microphones,
and with a bunch of reporters sitting around a desk.
Finally, the conferences often take place in one of the
reporter's rooms used by journalists working for the large
papers and the liberal papers.
As already mentioned, a lot of information flows around
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parliament.	 Therefore, in an attempt to attract media
attention, publicity events are well planned. As noted
above, the press conference is designed to suit the time-
frame of reporters. Besides this some informal and personal
contacts are made before or after the conference to ensure
that the given message will attract the reporters' attention
and will be treated as significantly as possible by the
press.
'The preparation of the news conference is very
important. First, the legislative Yuan is a place
where there is an awful lot of competition. There
are many sources competing for media attention.
Second, the parliamentary reporters have been fed
too much violent and dramatic raw material. They
get addicted to sensational events. Therefore, a
legislator who raises a less controversial topic
in the parliament always feels it difficult to
attract media attention.... I was a parliamentary
reporter. I am friends with most of the reporters
here. Before the news conference, I will inform
some formal colleagues personally including photo
journalists that my boss is going to release some
news. Of course, some hand-outs are given in the
meantime.... After the news conference, I try to
telephone some of the chief reporters or editors
in the hope that my story will be arranged on the
prominent pages. At least, I hope that they don't
drop my story. By so doing, I have to be careful
not to run the risk of intruding on their
professional autonomy. Fortunately, I know the
way newspaper men work.' (Interview, Legislator's
research assistant, 1-12-92:p1)
To achieve publicity is also a matter which has to be
carefully calculated. Not surprisingly, the legislators
make efforts to establish a rapport with the larger
circulation papers which are assumed to have a great
influence on public opinion.
'Apart from putting announcements on the notice-
broads in the reporter's rooms, the research
assistants or legislator himself may ring some
friendly reporters to inform them about the
topics, but it depends on the case.... Generally,
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we contact the reporters by facsimile. For
special cases, at the request of my boss, we have
to deliver the news releases to the reporters of
the major news organization, such as, the two
paper groups (the China Times and the United Daily
News), the Independence Daily Post, the Liberty
Times and the Taiwan Times in person.' (Interview,
Legislator's research assistant, 4-12-92:p1)
Furthermore, in the calculation of efficiency, the
legislators are willing to devote resources to the
politically sympathetic papers that are most likely to cover
their messages, rather than those that are politically
hostile.
'Generally, I will notify every paper about when
the press conference is scheduled. But only
facsimile the news releases regarding the press
conference to two big papers (the China Times and
the United Daily News), the Liberty Times, the
Independence Daily Post, the Taiwan Times and the
People's Daily News.... The party-state owned
papers have a prejudice against the DPP. I know
their orientations very well, therefore I don't
expect that their reporters will attend the news
conferences. Because of having limited funds to
work with, I am definitely not going to waste
money and energy on them.... However, if they ask
for the materials, I will give them to them....
In my own experience, the reporters working for
party-state owned papers seldom contact the DPP
legislators or their research assistants.'
(Interview, Legislator's research assistant, 11-
24-92:p3)
In Taiwan's case, the exercise of public relations is
necessary, but it is not sufficient to win media coverage.
Partisanship has characterized the Taiwanese press. The
paper's political prejudices have excluded the possibility
of information exchange between certain reporters and
legislators. Therefore, public relations practice alone can
not make a difference.
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(1) Case One: KMT Legislator's Press Conference
A KMT faction, the New KMT Alliance called a news conference
on 20 September 1992. The news conference was scheduled at
8:40 AM; this was 20 minutes before the opening of the
Legislative Yuan. The news conference was held at the
reporter's room located on the left hand side of the
Assembly Hall. More than 15 reporters were crowded around
the desk. At the news conference, an incumbent New KMT
legislator Lee Sen-fong who was not endorsed by party
headquarters for running in the forthcoming election
announced that he had decided not to seek re-election. In
the announcement, legislator Lee criticized the KMT's
candidate selection procedures and demanded more internal
democracy within the party and less money politics.
Furthermore, he announced that the New KMT faction had
decided to drop the previous proposal of splitting away from
KMT and forming a new political group. Then the leader of
New KMT,	 the chief of Environmental Protection
Administration Jaw Shaw-kong and the other six New KMT
members commented on this matter.
It was an emotional news conference. When New KMT
legislators paid sympathy to Lee's decision to withdraw from
running in the election, every person burst into tears. At
that moment the camera crews and photographers all stepped
forward with a rush to take pictures. None of the reporters
raised questions. After one reporter said, 'Hau Pei-tsun
(the Premier) is on the floor', a handful of reporters left
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and headed to the press gallery on the floor.
The New KMT's news conference was significantly
reported in the next day's papers. Without question, the
picture with the New KMT members wiping their eyes was
prominently printed in each paper. Moreover, every New KMT
member's remarks at the news conference were covered in
great detail, even his or her personal feelings were vividly
portrayed.
In this case, commentary from counter sources was
published in the papers. However, the selection of the
information sources was very much dependent on each paper's
political affinities. For instance, the party-state owned
papers and the United Daily News were viewed as having close
relations with the KMT, and therefore they balanced opinion
by offering comments from KMT headquarters. By contrast,
so-called liberal papers, such as the Independence Daily
Post and the Liberty Times seemed to slant toward the
opposition line. For instance, the Independence Daily Post
only quoted statements from the DPP's Secretary-General and
the Liberty Times produced a story in which a diversity of
sources were drawn from KMT headquarters, and the caucus
leaders of both parties.
(2) Case 2: The DPP's Press Conference
Holding an impromptu news conference has been widely used by
the DPP to generate publicity. Many examples demonstrate
that when the DPP legislators fail to introduce bills on the
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floor, they immediately call a news conference to articulate
their political position. Under some circumstances, the DPP
legislators also use this occasion to release some
information which is not related to legislative matters.
For example, on 2 October 1992, the DPP legislator Yeh
Chu-lan chaired a 20 minute news conference at the
reporters' room. At the news conference, she explained the
bill on the 'One Taiwan, One China Diplomatic Strategies'
that was voted against by the KMT ten minutes earlier on the
floor. Then the leader of the 'One Taiwan, One China
Action' Alliance, Professor Lee Ying-yuan was introduced to
the reporters. He spent 10 minutes briefing reporters on
the purposes of the Alliance. Afterwards, the reporters
were told that a public rally organized by the Alliance
would be held on the forthcoming Sunday. Finally, he urged
the news media to support and cover this campaign.
Only a dozen reporters were at the conference. Three
questions were raised by a reporter who joined in later.
Her questions only dealt with primary facts, such as when
and where the march would take place and whether the rally
was approved by the local police authority. None of the
camera crews from the television networks were at the
conference.
Another example shows how legislators use the news
media to highlight issues which they are not able place on
the legislative agenda. On 6 October 1992, the DPP
legislator Chen Shui-bian introduced a resolution on the
floor and he proposed that Defence, Finance and Justice
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ministers should come to the committee meeting to give a
report on a scandal called 'The Fraudulent Loans of the Iran
Arms Sale'. After his resolution was defeated by the KMT on
the floor, legislator Chen held a news conference. At the
news conference, he gave the background to the scandal in
detail. In the announcement, a senior government official
was identified and accused of involvement in this case.
Furthermore, in an attempt to convince the press, he
declared that he would give up the right of immunity and was
willing to take the risk of committing libel. Although
opinions given by legislators outside the formal legislative
process are not immune from prosecution, he insisted that he
had a strong case and had to make the allegation.
As was elaborated previously, the informal news
conference is a special arrangement through which
parliamentary reporters are efficiently targeted.
Therefore, the omission of the reporting of the DPP
legislator's news conference is related to a paper's
ideology, and not a question related to constraints on time
and materials. Therefore, a newspaper's political ideology
is the dominant factor which shapes the reporter's attitudes
toward the DPP legislator's news conference.
Taking the DPP Legislator Chen Shui-bian's case, the
party-state owned papers deliberately ignored and played
down the significance of the news conference. This decision
was made on the basis of private interest--protecting their
ultimate employer, the KMT government, rather than
professional judgement--that the DPP's accusations were not
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substantial.
'In general, public run papers (party-state owned
papers) are unwilling to print the DPP
legislators' actions and words in the parliament.
Since there are only a few chances to get the
DPP's stories into print, colleagues will not
waste time and effort in covering the DPP
including legislator Chen's news conferences....
When I knew the senior government official was
accused of involvement in this matter, I
telephoned the main newsroom to inform them what
allegations were made about whom.... We are
working for the government, we would like to let
the government put its case.... Personally, I do
agree with some privately owned papers' news
policy, such as the China Times and the United
Daily News. They attempt to present two sides of
an issue. In fact, the reporters should support
the government, when a good policy is implemented.
The reporters should not indiscriminately support
every policy set up by the government.'
(Interview, reporter, 2-11-92:p2)
In this case, legislator Chen's news conference went
unreported in the party-state run papers. By contrast, the
accused senior government official, the Secretary-General of
the Presidency, was provided with space in which he
dismissed the charge. In an attempt to minimize damage to
the official's reputation, these papers significantly played
down Chen's accusation by reducing his statements to one
sentence or one short paragraph.
By comparison, the major privately owned newspapers
including the big two papers (the China Times and the United
Daily News) and the so-called liberal papers (the
Independence Daily Post and the Liberty Times) were less
hesitant in covering the informal news conferences held by
the DPP legislators, especially those news conferences used
to disclose political scandals. In this case, these papers
took legislator Chen's conference seriously, because
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political scandals were always guaranteed to sell
newspapers.
In fact, for the papers covering the allegations made
by the DPP outside the formal legislative process this is a
matter which not only runs the risk of libel, but also of
discrediting the government. Therefore, for the reporters
who report the stories at the DPP's news conference it is
more a choice of 'take it or leave it'. For instance, as
some reporters are afraid of being used as an instrument for
undermining the government's credibility, they attempt to
verify the information issued by the DPP legislators. It is
quite often that the reporters check the truth of
allegations against the credibility of legislators and the
validity of given evidence. Whether the given remarks are
reported or not very much depends on the validity of
information and the levels of trust the reporters have with
the legislators.
'The reporting team decided to file this story,
because legislator Chen provided us with a great
deal of information. More importantly, it seemed
that he was not a person with an axe to grind. He
seemed very decisive in disclosing the scandal.
In my view, the reporter should not accept a
legislator's allegations against the government as
fact. As far as I know, some papers do print
whatever they are given by the legislators outside
the parliamentary proceedings.... I am working
for a big newspaper whose policy of dealing with
troublesome events, such as government scandals
and government malpractice, is very rigid. We are
asked never to take any legislator's accusation or
allegations for granted.... When we covered
events, such as, 'The Fraudulent Loans of the Iran
Arms Sale', we judged the credibility of
legislator Chen, then we examined the validity of
verbal or written accounts that were given at the
news conference.
	 Finally, we asked the main
newsroom for help cross-checking with other
sources,	 such as the alleged government
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executives, documents or whatever.... If the
allegations are too difficult to be verified, we
prefer to drop the story, especially those stories
expected to cause huge damage to the reputation of
the government. However, the rule of thumb is to
make sure that the statements from the government
side are presented regardless of what has been
said.... Verification of fact is always a time
consuming task. Since we are working against the
clock, we rarely conduct more elaborate
investigations. Under most circumstances, we just
put statements of both sides in the news.'
(Interview, reporter, 7-10-92:p1)
The parliamentary reporters seem to accept the face
value of the given information. When challenged on this,
the reporters will argue that they get both sides of the
story. This balancing creates a false impression: the
actual truth of the matter is reduced to getting both sides
of a story.
'My paper rarely avoids covering the scandals and
government wrongdoing disclosed by the DPP
legislators, if they have a strong case. The
conventional way of treating the scandals is to
present opinions from both sides, especially the
alleged government officials. Of course, printing
both sides' stories does not mean that the press
provides a comprehensive and meaningful picture to
its readers. Since each side has an axe to grind,
the reporters have difficulties in verifying the
statements given by both sides.... Perhaps, the
responsible press should allow its reporters to
conduct an investigation reporting on such kinds
of cases. Because every reporter in the team is
bound to the formal legislative actions, he or she
has no chance of carrying out independent
research.' (Interview, reporter, 27-10-92:p8).
Generally speaking, except for the party-state owned
papers which consistently suppress the DPP, most of the
major privately owned papers are able to follow this
practice of reporting both sides. In this case, the United
Daily News tended to play down the significance of the news
conference. By contrast, the China Times, the Independence
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Daily Post and the Liberty Times treated the news conference
more significantly.
For instance, the China Times, the Independence Daily
Post and the Liberty Times put the news conference in a
broader and more sophisticated context. Firstly, much
detailed information released at the news conference was
presented in these papers. Therefore, an image was created
that legislator Chen did have a strong case to challenge the
senior government official. Moreover, Chen's determination
to get the message through by declining to exercise his
right of immunity was specified. All these devices seemed
to inform the readers that the legislator and the papers
themselves were telling a story that was authentic.
By contrast, the accused side's story was reported in
a less complicated manner. In this case, an identical story
was published by every paper regardless of its political
ideology. According to Taiwan's journalistic convention,
unanimous reportage is often due to the duplication of the
news release issued by the official press office or
reproduction of the news filed by the Central News Agency.
The coverage of the DPP's news conference clearly
illustrates that there is a close link between politicians
and journalists. The party-state owned papers deliberately
suppressed the DPP's publicity. By contrast, some DPP
sympathizers tended to get the DPP's message through without
appropriate investigation. By and large, almost all the
reporters tended to take the government's statements for
granted in an attempt to neutralize the political
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embarrassment or humiliation caused by the DPP.
Consequently, the political affiliation of reporters with
the politicians inhibits what the reporters reported and
leaves them vulnerable to politicians who may wish to pursue
private political objectives through press coverage. Also,
the political partiality of the papers creates two versions
of the same story making it difficult for the audience to
know which to believe.
(2) Reporting on the Premier's Administrative Report
The conventions of reporting politics reflect the role of
the press and the nature of politics in any society
(Schudson, 1982:98-100). Coverage of the Administrative
Report addressed by the Premier on the opening of the
Legislative Yuan serves as an example illustrating the
relations between the Premier and the press. The form of
news reporting on the Administrative Report mirrors the fact
that the Executive Yuan is far more important than the
Parliament in Taiwan's political culture.
Before 1980, the press seemed to confine itself to
being a recorder of the Report. By taking this role, the
press served as a conduit for the government. Every paper
took the Administrative Report seriously. For instance, the
message of the Report was printed in full by every paper.
The typical form of the coverage of the Report was to run a
headline story on the front page in which a brief summary of
the Report was listed. Then the reader was referred to the
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paper's later pages for the full message. Generally, no
separate news story was published to interpret the contents
of the Report or to convey the legislator's reactions to the
Report.
By the early 1980s, the coverage of the Report had been
partially transformed, although it did not happen in all
papers simultaneously. In 1982, except in the party-state
owned papers, no paper still printed the full message of the
Administrative Report. Instead, the press ran a number of
news stories on prominent pages in which the contents of the
Report were cited in great detail.
The dramatic change in reporting the Administrative
Report occurred in the late 1980s. For instance, the
Premier's message is no longer guaranteed to occupy the
front page headlines, although the press still treated the
report significantly. On 21 September 1988, the Premier's
Report made in the 82nd Legislative Session was moved off
the front page by the Independence Daily Post. It seems
that the press began to shift from a simple recorder of the
Report to a mediator. Some papers began to take
responsibility for identifying the salient points in the
Reports for their readers, instead of printing each item
that the Report contained. For instance, on 21 September
1988, the Independence Daily Post ran a story in which only
two items were highlighted. By contrast, the United Daily
News published six items relating to the Report. The party
owned paper, the Central Daily News still continued to
reprint the full text.
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Much more important, instead of passively transmitting
the Premier's message, some papers began to function as an
interpreter by incorporating the information which was not
mentioned in the Report into their stories. For instance,
on 20 September 1989, the United Daily News featured a story
in which a key issue mentioned by the Premier in the report,
'the relations between the President and the Premier' was
commented on. In this story, the Premier's immediate
opinions on this matter were compared to his opinions given
on other occasions. In addition to place the Report in a
broader context, some papers started to pay more attention
to the legislators' reactions to the Report. For instance,
on 20 September 1989, the Independence Daily Post published
a story on the second page in which four legislators'
comments on the Report were conveyed.
At present, the news conventions used to cover the
Report addressed by the Premier are more brief and
interpretive than before. Taking an example of the press
coverage of the opening of the 90th Legislature Session in
September 1992, with the exception of the liberal papers,
most of the papers ran a headline story on the Premier's
report to the legislature. In this story, the Premier's
statements regarding the issue of national identity were
highlighted. Then, readers were referred to the paper's
second page for the news stories related to the public
policies addressed by the Premier. However, the party-state
owned papers, such as the Central Daily News, Hsin Sheng Pao
still continued to reprint the full speech on a later page.
308
Generally speaking, the big two papers, the China Times
and the United Daily News began to treat the Premier's
report as a part of the day's proceeding in parliament. For
instance, the big two papers, especially the China Times,
put the Report within the context of legislative actions.
For instance, in the China Times' headline story, the
Premier's message about national identity was highlighted in
both the lead paragraph and in the headlines. In addition,
the China Times included some legislators' actions which
took place before the Report in the body of its story. By
comparison, the Premier's report was framed as the sole
legislative proceeding on the opening of parliament in the
party-controlled papers.
Without question, in liberal papers such as the Liberty
Times and the Independence Daily Post the attention was
focused on the parliament with less emphasis on the
Premier's report. For instance, the Liberty Times printed
its front page headline story on the resolution of cabinet
resignations introduced by the DPP legislators. The Report
was carried in second place. In this story, the Premier's
assertions on the relations between Taiwan and communist
China were briefly reported. Besides that, the Liberty
Times carried another news story on the second page to
denote the public policy comments given by the Premier. The
Independence Daily Post paid less attention to the Report.
It ran a very short story on the second page in which only
the Premier's statements on the issue of national identity
was covered.
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The change of coverage of the Administrative Report
suggests that some of the papers began to question the
doctrine of the greatness of leadership during Taiwan's
democratic transition. In Chinese political culture, the
success of the nation is associated with having a superior
leader. Therefore, the personal character of the leader is
usually considered more important than policy issues in
shaping Chinese politics (Pye, 1991:16). Under such
circumstances, the media always treat the leaders, such as
the President, the Premier and the KMT chairman with great
seriousness and deference.
(3) Reporting on the Premier's Question Time
_
The Premier's Question Time is an example which demonstrates
why the legislative process is addressed differently by
papers in accordance with their political orientation.
In theory, participating in the question and answer
session is one way that legislators are guaranteed to carry
legitimacy in the media. However, the parliamentary
reporters who cover the Premier's Question Time are
interested in what government executives say rather than
what legislators do.
From a reporter's viewpoint, the Legislative Yuan is
still a subordinate institution to the Executive Yuan,
although it is becoming more independent. Therefore, what
makes the Legislative Yuan newsworthy is its involvement
with the Executive Yuan.
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'To be honest, the news media overemphasize the
significance of the question and answer
session.... The Legislative Yuan remains
subordinate to the Executive Yuan on important
issues, though it is beginning to act more
independently. In my view, the legislators are at
a disadvantage, because inadequate staffing and
lack of knowledge of government policies make it
difficult for them to properly scrutinize
government practices and proposed bills. As far
as I know, some legislators are too incompetent to
raise substantial questions, they usually ask
questions which embarrass the government and make
the government look bad....
	 The question and
answer session is a political show. Most
legislators prefer to conduct the debate on
ideological issues rather than public policy on
the floor. Since the KMT and the opposition DPP
have less common ground on the issue of national
identity, there is no dialogue during question
time. How can people expect that they can reach
consensus
	 through	 parliamentary	 debates?'
(Interview, reporter, 27-10-92:p2)
Reporters often state that the executive is worth
reporting, because it controls public policy which affects
almost every citizen. On the contrary, what the legislators
do on this occasion is less newsworthy, because most of them
are unable to hold the government accountable. As already
mentioned, the government has control over the parliament
through the party machine, therefore, legislators
criticizing the government in the question and answer
session do not pose a political threat to the Premier or to
his cabinet members.
'Why are reporters more energetic in reporting the
government's words and actions than legislators at
the question and answer sessions? I think it is
a matter related to the nature of parliamentary
politics. Let me put it in a simple way. In the
parliament what the government does is always more
important than what the legislators do, especially
where the question and answer session is
concerned.	 The Premier in general, and the
government executives in particular, are
newsworthy, because their actions and words are
representing government policies which could
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affect almost every citizen. By contrast,
individual legislators become newsworthy only by
raising pertinent, penetrating or debunking
questions.	 Otherwise, I have to let it go
unreported.	 In rare instances, this kind of
antagonistic question can obtain satisfactory
reactions from the government branch. In my
opinion, a reporter does have difficulties in
framing a story which consists of a good question
without a relevant solution.'	 (Interview,
reporter, 15-10-92:p4)
Question periods are viewed as the legislature's
regular news conference (Ericson, Baranek and Chan,
1989:232). In the Taiwan experience, the question and
answer session is also viewed as a news conference in
everyday reporting practice on the legislature beat. At
this conference, the legislators stand in for the reporters
to question the government executives, especially the
Premier who bears important and newsworthy messages of state
and always distances himself from the media.
'The reason that the coverage of parliament is
preoccupied with the government executives is at
the employer's requests. Taking an example from
my paper, the main newsroom demands reporters to
cover the government executives' performance in
great detail. The question and answer session
provides a good opportunity for reporters to pick
the stories on the government. The government
executives have to say something on that occasion,
although most of the time they are reluctant to
speak to the press and the public.' (Interview,
reporter, 27-10-92:p2)
'Of course, the Premier's performance at Question
Time is worth covering, because his statements
illustrate government attitudes toward certain
issues.... Part of the reason that the press
treats the Premier significantly, is because he is
not answerable to the news media. In parliament,
legislators make the Premier and the cabinet
members accountable to the ordinary people. To
some extent, legislators also make the government
executives, especially the Premier, answerable to
the media. Although the Premier is a person who
does not like to deal with the news media, he
still has to defend his policy in the
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parliament.... In my view, the question and
answer session serves as a formal news channel by
which the news media can elucidate some
information	 from	 the	 top	 administrator.'
(Interview, reporter, 16-10-92:p2)
Individual legislators who are worth reporting are
dependent on what subjects are given space during the
Premier's Question Time. In Taiwan, the legislators are
newsworthy except when they are connected with national
issues not local issues. Furthermore, it seems that when
they raise questions regarding fundamental political
beliefs, such as unification versus independence it is more
likely to get a better press than those issues dealing with
public policy.
For instance, on 6 October 1992, 17 legislators raised
questions in the Premier's Question Time. Among them, two
members of the KMT faction had a heated debate with the
Premier on the 'One China' policy. The floor debate gained
extensive news coverage in the papers the following day. By
contrast, the press coverage given to the leader of the
Democratic Socialist Party Chu Kao-cheng who questioned the
Premier about the social security benefits of senior
citizens was less significant.
3.1 Case 1: Reporting on the Leadership Conflict within
the KMT
Before 1992, according to the Sedition Law, especially the
ambiguous provision of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, the
advocacy of an independent Taiwan was a crime that could
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bring with it the death penalty. Therefore, only the
legislators who enjoyed the right of immunity were able to
openly discuss issues relating to it. By the late 1980s,
coverage advocating an independent Taiwan as discussed in
the Legislative Yuan was viewed as a politically taboo
subject by the papers. Recently, the news concerning
political conflict within the ruling party was considered
politically sensitive.
'Since the government can no longer use sedition
laws to silence the separatists, the reporting of
the independence issues advocated by the DPP are
no longer politically sensitive. In my opinion,
quarrelsome factions within the KMT itself makes
it difficult for us to cover this. Basically, the
conflict between the two KMT factions, the Wisdom
Coalition and the New KMT Alliance in the
parliament reflects the tension between the
Taiwan-born President and the Premier who
represents	 the	 conservative	 mainlanders.
Ultimately, it reflects the historical
controversial matter between native Taiwanese and
mainland Chinese.... The members of the Wisdom
Coalition are native born Taiwanese. They support
the KMT's unification doctrine, but they assert
that the KMT's primary commitment is to Taiwan.
In my understanding, this faction is seen as the
President's strongest source of support in the
legislature.... The New KMT Alliance is organized
by second generation mainlanders. They are
committed to defending the interests of the
mainlanders. The mainlanders arrived in Taiwan
with armies in 1949. Generally, the New KMT
Alliance are viewed as having powerful links with
the military. Also, they have support from the
Premier.' (Interview, reporter, 21-10-92:P3)
The problem of covering a politically sensitive news
story rests with the papers. As already mentioned, most of
the limitations placed on parliamentary reporting come from
the paper's political orientation and the journalists' self-
censorship. By and large, most of the papers tend to play
down the significance of politically sensitive issues. For
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instance, the news policy adopted by the privately owned
papers in dealing with the KMT's leadership conflict is to
please the politicians on both sides in order to make the
stories safer and less troublesome.
'The principal policy laid out by my chief editor
to deal with political conflict between the
President and the Premier is to please both sides.
For example, recently, we were told that the news
in association with the Finance Minister's
resignation should follow the principle: "To
support President Lee's judgement, to back Premier
Hau's decision and to conciliate the Finance
Minister's determination." In this case, to some
extent, the Finance Minister was sacked by the
President, because in a public speech the
President opposed or at least disagreed with the
land reform policy which was set up by the
cabinet.... If a reporter intends to write a
story on the allegation which is conceived as a
sensitive one, such as the conflict between senior
politicians, he or she inevitably has to find more
facts which are sufficient enough to validate the
case. Journalists have to get their work done in
a short period of time. My own guess is that most
of the reporters will avoid holding the hot
potato.' (Interview, reporter, 15-10-92:p2)
Part of the reason that reporters working for privately
owned papers suppress sensitive issues is because they are
reluctant to devote much time and effort to an unpromising
story. As for reporters employed by the party-state run
papers who ignore the political taboo it is because they
censor information which may damage the government's
credibility.
'Without doubt, my superiors will pay special
attention to the news regarding the leadership
conflict.... Since the basic news policy of my
paper is to serve as a channel for enunciating
government policy, they expect that the news
stories shall make a contribution to national
unity and maintain social stability.... In
general, I don't cover the sensitive events, such
as the leadership conflict alleged in the
parliament. There is little doubt that this kind
of political information would court social
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unrest.... Speaking as a responsible reporter, I
reluctantly carry news stories on the rows within
the government and the party (the KMT), even
though my paper allows me to do so.' (Interview,
reporter, 2-11-92:p4)
Legislator Lin Hung-tsung questioning the issues
concerning the cabinet resignations on 6 October 1992 is a
good example illustrating how the papers have been cautious
in dealing with politically sensitive news. That day, the
non-party legislator Lin posed several questions to the
Premier. In one question, he urged that the Premier should
resign after the forthcoming election. He pointed out that
70% of respondents in his opinion poll supported the cabinet
resignations .3
Legislator Lin's statements which call for the
Premier's resignation were only reported in the Liberty
Times which has a tradition of being hostile to Premier Hau.
Although no story was published by the other papers, it does
not mean that none of the other parliamentary reporters paid
attention to this matter. In fact, the reason that this
question failed to achieve coverage was partly because of
the main newsroom's interference.
'Recently, the main newsroom took a tough
censorship policy in dealing with the news
regarding two top administrators: the President
and the Premier. Taking the example of legislator
Lin Hung-tsung's question about the cabinet
resignations, I filed a story on this matter.
Anyway, it was killed by the editor.... Before,
I was asked by the editor to check the reliability
of this survey. He wanted me to look through
every questionnaire and carefully check its
answers.... Finally, the story still was buried
by the editor.	 To my knowledge, part of the
3This poll was conducted on 2 October 1992 with a sample of 1,000
and 80% of effective respondents.
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reason is that the editor questioned the
representativeness of the survey. This poll was
not a nation-wide survey, it was carried out in
Kaohsiung region. I guess the editor thought that
the poll only reflected public opinion in southern
Taiwan. More importantly, since any of the matter
concerning the Premier is considered politically
sensitive, the editor must exercise a rigid
standard to scrutinize the news stories.
Consequently, letting it go unreported is the
conventional way of tackling the problem.'
(Interview, reporter, 7-10-92:p1)
3.2	 Case 2: Reporting on the Question and Answer
Session
In the parliament, the proceedings of the Premier's Question
Time is an institutional arrangement ensuring that the
legislators and the government executives engage in a
dialogue. According to parliamentary regulations, a
legislator has the right to make an impromptu
interpellation4 about administrative policy, an
administrative report or any other report of the Executive
Yuan in 15 minutes. Furthermore, the same interpellator may
make another 15 minutes impromptu interpellation on the
reply to his or her previous interpellation. At the same
time, the Premier, the relevant ministers or the Commission
Chairman shall answer the interpellation immediately after
its presentation, except for confidential matters relating
to national defence and foreign relations. Although an
interpellated party is required to answer the questions, who
4Interpellation means that legislators or assemblymen formally
question the head of the executive branch about government policy or
action in legislative bodies.
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and how to answer are not specified in the parliamentary
regulations.
In comparison with the real situation, the Premier's
Question Time is portrayed differently in the news.
Generally, the papers treat the executive branch more
significantly than the legislators. Ultimately, the
dialogue between the government and the legislators on the
debate is almost replaced by one-way rhetoric.
3.2.1 The Premier versus the KMT Legislators
On 6 October 1992, 17 legislators participated in the
question and answer session. Among them, 2 members of the
KMT faction, Wisdom Coalition, had a heated debate with the
_
Premier on the 'One China' policy.
KMT legislator Wu Tzu proposed the idea of 'Two China,
but Taiwan in priority'. Also he pushed for the KMT to be
Taiwanized. Another KMT legislator Chen Jen-nan voiced
support for the Democratic Progressive Party's separatist
slogan of 'One China, One Taiwan'. He advocated the view
that 'without the Republic of China, Taiwan will still exist
tomorrow.' These views angered Premier Hau, therefore, he
severely criticized the two KMT legislators.
This floor debate won extensive news coverage in the
next day's papers. But the reason that reporters took the
events seriously varied from paper to paper. For the
reporters employed by the privately owned papers, conflict
and the drama generated by the clash between the KMT rebels
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and the Premier were the core ingredients for ensuring
coverage.
'We were willing to take up the Wisdom Coalition
members' interpellation, because it was signifying
a conflict within the ruling party. The 'One
China, One Taiwan' policy is nothing new in the
parliament. It has been proposed by the DPP for
years. Now, it is an important subject for the
media because some KMT legislators openly
challenge the party's basic policy. In this case,
signs show that the KMT is heavily divided in its
dealing with the national identity question, and
is experiencing increasing erosion of consensus in
its bedrock principle.... 	 Frankly speaking,
legislator Wu Tzu deserved some credit for his
performance. During the question and answer
session, he dramatized the legislative actions.
For instance, his speech was full of emotional
appeals that created a tense atmosphere and
generated a sense of strong conflict on that
occasion. I was very impressed by his words and
actions.' (Interview, reporter, 21-10-92:p3)
By comparison, the reporters working for the party-
state controlled papers tended to emphasize that the Premier
who is the media star of the beat himself is sufficient to
warrant news coverage.
'I am working for a government paper. To help
government promote and diffuse its public policy
is one of my important tasks. Therefore, I have
to focus fully on the government's disclosures....
Answers given by the Premier were definitely more
important than the questions raised by the
legislators. The 'One China' policy declared by
the Premier represented the government's attitude
toward the future of our country. It is a
principal policy that no one is supposed to be
doubtful about.	 The papers should let the
Premier's remarks get across.'	 (Interview,
reporter, 21-10-92:p2)
The debate between the Premier and the KMT rebels was
portrayed in the party-state controlled papers as the
Premier addressing the Legislative Yuan. These papers only
mentioned that legislator Wu questioned the KMT's 'One
China' policy.	 However, the other issues, such as
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government wrongdoing were ignored. In this instance, the
party-state run papers were biased in favour of the Premier,
because his refutation of the 'Two China' policy was
significantly covered. By contrast, legislator Wu's
assertion on 'One China policy would simply drive Taiwan
into a deadlock' was published in just one paragraph.
Furthermore, the coverage in the party-state run papers
was hostile to the Wisdom Coalition. For instance, the KMT
mouthpiece, the Central Daily News featured two highly
opinionated stories condemning legislator Wu's conduct on
the floor. In one story, the 'Two China' policy endorsed by
the Wisdom Coalition was severely criticized. The KMT
reporter argued that the 'Two China' policy was equivalent
to an independent Taiwan, and any attempt to make Taiwan an
independent country would endanger the welfare and safety of
the 20 million residents of the island. In the other, the
parliamentary reporter criticized legislator Wu's
performance on the floor as poor, because some of his
questions, such as the unfair decisions on candidate
selection were internal KMT issues and not suitable to be
raised on the floor. However the reporter never criticized
the Premier who also devoted a certain amount of time to
defending his own stand on the selection of the candidates.
The privately owned papers' coverage of the floor
debate between the Premier and legislator Wu was quite
different from the party-state owned papers' stories. They
gave more space in which the legislators could voice their
political feelings. The floor exchange was portrayed as one
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in which the Premier and legislator Wu were engaging in some
sort of dialogue. That is, legislator Wu raised a question
and the Premier gave an answer. This sequence of paired
questions and answers was drawn from two temporal
dimensions. In reality, taking an example of the first
interpellation, legislator Wu spent 15 minutes stating his
questions, and the Premier gave a 25 minute response.
It seems that liberal papers including the Independence
Daily Post and the Liberty Times treated the KMT rebels more
significantly than the two big papers. For instance, in
addition to printing a story on the floor debate, the
Liberty Times also published another story in which
legislator Wu's criticisms of government malpractice were
described in detail.	 However, none of the Premier's
reactions were mentioned in this story.
3.2.2 The Premier versus the DPP Legislators
By participating in the formal legislative process, the
legislators are guaranteed to carry legitimacy in the media.
However, the DPP legislators seldom receive fair media
attention in comparison with the Premier.
On 13 October 1992, 6 DPP legislators took part in the
floor debate. Because the DPP has been strongly identified
with Taiwan through its independence platform, a huge amount
of floor time was devoted to attacking the KMT's doctrine on
the unification of China. The DPP's counterparts, the
Premier who has a strong connection with the KMT's right-
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wing and the military, severely denounced the DPP's 'One
China, One Taiwan' policy advocating dual recognition.
Heated debate over the issue of national identity and
relations with communist China dominated that day's
legislative agenda. For instance, some legislators
questioned the Premier about his commitment to the future of
the island. Some legislators demanded that the government
be more active in gaining international recognition for
Taiwan, including joining GATT and re-applying to the United
Nations under the name 'Taiwan'.
In addition to the politically sensitive 'One China'
policy, some legislators criticized the Premier's policy on
the maintenance of law and order, which had been one of the
priority goals of his administration. Moreover, some
legislators urged the Premier to take tough action on the
practice of vote-buying and other questionable vote-winning
tactics used by KMT candidates in the run up to the
forthcoming election. 	 Furthermore, the Vocational
Assistance Commission for Retired Soldiers which is heavily
subsidized by the government, was alleged to be involved in
monopolizing the business of public construction.
The debate between the Premier and the DPP legislators
over the national identity issue was printed on the front
page in the next day's papers. But coverage of the DPP
legislators' performance in the question and answer session
varied among the papers in accordance with each paper's•
political orientations. Most of the reporters from the
privately owned papers do not refuse to write reports on the
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DPP's performance, because they believe that the legislative
actions are legitimate to report regardless of who is taking
part and what is being said.
'My paper's policy in dealing with ideological
questions involving national identity, such as
advocating an independent Taiwan is very clear.
In practice, any of the legislators who speaks on
this issue on the floor will receive fair
attention. However, novelty is another criterion
of newsworthiness that has to be taken into
account. When I cover this matter, I prefer that
the legislators raise a newly developed subject,
not tell the same old story.' (Interview,
reporter, 21-10-92:p3)
However, the DPP's deliberation on the floor has been
consistently ignored by the reporters from the party-state
owned papers and some privately owned papers. Generally,
these privately owned papers are regarded as being in
alliance with the KMT. It seems that their reporters
conflate the journalistic profession with their papers'
policy. Just like the government, these reporters intend to
educate the readers and to socialize them into the official
view of the political situation. Since the DPP's political
assertions are justified initially as being against people's
social welfare and the societal consensus, the reporters
believe that they have to take the responsibility for moving
the DPP to the margin of the media and political agenda.
'Today, our country is facing a crisis in national
unity. In a free society, every person is allowed
to give his or her opinions on any issue including
an independent Taiwan. Under such circumstances,
there is a problem which needs to be reconsidered.
Are we abusing freedom? I think the DPP
legislators are those who have to think about this
problem.... As a responsible journalist, he or
she is not supposed to get every legislator's
assertions into print. No reporter can report
everything happening in the Legislative Yuan.
Selectivity is inevitable, but the decision shall
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be made in accordance with professional and
ethical judgements. In my view, the legislative
actions or words which undermine the people's
unity and threaten people's welfare should not be
reported. Otherwise, the reporters have to attach
a story called "news analysis" in order to tell
readers what is wrong with these actions.'
(Interview, reporter, 21-10-92:p2-3)
Also, these parliamentary reporters seem to be granted
a degree of autonomy, but they will use it within
politically acceptable limits. In other words, they are
independent agents in a conditional way, free to report what
they like as long as the story well fit their employer's
pro-government policy.
'I well understand my employer's new policy. The
political spectrum of my paper is viewed as
moderate and more or less pro right-wing. The
DPP's legislators are a group of politicians who
play some sort of political game and try to
embarrass the government in the parliament.
Therefore, from_the first day I was assigned to
the legislature beat a year ago, I was told to
play down the stories regarding the DPP.'
(Interview, reporter, 28-10-92:p1)
Since the party-state controlled papers serve as a
conduit for the government, much news framing aims at
transforming the legislative actions happening on the floor
into information that reinforces the legitimacy of the
government. The conventional way of covering the question
and answer session is to replace the dialogue between the
Premier and the opposition legislators with a one-way
speech.
In general, regarding coverage of the Premier's
Question Time, the party-state owned papers almost all rely
on the concerns of the government to constitute the bulk of
their report, and offer no statement from the opposition
324
legislators. Their stories on the Premier's Question Time
were reconstructed solely around the Premier's and the
ministers' remarks. In the headlines, the Premier was
presented as the responsible agent making declarations,
explanations or rejecting points. By applying the active
voice to the government, the papers offered sufficient space
for the government, especially the Premier to defend his
policies and attack his political opponents. By contrast,
the DPP legislators were passive actors in the news. The
common practice was that the DPP legislators' questions were
reduced to one paragraph and used to echo the government
executives' arguments. For instance, one phrase, 'In
responding to legislator (name)'s question' was regularly
used in the news stories to denote that all statements given
by the executive branch answered the DPP's interpellation.
Since even the titles of the interpellation were always
omitted in the news, the DPP had great difficulty in getting
their message through the party-state run papers. Apart
from carrying straight news stories on the Premier's
Question Times, the reporters from party-state owned papers
often featured stories appraising the Premier's performance
on the floor, or condemning poor legislative action taken by
the DPP.
In this case, the coverage of the DPP's interpellation
in the privately owned papers was not all of a piece.
Generally speaking, the news framing of the interpellation
regarding the public policy was less complex than those
concerning the issue of national identity.
	 The press
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coverage of the public policy debate on the floor had a high
degree of uniformity. The typical form of representing the
public policy debate on the floor was that the government's
remarks were dominant in the headlines, the lead paragraph
and the body of the story. However, the press coverage of
the interpellation concerning national identity varied from
paper to paper.
The United Daily News has a close relationship with the
Premier. In reporting the Premier's Question Time, the
United Daily News ran a front page story on which the floor
debates over the issue of national identity between the
Premier and the DPP legislators were briefly reported. Then
the readers were referred to the stories on page three.
Generally, the United Daily News treated the Premier
significantly. For instance, the Premier was dominant in
the headlines and the lead paragraph. Moreover, the news
stories were full of the Premier's remarks. By contrast,
the DPP legislators' statements was summarized in one
paragraph. It seems that the DPP was disadvantaged in its
press coverage in the United Daily News.
The United Daily News' rival, the China Times seemed to
adopt a more equitable balance in dealing with the floor
debate. For instance, the China Times printed a front page
story which was very similar to that which appeared in the
United Daily News. That is, official discourse was
prominent in this story. Furthermore, half the space of its
second page was devoted to describing the floor exchange
between the Premier and the DPP legislators on the issues of
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independence and unification. This long story was built up
in a point and counterpoint format. That is, the arguments
from the Premier and the DPP legislators were more or less
equally covered, in spite of the fact that the Premier was
still portrayed as an active agent in the headlines and the
lead paragraph. Besides that, the China Times published an
announcement issued by the DPP headquarters. In this, the
DPP spokesman criticized the Premier's remarks on the 'One
China' policy.
Not surprisingly, DPP legislators got better coverage
in the liberal papers. For instance, the Independence Daily
Post devoted almost all its second page to covering the
floor debate. Like the China Times, it ran a long story on
the floor debate over the issue of national identity.
Unlike the China Times, the Independence Daily Post took the
DPP legislators more seriously. For instance, the DPP
legislators and the Premier were simultaneously portrayed as
active agents in the headlines and in the lead paragraph.
Furthermore, two DPP spokesmen representing its factions
were interviewed to give their reactions to the Premier's
performance.
Because the Executive Yuan is presumed responsible for
the welfare of all citizens, the press treatment of the
Premier's Question Time tends to lay much emphasis on the
officials rather than the legislators. As the conventions
of covering the question and answer session emphasize the
prominence of the Premier and his cabinet at the expense of
the legislators in general, and marginalize the opposition
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legislators in particular, this in turn diminishes the
Legislative Yuan's importance in the eyes of the public.
3.3 Case 3: Reporting on the Passage of Bills
As already mentioned, covering floor deliberations, such as
the question and answer session, reporters rely solely on
the legislators' performative accounts that are directly and
immediately observable. Not surprisingly, in reporting the
final passage of bills, the reporters also confine
themselves to observation of the legislators' behaviour on
the floor. Furthermore, it seems that the press neither
exploits backdrops of the ongoing floor discussion nor
delves into impacts of the special bills. Such an emphasis
has its reasons. Among the reasons are lack of time to seek
out other sources, and a concern that the readers would be
bored by reading heavy, dull and abstract parliamentary
discussions. The most important explanation that the
press's cursory coverage of the bills stems from the
reporters themselves, because they lack the knowledge to
deal with the legal and policy issues in detail.
'In my view, why the bills are poorly reported is
partly due to time. Regardless of longevity of
tenure, almost every reporter here is acting as a
stenographer. Since every reporter has always to
be available on the scene, he or she rarely has
opportunities to search out further
information.... Partly, it is a matter regarding
readership. I don't think ordinary people are
willing to read a story that is full of dry
discussions.... First and foremost, most
parliamentary reporters have limited knowledge of
legal and policy issues and operations.
Therefore, they have no sense of history or
context for the particular bills. Dealing with
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the discussion on the bills is far more complex
than the debate on the national identity issue.
In reporting the debate on the issue of national
identity, a reporter can simply represent the
opinions given by the legislators and the
government executives. However, in covering
complex policy and legal issues, the experienced
reporters are expected to discover multiple
competing interests behind the formal legislative
process. For instance, in my report on the third
reading of the amendments of Lawyers Law, I did
mention that some military lawyers were lobbying
in the parliament. I am the only reporter who
pays attention to this matter. In my view, people
concerned with particular policies should include
the legislators, executive agencies and interest
groups. As a reporter you should be sensitive
enough to detect those strangers appearing inside
the parliament, not just merely focus on the
public rallies gathering outside the parliament.'
(Interview, reporter, 27-10-92:p9)
The typical news convention of reporting a bill's final
passage consists of two parts: the floor discussions and a
summary of the amendments. In general, the reporters cover
the passage of the bill by duplicating the official
documents issued by the Conference Department of the
Legislative Yuan. The discussions on the bills are depicted
in accordance with the performative accounts taking place on
the floor.
There is a tendency among reporters to concentrate on
the chaos that is caused by the DPP's tactics to delay the
bill rather than the gradual, orderly nature of the way that
bills are discussed. Therefore, the controversial bills
regarding the reform of government structure receive much
more media attention than the others. These kinds of bills
are highly controversial, because both parties have
difficulty in reaching a consensus in the course of the
negotiation.	 According to previous experience, during
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discussions over the bills which are a long way short of
meeting opposition's demands, the DPP will take non-
parliamentary action to underline its dissatisfaction and to
prevent the bills from being passed into law.
By contrast, the less controversial bills which are
remote from the ideological disputes between two political
parties attract less media attention. For example,
reporting the final passage of the Lawyers Law was very
superficial and no major difference in the papers was found
as far as their content was concerned. In general, the
reporters tended to put their stories together by
summarizing the amendments at the expense of the detailed
discussion which took place among the legislators. Since
the coverage of the amendments of the Lawyers Law was
treated as an abbreviation of the documents provided by the
Department of Conference of the Legislative Yuan, the
coverage across the papers was highly similar.
In the 90th Legislative Session, the Provisions in
connection with the Control Yuan Organization, the Public
Officials Selection and Recall Law were considered as highly
controversial bills. 5
 These bills received extensive press
coverage, because of the dramatic and sensitive actions
used by the DPP to slow down the proceedings. Taking as an
example the third reading of the 31st Article of the Public
Officials Selection and Recall Law which proceeded on 22
5This information was provided by the parliamentary reporters.
These bills dealt with the fundamental reform of the political system in
Taiwan. The KMT and the DPP were sharply divided on these matter in
private negotiation held by the Caucus of both parties.
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October 1992, papers varied as far as their content was
concerned. In general, regardless of their political
orientations, all papers took the un-parliamentary behaviour
carried out by the DPP to boycott the bills in the final
process seriously. Nevertheless, the DPP's rational debates
conducted in the earlier stages were not treated equally
favourably in all the papers. Only privately owned papers
printed part of the dry discussion which took place before
the parliament had voted on the bills.
In this case, all papers were interested in the
parliamentary actions taking place in the last 15 minutes
when the amendments were passed. Therefore, an action-
packed, exciting story was run by the press to represent how
the parliament had voted on the bills. This story was
depicted chronologically in which a KMT legislator proposed
the vote, the DPP legislator Lu Hsiao-yi then threw
documents at the speaker, the DPP legislators seized the
podium, and the KMT and the DPP got involved in a shouting
match on the floor.
However, there was a dramatic difference in the papers'
reporting of the earlier floor discussions on the bills
regarding the Public Officials Selection and Recall Law.
Reporters working for the party-state owned papers tended to
speed up the discussion by omitting the DPP's utterances.
By so doing, the reporters only mentioned the fact that the
opposition opposed the bills without reference to details of
their reasons for such action.
In contrast to the party-state owned papers, the
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privately owned papers treated the floor discussion which
took place before the bills were voted into law much more
significantly. The floor deliberations were depicted as
divisions between the supporters who were the legislators
representing overseas Chinese communities and the opponents
who were the DPP. Then the core arguments of each bloc were
selectively represented. In this case, these papers framed
the floor debate in a way favourable to the DPP. The DPP's
legislators had no difficulty in getting their message
across via the privately owned papers. In comparison with
the DPP, its counterparts, the legislators who were
representative of Overseas Chinese communities, apparently
lacked chances to gain access to the papers. 	 Only one
report made by the China Times mentioned Overseas Legislator
_
Tasi Fan-dao's statements on this matter.
Liberal papers, such as the Independence Daily Post and
the Liberty Times provided more space to the DPP legislators
to get their message across. For instance, the Independence
Daily Post produced a more diverse range of coverage than
the two big papers. In addition to carrying a story on the
third reading of the bills, the Independence Daily Post also
featured a headline story in which it explained why the DPP
fought hard to make the amendments to the bill.
A bill's final passage is seen as the most newsworthy
moment for the parliamentary reporters (Cook, 1989:50-51).
Taiwan's parliamentary reporters also share this view. More
importantly, Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989) and Russell
(1984) point out that parliamentary reporters tend to focus
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on the sensational events, rather than dealing with the more
important debate or discussion.
	 In Taiwan, the press
coverage of a passing bill also skews towards the dramatic
and confrontation at the expense of rational discussion.
But stressing the trivial and the sensational information
has its costs. The superficial and action oriented coverage
of legislature can have a detrimental impact on the reader's
understanding of parliamentary politics.
3.4 Case 4: Reporting on the Parliamentary Reaction
The government spokesman is designated to speak for the
Executive Yuan in which reporters' tasks are simplified.
Frequently, they only turn to the government spokesman when
a given topic becomes newsworthy. With the Legislative Yuan
the solution is less simple. Who can speak on behalf of the
legislature or political parties is very much dependent on
the topics and the availability of legislators.
When the parliamentary reporters are assigned to cover
a subject which requires parliamentary commentary, they may
choose their sources by trying to maintain parity among the
KMT and the DPP. Of course, the reporters working for the
party-state owned papers will not follow this rule, because
they faithfully echo the official voice.
In general, parliamentary reporters choose their
sources by trying to maintain a parity among the major
political parties. Nevertheless the major party which takes
more responsibility for legislative action is usually the
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first to be covered (Cook, 1989:55). In Taiwan reporters
may choose their information sources based on the familiar
division between the KMT and the DPP, between the executive
branch and the legislature, or between supporters and
opponents. In some special cases, the balance between the
two KMT factions, the Wisdom Coalition and the New KMT
Alliance is also taken into account. Then the leaders of
each political group are selected to give their comments.
The legislators who hold the institutional position are
considered as stars on the legislature beat, because they
are assumed to have greater influence than the average
member. To some extent, these leaders also are expected to
be good communicators. Otherwise, the reporters turn
themselves to those who are able to convert their questions
nIM
into answers in a timely, concise manner. However, the non-
leaders still could be an authoritative source, especially
the legislators who have a strong background knowledge in
the fields of economics, law and technology.
'Taking an example of Finance Minister Wang Chein-
shien's resignation (7 October, 1992), the
parliamentary reporters were asked to fill out a
story on parliamentary reaction. In this case,
theoretically, the legislators in the Finance
Committee should have been targeted, because they
are responsible for the legislative actions
regarding Wang's land reform policy.... In the
Finance Committee, some legislators with a strong
finance and economic background are seen as the
authoritative source, although they don't hold
posts in the parties or parliamentary
hierarchy.... So far as I know, Wang's case is a
matter of political conflict within the ruling
party, nothing to do with the policy. Therefore,
the reporters did not particularly seek the
information about land policy from the Finance
Committee members. Since the reason behind Wang's
resignation was because of a political struggle,
commentary from both parties, and the KMT's two
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factions were necessary ingredients to write up
the story.... In this instance, most reporters
just drew on their sources in committee meetings.'
(Interview, reporter, 21-10-92:p2)
Since reporters tend to save time and effort, the
convenient way of getting their work done is to look at who
is participating in a floor proceeding or committee meeting.
Without doubt, the legislators who are always on the scene
are more likely to attract media attention.
For example, when the press coverage of the
parliamentary reaction to the Finance Minister Wang Chein-
shien's resignation is examined, it is found that most
sources used drew upon the legislators participating in the
committee meetings on that legislative day. In addition,
the diversity of sources is very much determined by the news
organization's political affinities. Table 7-1 (p.340)
shows that the party-state owned papers, such as the Youth
Daily and the Central Daily News deliberately avoid
publishing the DPP legislator's response. The Central Daily
News even twisted a DPP legislator Chen Shui-bian's remarks
in order to fit its news policy. However, the government
owned paper, Hsin Sheng Pao held the principle of balance
well in this case, because it published the statements from
both political parties. Strictly speaking, the privately
owned papers present the statements from the two major
parties. The Independence Daily Post and the China Times
even quoted the announcement released by the DPP Caucus.
The media stars of the legislature beat are often those
who hold high positions in the party hierarchy and who
master communication skills (Cook, 1989:54-56; Ericson,
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Baranek and Chan, 1989:211). In Taiwan's case, perhaps more
importantly, the legislator's star status is somewhat
attributed to his political affiliation with the press. At
least, communication skills and institutional prominence are
taken into account only within politically acceptable
limits. This is particular true for the party-state owned
papers.
CONCLUSION
As already mentioned, the party-state can afford to obstruct
the free flow of information, because it controls the
primary sources of political information. By comparison,
the Legislative Yuan is less able to attempt the tight
control over journalism. Consequently, press coverage of
the Legislative Yuan does represent somewhat of an opening
in the authoritarian political system, although it is still
limited.
On the legislature beat, the legislators and reporters
are working in a symbiotic relationship. The Legislative
Yuan relies on the press to inform the public about its
legislation. The press also relies on the parliament for
information.
Like the executive branch, the Legislative Yuan
institutionalizes parliamentary reporting by providing
reporters with galleries from which to work, and offering a
host of legislative reports, bills and digests which are
reportable. However, in Taiwan's case, the press generally
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interacts with individual legislators, rather than with the
parliamentary institution. In attempting to publicize their
political perspectives and seek to get re-elected, the
legislators are adept at media manipulation. They release
handouts and launch news conferences on a regular basis.
In the Taiwan experience, partisanship is the most
important aspect of the relationship between the press and
the Legislative Yuan. The press has its tradition in
affiliating with political parties and factions which
prevents its reporters from reporting impartially a
parliamentary matter. Parliamentary reporting demonstrates
that having greater freedom of access to the information
sources does not guarantee a better quality of political
news coverage.	 Because the press collaborates with
particular political interests, the coverage of
parliamentary actions is significantly biased in favour of
certain groups. Also, the voice of opponents is constantly
suppressed and ignored. Perhaps, only if the reporters act
in good faith to defend their journalistic profession by
loosening this process of self-censorship will the
democratization of political news become possible.
The greatest concern of the legislative news is its
superficiality and lack of context. There is a common
tendency for the parliamentary reporters to trivialize and
dramatize the legislative news (Ericson, Baranek and Chan,
1989:210-216; Russell, 1984:227). In Taiwan, parliamentary
reporters apart from avoiding publication of news concerning
political embarrassment and humiliation to the party-state,
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also have a tendency to pursue less abstract and complicated
subjects, disregarding the potential impact of legislation
on the whole nation. For instance, the press regardless of
its political orientation, seems to focus on the dramatic
aspects of legislation at the expense of the fundamental
issues of political structure or public policy which are the
essence of parliamentary politics.
Part of the reason that parliamentary news is
superficial is because the press attempts to cover events
which take place elsewhere. In Taiwan, the press believes
that parliamentary news must cover whatever the officials
and legislators do in committee or on the floor. Therefore,
the reporters are not allowed freedom from routine to pursue
news somewhat more idiosyncratically or historically
specific. Partly, the reporters also lack the special and
recipe knowledge to interpret the legislation which also
contributes to a poor quality of legislative news. As a
result, the press is not very successful in circulating
information which the public requires to understand
parliamentary politics.
Good quality press coverage of parliament ultimately
depends on the quality of the legislature. Taiwan is in a
process of transition into a democracy. In such a
particular political environment, the Legislative Yuan
itself bears some responsibility for healthy parliamentary
reporting. The more interests that are formally represented
in parliament, the better representative democracy seems to
work. To a large extent, only the media can help promote a
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healthy parliamentary politics. To achieve this aim,
political news needs to impartially reflect political news;
it needs to reflect perspectives provided by a range of
legislators and officials as well as the public.
Unfortunately, the press is working within a parliament
where non-parliamentary behaviour has been frequently
conducted to delay the legislation. It seems that the
Legislative Yuan is not yet mature enough to function well
in order to serve a democratic society.
Good quality of parliamentary reporting is also very
much dependent on good legislators. The better legislators
are those who use media strategies to help open the
legislative process to public scrutiny, and who release
information that will contribute to better parliamentary
reporting, first and foremost; ideally, their motives and
actions behind information manipulation will not go against
the public interest. As a consequence, information provided
by legislators is more objective and relevant to the
democratic process.
All in all, the press has to take the responsibility
for making legislators more responsive to the public
interest. In Taiwan, the relationship between the press and
legislators is based on political preferences, rather than
responsibility, fairness and trust. Therefore, it is
reasonable to say that the press will continue to have
difficulties in fulfilling its role as the watchdog of the
legislators for the foreseeable future.
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Table 7-1 Sources Quoted in the Press Coverage of the
Finance Minister Wang Chein-shien's Resignation
Information sources Newspapers
Political
parties/
factions
Legislators Party-
State	 .
run
Privately
run
YD CDN HSP CT UDN IDP LT
The New Chou Chuang *	 *	 * *	 *
_
*	 *
KMT KMT Wang Tien-
chung
* * *
Wisdom
Coli-
tion
Tasi Pi-
huang .
*
Others Ting Shou-
chung
*	 *	 * *	 * *
KMT Li Tsung-jen * *
Caucus Li York-gi *
The
DPP
Chen Shui-
bian
*	 * * *	 *
Hsieh, Frank * *	 * *	 *
Hung Chi-
chang
* * *
Wei Yao-
chien
* *
Lu Hsiao-yi *
Non Lin Cheng-je *	 * *	 *
KMT Tsai Fan-dao *	 * *
&
DPP 
Lin Hung-
tsung
*
(The data have been analyzed by the researcher.)
YD : The Youth Daily
CDN: The Central Daily News
HSP: The Hsin Sheng Pao
CT : The China Times
UDN: The United Daily News
IDP: The Independence Daily Post
LT : The Liberty Times
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
If the press performed as ideally as it should, if the press
actually served to create an informed citizenship, democracy
might more closely approximately its ideal. However, it can
be argued that in reality democracy has gained little from
the rise of press power. The centrality of journalism to
modern democracy makes the issues that prevent the press
from performing its democratic function more important than
ever. The power of the state and the market are two factors
blamed by scholarly research which have inhibited journalism
in communicating democracy.
This study has given a detailed explanation of state-
press relations which have impacted on democratic
citizenship in Taiwan. The history of journalism in Taiwan
records the close links between the Nationalist Party, Kuo
Min Tang (KMT) and the press and notes the change from press
control by the party-state to a form of market censorship.
Specifically, party-state manipulation of the press had by
the late 1980s been transformed from regulation and
censorship to news management.
We propose that the history of the press in Taiwan
needs to be located in a broader history of society as a
whole. The nature of the party-state intervention in the
press varies greatly depending on the stage of
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liberalization of civil society. Along with the
liberalization of civil society which has marked Taiwan's
passage through the last 20 years has come a shift in the
relationship between the party-state and the press. To
argue this issue further, the party-state manipulation's of
the press is assumed to be a process which comprises a
number of juxtaposed and changing political and economic
elements. This demands that we look beyond the political-
economy perspective in an attempt to understand the issues
of state-press relations toward democracy.
Beginning with the political-economy perspective, we
show that the party-state exercises power over the press by
means of its licensing of newspapers, giving financial
support to the press industry, and seducing proprietors
through political and economic interests in the heyday of
authoritarian rule. A revised theory which concentrates on
the daily interactions between the party-state authorities
and journalists yields a more detailed map of how the party-
state exerts power over the press through a process of news
management when the party-state faces a civil society in
turmoil.
As an immigrant regime, the KMT's nation-building task
began in 1949 in an attempt to consolidate its legitimate
rule of Taiwan during this period. The press was assigned
a crucial role in the task of national development. Freedom
of expression was subordinated to the larger and more
pressing goal of nation-building.
The party-state control of the press industry through
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statutory constraints was justified by the urgency of
nation-building and economic growth. Between 1950 and 1988,
the number of papers was fixed at 31. The number of pages
which a newspaper would have and the price of all papers was
determined by the party-state.
In hostile economic conditions the party-state's
control of the press industry made a positive contribution
to preserving a diverse press market. Faced with widespread
poverty and illiteracy, privately-run papers would not have
survived in a marketplace which was dominated by the party-
state owned papers without the provision of government
advertising and grants. Since the KMT had actively
interfered with both civil society and the press market,
none of us can argue that the press had much role in calling
the party-state to account.
Between the early 1970 and 1988's deregulation, state-
press relations certainly changed, and almost as certainly
strengthened. In response to the liberalization of civil
society emerging in 1977, the need to keep an integrated and
docile newspaper industry was more important than ever.
However, the development of opposition movements and
economic growth acted as two impetuses for expanding and
changing journalism in the country.
Between 1949 and the mid-1970s, the language of
political debate in Taiwan was restricted by the KMT. The
undermining of the KMT's national building task had in fact
been simmering since 1977, the year the political opposition
crystallised in the building of a legitimate opposition
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party. In this period, the dissemination of the political
opposition which attacked the KMT's monopoly of power was
precisely what aroused the hostility of the party-state
toward the press. Under such circumstances, the
manipulation of the press aimed at not only promoting the
KMT's ideology, but also eradicating dissenting views in
order to maintain the stability of a political consensus.
A commercial press was one other factor that altered
state-press relations. It is evident that the market served
as a moderating influence on the liberalization of the press
in the early 1970s. In Taiwan, privately operated
newspapers have existed alongside the party-state owned
papers. However, economic development in the early 1970s
spurred the growth of this sector of the press, especially
the 'real' privately held newspapers which were free from
party-state financial control.
The privately owned papers, the China Times and the
United Daily News, which replaced the party-state owned
papers, played a leading role in the marketplace by the mid-
1970s. The significant development of the privately owned
papers forced the party-state to devote much of its energy
into cultivating media relations.
Taking those trends into account, statutory controls
alone were no longer effective enough to keep dissenting
groups off the media agenda. As already mentioned, the
party-state restrictions on the economics of the press were
used to protect the financial health of the press. Fifteen
years later, these press restrictions turned into a weapon
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to be used against the opposition which attempted to
purchase newspapers in order to voice its political message.
To speak of direct party-state control of the privately
owned newspapers is misleading. It is certainly true that
the KMT government was entitled to regulate the papers
through the Publication Law, or to arrest and bring to trial
journalists who disseminated information deemed to threaten
the security of the state through the Sedition Law and
martial law.
In the case of Taiwan, during the first 40 years of KMT
rule, the party-state constantly exercised prerogative
powers over opposition magazines, but these were never the
primary methods for keeping the mainstream newspapers in
line. In fact, the party-state won over the privately held
papers by providing political and economic favours to their
proprietors in exchange for their loyalty. The big
newspapers, such as the China Times and the United Daily
News, were granted rights to acquire papers which were
expressing sympathies to the opposition or financially
unable to survive in the marketplace. Moreover, the
proprietors of these two paper groups were recruited into
the party-state's hierarchy. In contrast, the small papers
were subsidized with state funds to help them be more
competitive in the marketplace. There is no doubt that the
effectiveness of party-state control will be aided as long
as the proprietors' intervention in the practice of
journalism remains strong.	 Reporting the opposition
movement in Taiwan was an example of the party-state's
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control over the press through an informal prior censorship.
Indeed, it illustrates very clearly how the party-state
controlled reporters through mediating proprietors and news
executives.
It would be an exaggeration to say that the opposition
and commercial interests had triggered the press into making
some fundamental changes in its reporting of politics. The
conventions of reporting the opposition which were largely
biased in favour of the party-state reflected the fact that
most of the newspapers remained closely linked with the
party-state. However, the privately-run newspapers enjoyed
a relative autonomy in reporting political information. In
the late 1970s, the boundaries of the freedom of the press
were ill-defined. There is no one simple explanation for
this. Firstly, the growth of a political opposition created
an alternative forum in which the press could market a
diversity of political versions. Secondly, boosted
circulation figures tempted the privately operated
newspapers to continually test the limits of the boundaries
imposed by the party-state; this was helped by the press's
desire to roll back the party-state censorship. Perhaps,
finally, the party-state authorities themselves were not
clear about how much relaxation of control was acceptable
when some privately owned newspapers began to toe the KMT's
unwritten guidelines.
As far as there is room in the market for papers
willing to challenge the party-state censorship, there
always was the potential for a freer press. We witness this
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in that the pursuit of commercial interests did encourage
some privately-run newspapers to loosen their ties with the
party-state in the late 1970s. Such a trend became
significant when some privately-run papers, such as the
Independence Evening Post and the People's Daily News began
to turn the spotlight on the opposition and enjoyed a boost
in circulation by the mid-1980s as a result. This fact
demonstrates that the audience market played a crucial role
in emancipating newspapers from the party-state control
under martial law. To some extent, economic interests
encouraged the press to override political censorship, and
market forces drove the press to provide a wider range of
political views.
The implication for state-press relations in the
post-martial law era is that news management became crucial
for a democratic government. We argue that only a
democratic or democratising government needs to interfere
with a pluralistic press because of its own accountability,
and that only an independent press can hold government
accountable to the public.
Close analyses of reporting politics provides a clear
example of the complex interactions between the party-state
and the press, and demonstrate the dilemma this poses for a
free press as guardian of democracy. During the years 1980-
90, Taiwan's society changed a great deal. The
authoritarian KMT regime based on a Leninist party structure
moved towards democratic rule.
	 A new political forum
required different political skills. When the party-state
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was not able to maintain its unity and the dominance over
the opposition, and no longer exerted the same degree of
control over the press industry, perhaps the press may be
able to fulfil its role as a watchdog in society. In the
same vein, state-press relations entered a new era, with the
extra edge of the party-state paying new attention to the
issue of news management.
In the early 1990s, the accountability of the party-
state may not yet lie through the Legislative Yuan, but the
increasing influence of the parliament in Taiwan's political
structures has changed relations between the press and
political parties. The rise of mass suffrage has made the
parliament dependent upon the media, therefore, the
legislature is less able to attempt the tight control over
journalism which previously existed. This has led to the
two major political parties undertaking a continuous effort
in cultivating media relations in order to publicize their
own policies, and to seek re-election.
Looked at differently, the weak power exercised by the
parliament in controlling the press has helped the press act
counter to the party-state's news management to foil
accountability. Reporting the legislature shows that the
information gathered in the parliament serves as an
instrument allowing newspapers to break through the party-
state's reticence on politically or diplomatically
embarrassing issues, and to report more fully all aspects of
the party-state. The reporter's right to free access to the
parliament has created the potential for a restructuring of
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how journalists report politics.
A more independent legislature has forced the party-
state to be more answerable to the press, but in reality
state-press relations have not been fundamentally
transformed. The historic connection between the party-
state and the press has not altered that much, even in the
years after the rule of martial law. The party-state still
controls the primary sources of information that is a clear
advantage over the legislature. Therefore, the party-state
can afford to obstruct or restrict the free flow of
information. Reporting the party-state clearly illustrates
that the exercise of public relations through staged events-
press conferences, briefings and news releases, and denying
reporters interviews with anyone, except the official
spokesman- is a common practice employed to restrain the
flow of political information. The top administrators, such
as the President and the Premier are not answerable to the
press. One can argue that the Executive Yuan tightened
controls over journalists' access to information about its
plans and activities partly because of Premier Hau's ultra
conservative ideologies, or that President Lee and Premier
Hau were reluctant to deal with reporters because of their
social status. However, there is a slow trend showing that
the party-state has been forced to open itself up to the
press, with even the President and the Premier symbolically
meeting reporters once a year, but more often they directly
address the people through the media.
The party-state has adopted a new mode of press control
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in the early 1990s. Now, the party-state's news management
is aimed not only to convey the image of a great government,
but also to compete with the opposition, and even their
opponents within the ruling party. Previously, the KMT
government, after a long period in power had had few public
rows. After the late 1980s, the party-state has divided as
its political interests as a power centre have multiplied.
The fact that the party-state no longer speaks with one
voice could increase the possibility of a greater diversity
of views in the news; however, there is no guarantee this
will be the case.
The KMT's leadership challenge occurring in 1992
yielded a more complex picture of state-press relations. In
this instance, news tended to emerge as a by-product of
political struggle or debate. The party-state factions
dramatically enlarged their own creative 'news' flows
through the conventions of deep background and off-the-
record briefings with journalists. The coverage of the KMT
leadership contest became biased in one direction or the
other in accordance with a newspaper's political
preferences, proving that while the press was less
manageable, the party-state still exerted a heavy influence
on the press. The frequency of anonymous sources in the
press coverage suggested that the press was not performing
its role of calling to account politicians for the benefit
of the citizens. The party-state's accountability was much
harder to pinpoint, because ordinary citizens without
political and journalistic knowledge had difficulties in
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reading names into anonymous sources, and were prevented
from taking part in the political dialogue. Taken as whole,
the press did provide more information to the public,
however, its coverage was biased in one direction or the
other in accordance with a newspaper's political
orientation. Under such circumstances, the readers seemed
to be told, 'Bias does not matter, you are aware of it and
rival papers exist supporting the opposite viewpoint.'
As already elaborated, the press is most effective at
countering the party-state's news management when disunity
wracks the KMT. There is no denying that the party-state
continuously exploits the press, however, its control over
the press is limited, even under the best circumstances.
The implication is that the press may provide more
information to the public when the party-state is weak.
However, the partisan press seems to lead us to believe that
there is little ground for such expectations. Greater
attention should be directed to press partisanship which has
developed since the mid-1970s, and its cumulative effect
which has resulted in voluntary self-restraints in the early
1990s. Arguably, the collaboration with the press and KMT's
factions has significantly decreased its ability to hold the
party-state accountable to the public. For instance,
reporting politics clearly shows that reporters consciously
refuse to gain access to politicians who are prejudiced
against their employers. Consequently, because of the
proprietor's intervention in the practice of journalism, the
reporters tend to aggressively criticize the politicians who
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are not of the same political persuasion, and fail to
scrutinize the political process impartially.
Apart from the party-state news management, the threat
to diversity in news which stemmed from declining •
competition in the industry has emerged in the late 1980s.
The previous assumption that economic competition enhances
a 'marketplace of ideas' requires rethinking. We argue that
the market which served as a safeguard against the party-
state interference is sustainable only in an authoritarian
society. In a democratic society, the market inevitably
becomes a new source of threat to press freedom.
In the late 1980s, the two big paper groups, the China
Times and the United Daily News took 80% of the market.
This level of concentration has seriously threatened the
existence of liberal papers and the party-state owned
papers. The decline of opposition magazines and liberal
newspapers has foreclosed the newly developed diversity of
papers and ideas. In addition, the interplay of the party-
state and market censorship seems to prevent the press from
providing enough high-quality news to enable an informed
citizenship to develop. Since the proprietors of the two
newspaper groups are still close to the party-state and the
papers are still under 'one man' control, we have to presume
that their market domination will further restrict certain
dissenting political ideas, certainly including KMT's
factions, because deliberate partisanship has changed from
the divisions between political parties to support for
political factions. However, we have reason to believe that
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the declining of competition among newspapers limits the
number of ideas in the marketplace may be somewhat
overstated. To some extent, monopolistic markets may have
more diverse journalism because the competition has led the
two papers to pursue better journalistic performance. It
seems that after enjoying monopoly status and revenues, the
China Times and the United Daily News have more political
and economic capital to report more extensively, and
impartially on political information, and more innovatively
on non-political information. For instance, these two big
paper groups generously spend their competitive energies in
staging 'pseudo events' for their own reporting.' Despite
the fact that the newspapers engage in public relations
operations to create information for their own ends that are
•••
somewhat professionally trivial, they also provide the
readers with more analytical, comprehensive and diverse
news.
If the questions of the interplay between state and
market censorship are addressed in the future as they are
being at present, then journalistic practices will continue
to grant space to the party-state and exercise little impact
on making the party-state accountable to the public.
Unless, the newspaper barons are willing to divert power to
'See The Journalist, 3-9 April 1994:52-54 and Wealth, May 1994:40.
Recently, many large scale cultural festivals have been sponsored by the
China Times and the United Daily News. They also held some seminars on
current political and environment issues and sponsored celebrities
including former American President G. Bush and former British Prime
Minister M. Thatcher to visit Taiwan. The most notable example is that
the United Daily News spent US$ 1,000,000 on inviting M. Gorbachev to
visit Taiwan in April 1994.
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professional journalists, and first and foremost,
journalists are more sincere, intelligent, and willing to
energetically pursue facts and rely on professional
judgement rather than self-restraint, the press will never
have a proper relationship with the party-state in a
political democracy. If the press is still economically and
politically controlled, then democratic structures and
practices are not safe.
In order for democracy to improve, the bottom line is
that ordinary citizens must demand better standards in
government and journalism. The press has been manipulated
by the party-state, but does that mean we in turn have been
manipulated by the press? To answer this question, we have
to understand whether media messages significantly influence
what the public think with by affecting what they think
about. With the exception of voting for legislators, we
simply do not know very much about the interrelationship
between the party-state, the press and the ordinary
citizens' political identity. To develop this understanding
will require a deeper grasp of the role that the press plays
in each citizen's processing of political information. It
is a task for another day.
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